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Abstract
As a result of development pressures and water resource struggles, once rural,
spatially segregated coastal commercial fishing villages along the U.S. portion of the
Gulf of Mexico are increasingly tourist frontiers for elites and the emergent businesses
that cater to them. Over the course of the twentieth century, water events, from coastal
land loss to hurricane destruction to natural disaster, have fast-tracked development
projects that have allowed for the expansion of the tourism sector, and relaxed policies to
encourage bold new economic development initiatives that often put poor coastal
communities and their environment in jeopardy. This outcome is not universal across the
northern Gulf Coast, but contingent on a number of local factors overlooked in the
literature on coastal tourism and water policy development. This paper investigates the
local nuances that have emerged as responses to global and regional development
pressures by focusing on the ways in which local values and policy decisions have
influenced the spread of coastal urbanization. An intensive analysis will examine the
layered effects of changing land-use patterns and tourism growth pressures on three atrisk coastal communities in Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida, in the United States. This
paper will test the hypothesis that coastal communities affected by a similar set of
development pressures respond to these forces in different ways, depending on complex
local and regional variabilities. The paper’s focus is centered on Northern Gulf Coast
tourism growth patterns from post-World War II through 2018, and employs a mixed
method, multiple-sited case-study design.

Keywords
Gulf Coast; coastal communities; Bayou Petit Caillou; Chauvin; Cocodrie; Terrebonne
Parish; Biloxi; Back Bay; East Biloxi; Harrison County; Apalachicola; Franklin County;
cross-case analysis; policy; tourism; fishing; environment; casino gambling; economic
development; conflict; adaptation; Louisiana; Mississippi; Florida
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Preface
I had my laptop open, finishing this manuscript, on a recent evening flight from
Tampa to Pensacola, when I happened to look down and see the Florida Panhandle on
fire. From above, the orange streetlights hugged the shoreline, tiny soldiers in neat
formations of grids and semicircles, beads of light between sea and forest. I recognized
where I was in the faint pink of the setting sun: Apalachicola, a walkable “city” of less
than 3,000 whose charm I had fallen for more than twelve years before. The city was
breathtaking on this particular weekday night. There were no blue tarps covering roofs
caved in by Hurricane Michael, the Category 4 storm that had just made landfall near
Mexico Beach, breaking yet another record as the third most-intense hurricane to strike
the United States. You would never be able to see from above the misery and misfortune
felt below. It looked like the idyllic fishing community of postcards and Polaroids.
When I first visited Apalachicola, I had no idea I would one day live in its
vicinity, but I knew I would never be too far away. The Gulf Coast has been the place
I’ve called home since January 19, 2002, the day I changed my address from Trenton,
New Jersey to Thibodaux, Louisiana, and, six months later, to Houma, Louisiana, where I
lived until Hurricanes Katrina and Rita pushed me into the bowl of New Orleans. It’s
hard to say what drew me to relocate 1,319 miles away from my birth state. I had been a
full-time newspaper journalist since junior year of college. I covered the goings-on of a
suburban school district, a protest against sprawl, a summer theater program for innercity youth, and the closing of a factory before I was thrust onto the front lines of 9/11, a
22-year-old reporter with a new college degree who had just learned how to read a
budget. The experience of covering September 11th and its aftermath of anthrax attacks
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showed me who my neighbors were. The disaster made people afraid, suspicious, but it
also forced a human connection I hadn’t known existed.
I witnessed the same falling of the veil when I moved to Houma all those years
ago. It was the middle of the night during Tropical Storm Isidore and I’ll never forget
waking up to the moan of my neighbor. “Oh my goodness!” she wailed into the darkness,
standing by her doorstep, the water inches away. My mother and sister were visiting, and
they heard the cry too. We opened the door to my trailer home, just a few blocks from
Terrebonne General Medical Center, and my mother joined the nighttime chorus with her
less mannered, slightly Sopranos-sounding string of curses. The water was waist-deep
and rising. I remember trying to make sense of it, because my colleagues at The Courier
had just rolled their eyes in the newsroom the day before. The tropical storm in the
middle of the Gulf quickly spinning its way toward Houma? That’s nothing in a region
the National Geographic had just named a “hurricane hotspot” of America, a region that
just a few months before had placed its future into the hands of a massive hurricane
protection project called Morganza to the Gulf.
My house didn’t flood, but my neighbors’ did. We evacuated, my mother losing a
sock when she climbed onto the shoulders of the National Guardsman from the top step
of my stoop. Years later, I wrote a story about my rescuer, Armand Frickey, after a
roadside bomb killed him in Afghanistan in January 2005. He was 20 years old when he
died, meaning he had just turned 18 when he hoisted me onto his back and carried me to
the deuce-and-a-half. Our destination was the Houma-Terrebonne Civic Center, which
had transformed into an evacuation shelter in under two hours. Lucky for me, the Civic
Center was across the street from my newspaper office. Suddenly our evacuation took on
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a new dimension, and I began interviewing sockless, shivering survivors like us,
scribbling their stories on the back of my checkbook because I forgot to grab a notebook.
It was there, in the parking lot of the civic center, when I realized something was
peculiar, perhaps even remarkable, about the Gulf Coast. Here I was, thinking I had
escaped the disaster of 9/11, only to have disaster follow me to south Louisiana, straight
to the heart of a community whose very identify and meaning seemed to be shaped by
disaster. I interviewed people in the parking lot that morning who reminded me of family
members at an annual reunion. It could have been a wedding had it not been for the Red
Cross trucks. Community members told stories of Betsy, Camille, Juan, Andrew, then
raised an eyebrow about Isidore, a tropical storm whose 16 inches of rainfall set new
records.
One week later, after my mother and sister had returned to New Jersey, Hurricane
Lili struck just west of Houma. I learned we were on the “good side” of the storm, but the
one-two punch of Isidore and Lili was legendary enough that the entire newspaper staff
got a T-shirt, “I survived Isidore and Lili.” I had been in Louisiana for eight months.
Over the next seventeen years, I would experience fourteen more disasters, each
more familiar than the last, until, like the old-timers in the civic center parking lot, I, too,
was dropping knowledge to newcomers. Working and learning on the disaster front lines
of coastal Louisiana meant learning a new language and building a deep sensitivity to
local knowledge. The sociocultural and ethnic histories of the people of the Gulf Coast
are not easy to discern, as these pages will show. The experience of hurricanes can be
unifying in its seemingly location-blind path of destruction, but also discriminatory in its
aftermath of winners and losers.
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Each of my children was born in a hurricane, so to speak. My first hurricane baby,
Lorelei, was conceived in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and became part of the
infamous post-Katrina baby boom of infants who entered the world in 2006. From the
time she was born until the day we left New Orleans, my Katrina Baby was in fierce
competition with her 2006-ers, from pediatricians and child care centers to preschool,
ballet, and kindergarten.
My middle child, J.J., was five weeks old when we evacuated from New Orleans
to escape Hurricane Gustav. It was my fault we didn’t leave earlier; Gustav was my first
evacuation and I hated to leave the epicenter after so many years in its spin. It took
seventeen hours to get to Jackson, Mississippi, which had one room available for one
night. It took another twelve hours the next day to get to Auburn, Alabama, where we
stayed for two nights before traveling to Mobile and then Biloxi, where we rode out the
storm until Mayor Ray Nagin opened the city. We spent over $1,200 on that evacuation,
and it just about broke us. The experience sobered me. I no longer wanted to trade
disaster stories in the civic center parking lot.
My last hurricane baby, Maida, is the only child to be born during an actual
hurricane, a fact she wears well. Like most storms, Hurricane Isaac took everyone by
surprise. New Orleans didn’t flood, but the rain seemed to have no beginning and no end.
The entire city lost power, except for the French Quarter, where I walked for hours in the
heat before finally giving into the temptation of an air-conditioned hospital on generator
power. Maida was born on September 1, 2012, right around the time residents in flooded
St. John the Baptist Parish started connecting the dots, accusing high and dry New
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Orleans, with its ring of steel and earthen levees, of saving itself at the expense of its lowlying, less influential, rural, and unprotected neighbors.
I learned more about St. John’s story the following year, when I left my position
in development at Tulane University to work for a food bank whose coverage area
spanned the entire Louisiana Gulf Coast from Mississippi to Texas. As chief impact
officer, I was responsible for finding solutions to hunger within 23 parishes spread across
24,000 square miles. I thought I knew Louisiana well from my newspaper days, and later
from my on-the-ground investigations as a master’s and doctoral student, but my
experience at the food bank put me on the front lines of a different kind of Louisiana. I
encountered a bitter, entrenched, neglected, and hopeless kind of poverty that seemed to
endure forever. Working in this area from 2013-2017, I witnessed first-hand the
socioeconomic effects of 16,000 job layoffs, sparked by low crude prices and work
slowdowns throughout the oil industry. When nearly one of every five adults is no longer
working, in a community that is already ground zero for coastal erosion and sinking land,
issues I’d been studying for a long time, such as second home ownership and coastal
tourism development, became even more prescient.
In December 2016, my family moved from New Orleans to Pensacola, Florida, a
city whose three-hour radius includes my three beloved coastlines. Florida is three states
away from Louisiana, but it may as well be three continents; it is a different country, for
complex reasons I try to unpack in the following pages. The experience of commuting to
Louisiana but living in Florida helped bring authenticity to my dissertation. For a long
time, the edges of my manuscript had tapered edges. In trying to say so much, I feared I
was saying too little. The core of my argument crystallized during those long commutes
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from northwest Florida through the Mississippi Gulf Coast to the south-central Louisiana
bayous. I realized my research, combined with nearly two decades of lived experience,
had not only come full circle, but perhaps also benefited from time.
It is my greatest joy to be finishing this manuscript in January 2019, on the
seventeen-year anniversary of my journey from New Jersey to the Gulf Coast. Soon after
I moved to Louisiana, I bought a T-shirt at a tourist shop in Cocodrie that made me laugh
out loud. “London. Paris. Cocodrie,” it said. Not too long ago, I bought another T-shirt
from a downtown Pensacola artist. Reflecting my own journey across the Gulf Coast, the
shirt’s point of view was less tongue-in-cheek, more sobering, but just as spirited. Printed
atop a blue wave, it said, “I sold my soul to the Gulf of Mexico.”
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Chapter One: Understanding Gulf Coast Communities
Introduction
This dissertation draws upon three case studies of coastal development to provide
new insight into the U.S. Gulf Coast’s significance in the history of the U.S. Sunbelt and
American sun, sand, and sea tourism. As recently as seventy-five years ago, most coastal
communities along the northern Gulf of Mexico were considered wastelands—remote,
worthless, and culturally backward. It was not until the rise of tourism and the Sunbelt
economy in the 1960s and 1970s that coastal outposts from Brownsville, Texas, to Key
West, Florida, experienced rapid urbanization and economic change. Emerging tourism
networks extending to the Midwest and Northeast succeeded in transferring Gulf South
patterns of leisure and coastal recreation to the rest of the country. The case studies in this
research—Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana; Harrison County, Mississippi; and Franklin
County, Florida—represent typologies of how the Gulf South region became inextricably
linked to the Atlantic and Midwestern economies as tourism spread along America’s
“third coast” after World War II (Gramling and Laska, 2014: 226). Each case study offers
a lens into the dynamics of coastal change along America’s increasingly populated shores
at the beginning of the twenty-first century, illuminating the importance of local contexts,
patterns of transition, and urban networks. The Gulf Coast tourism experience contributes
to broader national debates and theories concerning coastal development, tourism
gentrification, and the globalization process.
Several factors have spurred the rapid conversion from working to recreational
waterfronts along the Gulf Coast. They include an increasing regional emphasis on
cultivating a broader economic base beyond commercial fishing; the growth of the
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coastal tourism industry; reconstruction surges following damaging coastal storms and
environmental disasters; the growth of consumerism, the service economy, and the
leisure class; and the globalization of the aquaculture industry, workplace, food
production, and marketing systems. This dissertation examines these factors while
investigating how other social, political, economic, and ecological changes have
influenced government planning, land use patterns, and policy making—and by extension
community values, attitudes, and interests in water, policy, and tourism expansion—in
three northern Gulf Coast fishing communities from the early twentieth century through
today.
The hypothesis guiding the research is that coastal communities affected by a
similar set of external tourism and growth pressures respond to these forces in different
ways that depend on a complex array of local and regional variabilities. These local
nuances often are oversimplified, overlooked or ignored in the literature. The celebration
and explanation of globalization masks the existence of regional variations in politicaleconomic and socioeconomic values and priorities that affect and influence local
decision-making. Research that emphasizes globalization also overlooks its profoundly
uneven effects at the local level, particularly within the context of coastal communities
experiencing rapid change. This dissertation questions how globalization comes into play
and interacts with national, regional, and local forces within the context of how water and
policy have shaped Gulf Coast maritime communities over the course of a century.
To test the hypothesis that urbanizing Gulf Coast towns and villages react in
dynamic, varied, locally-dependent ways to external development pressures and
ecological threats, this project employs a cross-case analysis of three coastal communities
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that represent typologies of coastal development across time and space. This particular
case study method allows for inductive and deductive analysis to compare and contrast a
range of local variabilities and to highlight major themes. The United States Government
Accountability Office (GAO) extensively uses case studies in their evaluations. GAO
defines case study as “a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a
comprehensive understanding of that instance obtained by extensive description and
analysis of that instance taken as a whole and in its context” (GAO, 1990, p. 15). This
study employs GAO’s exploratory case study methodology in an effort to discover
linkages and investigate causal relationships. The study will identify differences between
individual cases with a view of potentially generating a classificatory framework
(Gerring, 2004).1
Case studies allow for confirmatory (deductive) as well as explanatory (inductive)
findings (Hyde, 2000; Yin, 2009), can be based on single or multiple cases, and can
include qualitative or quantitative data (Gerring, 2004). They can be exploratory,
descriptive, or explanatory, and they have been described as the preferred research
method when “how” and “why” questions are posed, when the investigator has little
control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a reallife context (Yin, 2009, p. 9). According to Yin, “how” and “why” questions are better
answered through case studies as such questions “deal with operational links needing to
be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence” (Yin, 2009, p. 9). On the
other hand, surveys are more appropriate when answering questions like who, what,
where, how many, and how much (Dane, 2010). The northern Gulf Coast is a logical site
1

The GAO defines exploratory case studies as descriptive case studies aimed at generating hypotheses for
later investigation rather than for illustrating.
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for such close analysis because its history since the 1950s has been heavily shaped by the
interplay of economic changes, environmental threats, and tourism pressures. These
forces have been at the center of local political debates ever since, yet the area continues
to remain understudied, with such a scarcity of scholarship that, as Stanonis remarks in
his case study of African American Biloxi (2014, p. 9), “a meticulous reading of
newspapers was essential given the scarcity of scholarship about these communities.”
While they may “often depict a rosy image of their hometown, newspapers also identified
blighted areas and problems that hindered tourism” (Stanonis, 2014, p.9).

Methodology and Research Design
As commercial fishing loses its occupational appeal, pressures grow to transform
transitioning working waterfronts into tourist hubs, and the power balance shifts as elites
gain control of the coast. While this phenomenon is broadly understood, what is more
nuanced and less clear in the research literature is the specific coastal transformation
process and outcome varieties at the local level. To better grasp the local process of
change based on Gulf Coast tourism development patterns, the following research
questions emerge: (1) How are coastal communities experiencing economic transitions
caused by coastal tourism interests? (2) How are external development interests able to
influence local economic, political, social and environmental conditions to promote their
agendas? (3) What are the outcomes of these gentrification and development interests on
local coastal communities? (4) What is characteristic of fishing communities’ responses
to coastal land-use pressures that makes them different from other places?
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To answer these questions, this project employs a multiple case-study design
using primary qualitative and quantitative secondary data to chronicle the processes
affecting the transformation of rural coastal fishing communities into networked vacation
zones for tourists and investors. The case study approach will be instrumental to this
project because of its abilities to describe, illustrate and explore the scope of issues at
hand. These issues – globalization, coastal land use changes, hurricanes, population loss –
are affecting Gulf Coast communities in ways that have not been considered at a holistic,
political economic, qualitative and quantitative level. The explanatory case-study method,
which emphasizes the production of findings that generalize beyond the instance and
circumstances in which a study is conducted, is ideal for this project because of its ability
to explain the complex, layered, causal links in real-life interventions that are too detailed
for the survey or experimental strategies to uncover (Creswell, 1998; Yin, 1993, 1994,
2014).

Case Study Selection Process
My study was borne out of a desire to examine different and competing versions
of the coastal urbanization phenomenon within the context of the northern Gulf of
Mexico.In the first stage of my case study selection process, from 2006-2007, I embarked
on an exploratory search to establish the selection criteria. First, I considered the
geography of the Gulf Coast from Brownsville, Texas, to Key West, Florida, a geography
that according to my analysis spans 56 counties and parishes, a few large metropolitan
areas, hundreds of municipalities, five states and a 1,631-mile shoreline. The Gulf Coast
has experienced a population boom during the latter half of the twentieth century; from
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1970 to 2000, the population of coastal zone counties nearly doubled (Jordan and
Benson, 2013).
Using a multi-phase sampling process, I narrowed down the selection of the case
study communities from a maximum of 1,198 possibilities (the number of coastal ZIP
codes in the five-state Gulf Coast zone) to a sample size of 330 (the number of fishing
communities within these ZIP codes). I used the “fishing community” criteria identified
in 2006 by National Marine Fisheries Service social scientists based on the nature of each
community’s links with commercial and/or recreational fishing (“Fisheries” 2012, p. 63).
Another selection criterion in the first phase was annual landings revenue; on average, the
Gulf of Mexico accounted for 21% of U.S. annual landings revenue from 1997-2006. I
wanted at least one of the case study communities to be a port city with an economy that
actively contributed to this broader economic picture. In 2006, fourteen of the United
Statesʼs top fifty ports by landings revenue were located in the Gulf Coast region,
including Bayou La Batre, Alabama; Dulac-Chauvin, Empire-Venice, Golden MeadowLeeville, Intracoastal City, and Laffitte-Barataria, Louisiana; Brownsville, Port Isabel,
Port Arthur, Galveston, and Palacios, Texas; and Apalachicola, Fort Myers, Key West,
Tampa Bay, and St. Petersburg, Florida (“Fisheries” 2012, p. 63). Finally, in the first
stage, my search strategy included reviewing the literature in the five-state region to
determine not just context and history, but what additional contributions I should
consider in choosing my case studies. Early on, I decided to eliminate the Texas Gulf
Coast as a case study focus area, in part because of geographic and funding constraints,
and in part because the Texas coast has been the focus of intensive study for decades.

12

Instead, I chose to focus my research on a lesser studied, narrower section of the Gulf
Coast roughly between central Louisiana and the tip of the northwest Florida panhandle.
The second stage occurred between 2007-2009. During this phase, I followed up
on the references, citations, and indicators selected in the first stage and narrowed down
the sample size from 330 to approximately 100. The process of eliminating possible case
study sites in the second part of the selection process involved a deeper examination of
how Gulf Coast communities in the targeted zone have experienced coastal changes and
hurricane impacts during the bounded time frame of approximately forty years (late
1960s through 2009), coinciding with the population boom referenced earlier. The
screening process involved collecting sufficient data to decide whether a case met a set of
pre-established criteria, including data related to hurricane damages; population change;
experience with land use planning and coastal zoning; and commercial fishing revenues.
Because this project is focused on coastal gentrification pressures in rural, urban and
suburban settings, as aided by the presence of hurricanes and the growth of tourism and
recreational fishing, and the complex ways communities and their respective states have
reacted to natural disasters and development pressures, I narrowed down the candidate
cases from 100 to 14 in four states. I accomplished this using a typological approach to
identify communities to study. I placed the 100 coastal communities into three categories
using a framework identified by Steve Jacob, Michael Jepson, and Frank Farmer in their
2005 analysis in the journal Human Organization (p. 380):
1. Gulf Coast- gained commercial fishing employment
2. Gulf Coast-lost commercial fishing employment
3. Gulf Coast-neutral
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This categorization helped me assess whether fishing employment was growing,
declining, or holding steady in the time period of 1960 to 2018. Several communities
from each of the categories were chosen for intensive case study, with secondary data
analysis as well as site inspection used to select the communities for the in-depth study.
In early 2009, I visited seven communities in Mississippi, Alabama and Florida to gain
qualitative insight about each place; I did not visit the Louisiana communities during this
phase as I already had extensive knowledge of them. I felt that it was necessary to select
communities from different regions throughout the Gulf Coast in an attempt to capture
the diversity of how fishing has evolved into tourism in rural, urban, and suburban
settings. The case study sites were chosen on the following criteria: 1) maximizing
geographical distribution within the state of Florida; 2) maximizing variation in
population size; and 3) maximizing variation in economic structure
(recreational/commercial fishing).
After the site visits, and using this criteria from Jacob, Jepson, and Farmer, 2005),
I settled on four former or current commercial fishing communities in four Gulf Coast
states that, among them, had two port cities in common and represented an urban,
suburban, and rural typology of coastal development. One of the original four case study
sites, Orange Beach, Alabama was later abandoned due to time constraints.
I wanted a group of three cases across multiple states because I thought they
would add a diversity of experiences to the Gulf Coast story of change. Ethnically,
racially, culturally, economically, and socially different communities do not usually
respond to change in the same way, and in my mind Louisiana, Mississippi and northwest
Florida were quite different from each other. My developing theory during the second
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phase was that there are several responses to global coastal gentrification pressures, or a
typology of types, that can effectively capture the range of coastal community outcomes
along the northern Gulf of Mexico. According to Yin, in multi-case studies, each case
should be selected so that it either predicts similar results (literal replication), or predicts
contrasting results but for anticipatory reasons (theoretical replication). If multiple cases
lead to contradictory results, the preliminary theory should be revised and tested with
another set of cases (Yin, 2009). Both single and multiple-case designs can be either
holistic (one unit of analysis per case) or embedded (multiple units of analysis per case).
After conducting the two-phase case study selection process, I decided to use embedded
case study methodology as a means of integrating both the quantitative and qualitative
methods in which I was engaging into a single research study (Scholz and Tietje, 2002).
In this study, I embrace what Gotham and Faust (2019, n.p.) term an “encompassing
comparative approach to explain how local” responses to development pressures along
the Gulf Coast “reflect, share characteristics with, and contribute to broader
socioeconomic and political trends in the United States.” As Gotham and Faust write,
“encompassing comparison” is a term coined by Charles Tilly (1984, p. 83) to place
“different instances at various locations within the same system, on the way to explaining
their characteristics as a function of their varying relationships to the system as a whole.”
It is my hope that the identification of multiple units of analysis within each case
study chapter succeeds in providing a more detailed level of inquiry than if I had chosen a
single-case methodology. In my research, the primary unit of analysis is current or former
coastal fishing communities, as defined by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006. There are three subunits of analysis, all of
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which emerged during the fieldwork phase of the research project that began in 2009.
These include: (1) market, housing, demographic, and other archival indicators of Gulf
Coast hurricane damages and impacts since the 1960s; (2) tourism and real estate
infrastructure advancements over the approximate one hundred-year timeframe; and (3)
the evolution of external fisheries pressures, including the implementation of regional and
federal fishing quotas, land use changes, and other related state and regional policies as
well as global factors such as price competition and industry consolidation. The time
boundaries of the case span the beginning of the twentieth century through the end of
2018.
Within the cross-case analysis itself, I use a theoretical replication strategy in an
attempt to identify consistent patterns of change and to uncover new and/or divergent
themes within the three typologies. While most case study research focuses on a single
case, often chosen because of its unique characteristics, the multiple-case study design
aims for replication. The question here is whether it is possible to compare and contrast
common factors resulting in different outcomes. I am hypothesizing that, in my study, a
case study of three communities can effectively capture many of the varied outcomes of
coastal community change related to tourism growth and post-disaster reconstruction
within the context of U.S. coastal regions and, perhaps, other similarly developed
shorelines, such as Australia. The hypothesis, if true, could generate the possibility of
replication by using these cases to develop a richer theoretical framework that builds on
coastal tourism and globalization models as well as disaster trajectories and geopolitical
scenarios. The hypothesis then, questions whether the theoretical framework in this
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chapter, and the cross-case analysis in Chapter Five, together can provide a vehicle for
generalizing to new cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008; Yin, 2014).
Four substantive research questions frame the study’s inquiry at the multiple-case
study level. The questions support the case-study approach, which depends on examining
year after year of official statistical reports over decades to show patterns rather than
collecting and analyzing numbers for a year or two. The multiple sources of data allow us
to see patterns over time, widening the coverage not only in space beyond a small
community but also in time beyond the narrow slice of time a researcher can observe.
The questions are listed in Appendix D, followed by a list of sources of evidence. In
general, the documents that form the basis of this chronicle of Gulf Coast economic
change include letters, pamphlets, newspaper stories, Census documents, government
documents, maps, workplace studies, investigative reports, survey data, organizational
records, and memoirs.
Finally, a brief note is needed on data collection and analysis methods. As stated,
the multiple-case study design demands a rigorous approach to collecting and analyzing
data. Evidence from the case studies in this dissertation primarily comes from six highly
complementary sources: archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant
observation, and physical artifacts. Document collection, field work, and analysis were
completed in several phases over the course of nearly 13 years. During the exploratory
phase, I finalized the communities to be studied and collected and analyzed preliminary
data. This data includes, but is not limited to, documentary information such as
administrative documents, newspaper and other media articles, and formal studies or
evaluations of the same “sites” under study; archival records such as maps and charts of
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the geographical characteristics of each place; survey data such as census records; and
data previously collected about each site.
In the second phase of the fieldwork, which occurred on and off for a decade,
long-form interviews were conducted with key respondents and informants, and a series
of direct observations occurred at each site. The foremost goal during this period was
data collection, with more data collected during each site visit or observation and the
scheduling of people to interview. Beyond gathering archival materials, the major task in
data collection for this project was gaining access to key organizations and interviewees.
Interviews were an essential source of information for several reasons. The subject matter
demands insights that in some cases only insiders can provide. Because of the depth of
material under review, interviews also helped provide shortcuts to the prior history of a
situation, helped identify other relevant sources of evidence and other players to
interview. All interview data was corroborated with information from other sources.
Altogether, I conducted sixty-four semi-structured, focused interviews, or about
20 for each in of the communities selected in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida. About
half the interviews were with locals – residents or former residents of each community,
local real estate brokers, local developers – and the other half were with non-resident
recreation fishers, tourists and/or second home owners and outside experts. The purpose
of these interviews is to develop a holistic, thorough understanding of the schemas and
cultural models being used by area residents and tourists to influence their decisions to
live, abandon, invest and/or recreate in vulnerable Gulf Coast communities. All
interviews were digitally recorded, downloaded to a computer and saved on a remote
hard drive, then transcribed and coded.

18

Direct observations were conducted periodically throughout the duration of nearly
five years of field work. During this period, I spent the equivalent of one year working
full-time collecting field data, interviewing and observing. Together these interviews and
observational data provide the means to assess the micro and macro dimensions of the
coastal urbanization processes in relation to storm and environmental damages, with the
result of being able to identify the roles disasters, developers, local, regional and state
governments, and the real estate industry each play in the coastal gentrification process.
Lastly, the analysis occurred in two phases. From 2008-2010, the analysis
included interpretations of results through the first decade of the twenty-first century.
These results were presented in reports as required in the stipulations of a research grant
from the RAND Gulf States Policy Institute, which funded the field work. A pause in the
dissertation required a second phase of analysis to include coastal community changes
and events from 2010-2018.
The case study analysis has grown richer and more informed as a result of this second
phase. While the gap in the research work plan was unintended, in the end I would argue
that it benefitted the dissertation project. It not only helped clarify and condense the
material, but also to build a better explanation of how each case, as a typology of coastal
development, fits into the larger argument of coastal change along the northern Gulf
Coast during a tumultuous time in its human history.
The three typologies chosen for this study include a gentrified coast of gated
communities amid the oilfields of south Louisiana’s “sportsman’s paradise” (Terrebonne
Parish, Louisiana); an historic Florida Panhandle fishing village with some nature-based
ecotourism along an ecologically threatened working waterfront (Franklin County,
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Florida); and a full-blown, urban beach resort town that epitomizes global capital flows in
the gambling economy (Harrison County, Mississippi). The research draws upon these
three case studies to understand the web of factors that have influenced coastal
urbanization, real estate development, and what might be called tourism gentrification
since the early twentieth century. While Cocodrie, a fishing mecca in lower Terrebonne
Parish, Louisiana, identifies as a sportfishing mega-village today, as early as twenty-five
years ago commercial shrimpers, crabbers, and oyster harvesters still dominated the
landscape. In Franklin County, Florida, Apalachicola is among the last working
waterfronts on Florida’s Gulf Coast, but the 2012 collapse of the town’s historic oyster
industry and the 2018 direct hit of Hurricane Michael symbolize the fragility of its bay to
external growth pressures in metropolitan Atlanta and the agricultural powerhouse of
southwest Georgia. Marking the halfway point between Louisiana’s commercial coast
and the Florida Panhandle is the casino capital of the Deep South: Harrison County,
Mississippi, where the county seat of Biloxi is home to a near-extinct shrimp and oyster
fishing fleet, a hub of Mississippi’s seafood industry before gambling became legal in
1992.
The cross-case analysis of these sites in Chapter Five will account for the effects
of practices and pressures to change state regulation; alter land uses; and adjust zoning
policy to control the flow of water and accommodate the spread of tourism, and how
local communities have responded to these forces over time. The analysis will compare
local responses to external development pressures, and open the way for theoretical
replicability of the change model proposed. In more detail, the case studies and their
typologies are summarized in Figure 1.1 below.
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Typology 1: Bayou Petit Caillou, Louisiana
The first prototypical response is marked by the near-complete absence, removal
or relocation of the formerly dominant industry of commercial fishing; in its place,
though, is not a new economy of resort tourism but the economic domination of the
recreational fishing tourism industry. The ideal type of a commercial fishing community
that has been almost completely overtaken by recreational sports fishers and recreational
tourism is Cocodrie,2 Louisiana which tourism boosters call the sports fishing capital of
Louisiana and the Gulf Coast. Located at the southernmost point of Bayou Petit Caillou
(or Bayou Little Caillou), Cocodrie is home to thousands of recreational second-home
camps on sinking land where cattle grazed at the turn of the early twentieth century. The
meandering waterway of Bayou Petit Caillou is one of five bayous extending like an
2

The name “Cocodrie” is an alternate spelling of the Old French word “cocodril,” which means
“crocodile.” The word “Cocodrie” was also the nickname for the “unmixed black man, who lighted ‘les
belles Milatraisses’ through the dark, muddy waters, by the rays of his hand lantern, but was not allowed to
go further than the door of the hall,” according to New Orleans writer Rosalie M. Jonas (1911).
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outstretched hand down the spine of Terrebonne Parish, situated about an hour southwest
of New Orleans. Bayou Petit Caillou contains two communities, Cocodrie and Chauvin.
Cocodrie is a sports fishing mega-community that was once dominated by commercial
shrimpers, crabbers and oyster harvesters, who now operate out of Chauvin, a marsh
community ten miles north.
In 2016, my analysis shows that Cocodrie was home to more than 1,425 secondhome recreational fishing camps and more than sixty-four charter boat operators.
Tourism boosters began marketing the unincorporated town as the “sports fishing capital
of the southern United States” in 2002. Since then, Cocodrie has been flooded more than
ten times, according to interviews, newspaper reports, and Federal Emergency
Management Agency records. In the disaster decade between 2002 and 2012, each
succeeding storm sent unprecedented amounts of floodwaters into the upstream
commercial fishing community of Chauvin. Like the rest of Terrebonne Parish, both
marsh communities lack hurricane protection levees and suffer from economic
outmigration, population loss, and extreme wetland loss, the natural buffer against storm
surge.

Typology 2: Biloxi, Mississippi
The second prototypical response is the near-complete absence, removal or
relocation of the formerly dominant industry of commercial fishing; in its place is a new
economy based almost exclusively on coastal tourism, involving growth in real-estate
interests and sweeping changes in planning and land use regulations. The ideal type of a
commercial fishing community that has transformed into a densely developed resort
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mecca as a result of hurricane destruction and declining market conditions, tourism
interests, and a rise in recreational fishing is Biloxi, Mississippi and the nearby section of
the Alabama coast known locally as the Cajun Bahamas or the Redneck Riviera, a term
that applies to a larger region of the coast from Mobile, Alabama to Apalachicola,
Florida. While city elites in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina rebuilt the Back Bay of
Biloxi, long a working waterfront, into a “seafood village” that combines berthing space
for the commercial fishing fleet and commercial processing with seafood restaurants and
retail outlets, the expansion of casino gambling continues to encroach on Biloxi’s nowtiny, mostly part-time commercial fishing industry.
The Back Bay of Biloxi Bay is home to a tiny fishing community, but it once bore
the title of seafood capital of the world. In the two decades before Hurricane Katrina,
Back Bay shrimpers and seafood factories were experiencing drastic changes due to the
spread of gambling casinos following legalization in the early 1990s and an influx of
people and capital. Like Bayou Petit Caillou and Apalachicola, Biloxi Bay was most
recently affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in
2010; rebuilding plans after each crisis or disaster event have diminished the commercial
fishing industry and welcomed the spread of casino-based tourism, encouraging hotels,
restaurants and shops to seize or take over traditional working waterfronts.

Typology 3: Apalachicola, Florida
The third response is a commercial fishing community that has remained
relatively intact despite development pressures and hurricane-related destruction; it has
managed to resist, for the most part, the influences of tourism and recreational fishing and
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sustain its commercial fleet, but it is uncertain how long that resistance to change can be
maintained. The ideal type is Apalachicola Bay, Florida, which is home to an endangered
commercial fishing community that is showing signs of eroding due to environmental,
economic, regulatory, social, and political factors. While recent legislation in Florida
encourages coastal communities to alter their development rules to preserve recreational
and commercial waterfront land, commercial fishing in Apalachicola Bay is threatened
by environmental forces outside its control. Unprecedented attention is currently being
given to the status of oyster resources in Apalachicola Bay because this fishery has
become central to the decision making related to multistate water disputes in the
southeastern United States, as well as millions of dollars in funding for restoration
programs related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the world’s largest accidental oil
spill.
Home to an historic commercial fishing community and one of the most
productive estuaries in Florida, the Apalachicola Bay area yielded 90 percent of the
oysters consumed in Florida and 10 percent consumed nationally before the ecological
collapse of the Apalachicola oyster industry in 2012 that continues to this day. While the
origins of the oyster collapse can be found upstream, its causes also are a byproduct of a
thirty-year geopolitical “water war” between Georgia, Alabama and Florida.
Apalachicola was a Hitchitee community that was considered the capital of the Creek
Nation during the seventeenth and eighteenth century in the southeastern United States.
Now the endangered traditional coastal fishing community is among the last working
waterfronts on Florida’s Gulf Coast. Prior to the most recent oyster collapse,
Apalachicola was severely affected by Hurricane Elena in 1985, Hurricane Ivan in 2004,
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and Hurricane Dennis in 2005. The bay area also suffers from a number of development
and environmental pressures due to metropolitan Atlanta sprawl and a string of recordbreaking U.S. Southeast water shortages.

Theoretical Framework
The Gulf Coast is understudied in the literature, yet it contains a rich history of
interaction with the outside world and a long history of extraction of natural resources. Its
post-World War II trajectory has been heavily shaped by the interplay of politicaleconomic changes, global forces, tourism pressures, and steady drumbeat of natural and
manmade disasters. These forces have been at the center of planning debates in Bayou
Petit Caillou, Biloxi and Apalachicola for more than seventy five years, but little is
known about them. I suggest that this gap has been caused, in part, by the tendency of
existing research to focus on highly developed urban and coastal areas, where awareness
of, and vulnerability to, impacts such as hurricane disasters and climate change are
highest, and thus where more active support for local policy to address these issues may
exist. Far less research has investigated planning in locations with larger numbers of
smaller communities and fewer central urban locations, such as the sections of the Gulf
Coast that frame this study. Although people live locally, their economic fates are not
simply local peculiarities or solely of local interest. People are part of an intricate web of
transformations. This is important to understanding the understudied Gulf Coast as it
continues to shift from an agricultural, extraction economy to a service economy
dependent on attracting new wealth to a region long “mired in poverty” (Stanonis, 2014,
p. 16).
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Since the 1950s, economic census and fisheries data show a rapid growth in Gulf
Coast tourism in volume and value. During the same timeframe, the northern Gulf Coast
has been hit by more than three dozen hurricanes or floods, the number one source of
disaster loss and damage worldwide. Further, the role of the state in permitting the
expansion of Gulf of Mexico petroleum and natural gas industries cannot be
overemphasized in the context of the region’s overall political-historical-ecological
footprint. In 2016, federal Gulf of Mexico offshore leases accounted for 23 percent of
U.S. crude oil production; the region is home to more than 40 percent of the country’s
petroleum refining capacity and 30% of its natural gas processing plant capacity. As the
case study chapters will show, oil and gas development began in Texas and Louisiana in
the 1930s before moving east to include Mississippi by the 1970s and Alabama by the
1980s, with Florida thus far largely “not involved with” the phenomenon of Gulf Coast
petroleum industry expansion (Abbott-Jamieson, 2015, p. 1), a finding that will be
explored more in depth in Chapter Three.
The intersection between tourism growth, oil and gas development, the role of the
state, and water policy is not insignificant. Polluted estuaries, along with damaging
floods, droughts and storms, pave the way for fast-tracked reconstruction projects that
allow for the expansion of the tourism sector and policies, at both the local and state
level, that encourage new economic development initiatives. As a result of these and
other forces, once isolated, peripheral, and spatially segregated commercial fishing
villages in coastal waterfront areas along the Gulf Coast are becoming near-total touristic
frontiers for professional elites and the emergent businesses that cater to them. As
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damages from tristate “water wars”3 and environmental disasters have multiplied, the
commercial fisheries that have historically been at the center of coastal maritime
economies have been crushed. The situation is neither unique to the Gulf Coast, nor to
the United States. Over the past few decades, commercial fisheries in industrialized
countries around the world have lost social, political, and economic importance as
recreational fishing, coastal tourism, and aquaculture have grown in economic might and
political clout. The literature on coastal gentrification and tourism, while emergent, is
clear in its struggle to understand the pronounced spatial dichotomies that exist in most
coastal areas around the world between lucrative tourist centers and the struggling,
underprivileged margins surrounding tourism centers (Agarwal, 2005; Lopez-Lopez et
al., 2006; León, 2007; Manuel-Navarette, 2016). Tourism research is also rich in analysis
of interpersonal conflicts and social values conflicts between visitors and locals (Graefe
and Thapa, 2004; Vaske et al., 2007; Nelson and Matthews, 2018).
However, the motivation for this research is the paucity of empirical
investigations analyzing how the tensions between the state, industry, and community
manifest themselves over time into a changed landscape. To date few studies have shed
insight on the interplay between political, economic, social, environmental, and global
factors and policies that give rise to the distinct coastal tourist landscapes we see along
the northern Gulf of Mexico. There is likewise scant research on the consequences of
Gulf Coast tourism growth on host communities located outside of major cities (Gotham,
2005, 2007), where water struggles and private-property damages are inspiring new

3

The term “water wars” was coined by law school student Robert E. Vest in 1993 (p. 689). The term is
used here to describe water conflicts both between and within Gulf Coast states, communities, and groups
over access to both freshwater and saltwater resources. The specific example of Apalachicola, Florida’s
three-decades-long “water war” with Alabama and Georgia is the subject of Chapter 3.
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policies that allow for more flexible tourist and private-market real estate developments
that remove or relocate lower income-producing, full-time homes from the picture (Klein,
2007; Freudenberg et al., 2007; Collins, 2012).
Only through further investigation is it possible for the northern Gulf Coast local
experience to contribute to international conceptual debates and theories concerning
coastal gentrification, tourism urbanization, and water resource policy, politics and
planning. A number of local factors that often go unnoticed in the literature on
gentrification, tourism, and environmental policy have affected each case study
community’s response to external development pressures.
Local power influences the scale and spread of economic and infrastructure
improvements, until that power is usurped by the power of the state as well as other
external forces no longer within local control. Critical social theorists studying the
current wave of globalization have labeled this increase in local variabilities and
fragmentation in the face of external pressures “glocal” (global-local). In strictly
economic terms, glocalization can mean minute changes in global products for a
particular local market (e.g., McDonald’s selling lobster rolls on the Atlantic coast of
North America or Maharaja Macs in India), or the selling of local products on a global
basis through e-commerce. In broader sociological terms, it signifies “the simultaneity—
the co-presence—of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies’’ (Robertson,
1997, p. 16). In the context of community development within the Gulf Coast, the
“glocal” term places the emphasis firmly on the ability of local communities to co-opt the
worst ravages of globalization, or external development pressures, economically,
culturally, and ecologically. This research will question how globalization and
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glocalization come into play, for how long, and how they interact with national, regional,
state, and local forces driving the Gulf Coast economy.
Many aspects of the cultural and environmental plight of Gulf Coast cities, towns
and villages are well researched by historians, anthropologists, geographers, sociologists,
and environmental scientists. There is rich historical and ethnographic data on the
region’s Cajun, Creole, American Indian, Islenos, and African-American people that
emphasizes their communities’ resiliency and vulnerability. Likewise there is in-depth
physical science data on the Gulf Coast’s susceptibility to flooding, climate change,
storms, storm impacts on coastal environmental ecosystems, habitat degradation resulting
from wetlands deterioration, and the loss of barrier islands. What is less explored in
previous research is process and power: the specific ways in which change happens, and
the dynamics of who gets to decide the place and pace of change, particularly within
those populated regions of the Florida Panhandle, coastal Mississippi, and the floodprone bayous of Louisiana that have experienced disproportionately higher threats from
water, and that have borne a disproportionate brunt of manmade and environmental
disasters, including extremely costly storms, oil spills, harmful algal blooms, coastal
erosion, and land subsidence, than the rest of the coastal United States in recent years
(Dillard, 2015).
By synthesizing a voluminous set of archival, primary, and secondary data, I tell a
story of power, privilege and politics along America’s Forgotten Coast. The story is
fraught with political, economic, race and class tensions that have taken on a different
tone and character through the postwar decades but are not yet close to being resolved.
What follows is an attempt to untangle the complex webs of change facing Gulf Coast
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communities in ways that illuminate the importance of local contexts, regional forces,
power dynamics and patterns of transition. This dissertation explores each case study in
Chapters Two, Three and Four.
The remainder of this introduction establishes an overarching theoretical
framework to contextualize and understand the role of local, state and global spheres of
interaction within processes of coastal urbanization, gentrification, water policy, and
collective decision-making processes. These multiple levels of reality are in constant
tension, reflecting the lived experiences of Gulf Coast residents as players on a broader
state, regional, and even global stage. Throughout the case study chapters, findings will
be analyzed from sixty-two semi-structured interviews, demographic and economic
statistics, direct and indirect observations, and archival research conducted from 2005 to
2018 in each of the three case-study sites. Findings from the data are presented to
highlight the local and regional structural frameworks and conditions affecting coastal
change during the twentieth and into the early part of the twenty-first century. The
conclusion assesses the relevance of the empirical findings in light of the literature
presented; considers issues for future studies of coastal change; and expresses hope that
the sometimes traumatic struggles of the past sixty years can be leveraged to galvanize
communities to press for an invigorated, sustainable, and locally centered Gulf Coast
economy.
Taken together, the three case studies offer a new lens into the dynamics of
development along America’s increasingly populated Gulf Coast shores at the turn of the
twenty-first century. Building an understanding of coastal change is an interdisciplinary
endeavor. I include a holistic examination of the interacting factors—global, national,
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regional, state, local, and personal—that define the political economy of place-based
coastal development and conflict (Trouillot, 2003; Baxter and Mann, 1992; Fainstein and
Fainstein, 1983; Wolf, 1982). As Lucy Lippard (1997) explained in her sensitive
exploration of “the lure of the local,” it is inevitable to conflate place and community.
They are intricately bound together: “Like the places they inhabit, communities are
bumpily layered and mixed, exposing hybrid stories that cannot be seen in a linear
fashion, aside from those ‘preserved’ examples which usually stereotype and
oversimplify the past” (24).
Given the depth and breadth of the case study material, a framework is useful to
synthesize the implications of each chapter for the research model. The themes and
patterns, how they link to each other, and how they connect to the theories framed below
will be expanded upon in Chapter Five’s cross-case analysis. For the purposes of the
theoretical review, findings from the three cases can be categorized into several
overarching explanations:
1. The role of the state, with specific attention to the impacts of federal, state and
interstate political economy and equity in resource allocation decisions. Within
this context is an examination of the capacity of business and industry, tourism,
and other pro-development interests to influence the agenda
2. Coastal gentrification and urbanization in terms of resources and willingness to
protect or preserve natural resource-dependent economies, including commercial
fishing and coastal tourism
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3. Disaster theory and the geopolitical economies of reconstruction following natural
and manmade crises, particularly Gulf Coast hurricanes
4. The capacities of coastal communities to emerge from adversity

1. The Role of the State
The drive between Bayou Petit Caillou, Louisiana and Apalachicola, Florida is a
near-perfect semicircle spanning 469 miles around Interstate 10. By car, the eight-hour
journey crosses ten estuaries and four state borders. Driving through each state, one
encounters a particular landscape - bayou, manmade beachfront, white-sand shore - that
is not natural, but that has been intentionally shaped by a maze of policing and
authorizing agencies that, over the course of two centuries, have either heavily regulated
or deeply ignored the development and defense of the coastal zone. The layers of
decision-making that govern management of the coastal zone can be characterized by the
existence or disappearance of policies, regulatory requirements, and capabilities of
various agencies, depending upon the context and scale of the decision, as well as which
state one is in. Across the Gulf Coast, the many agencies involved in coastal governance
“have mandates that can be complementary, overlapping, or conflicting” (Jordan and
Benson, 2013, p. 4689).
Within the case study states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida, unraveling the
tensions between, on the one hand, state-centered governance from the capitals of Baton
Rouge, Jackson, and Tallahassee and, on the other hand, local self-governance, local
decision-making, and cross-sector collective action is essential to illustrating the issues
that both unify and distinguish each empirically grounded case study chapter, particularly
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through the lens of the Gulf Coast as “an environment of risk” (Nichter, 2008). While
each case study provides a diversity of situations that are at times idiosyncratic, I argue
the cases share a similar reliance on their respective state to provide the technical and
financial resources to strengthen local capacity to govern the coast. That is, I am arguing
that we need to understand each state’s particular coastal policymaking decisions -- how
state policies, laws, and regulations shape access to and use of the coast -- in order to
understand how, as François Molle, Elena López-Gunn, and Frank van Steenbergen write
in their 2018 account of global groundwater overexploitation, “local actors ignore,
circumvent, deflect, appropriate, cope with or adjust to state policies” (p. 448). While not
all states are the same, they do tend to “underperform” in their regulation attempts at the
local level for a variety of reasons, including lack of technical knowledge, lack of
financial and human resources to monitor and control illegal activity, a plethora of legal
challenges, the interests of “economically powerful and politically connected users,” and
“a reluctance to face the political cost of antagonizing” certain constituencies such as
rural stakeholders (p. 450). In all cases “where governance is centred on the state its
regulation and enforcement are found to be lax” (p. 450). I argue that within the Gulf
Coast exists a similar relationship between what happens at the state policymaking level
and how outcomes play out at the local level. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida are
states with dynamic histories, compositions, forms of capital, social structures, and
capacities, all of which play into local responses and the social dynamics resulting from
state policies and their implementation (or resistance).
In terms of protecting or preserving the coast, the remainder of this section
explores the conditions that shape the state’s role (e.g., pro-environmental statewide
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policy adoption, as we see in Florida) and the local factors that may help some coastal
communities implement programs and policies that specifically target local concerns,
external to the state, at the same time the vast majority of local and regional governments
are unable, or unwilling, to do so. I expand on this argument by first orienting it in
literature and relevant scholarly debates. Specifically, I explore the role of the state and
state-local relations in shaping both coastal policy and on-the-ground local outcomes as
they relate to complex interrelationships between environment and
social/political/economic contexts. Following this discussion, I provide more detailed
accounts of three policies, one from each state, that frame the center of this research.
Uneven outcomes and the state’s role in promoting or limiting economic
development have long fascinated scholars. Bourdieu’s (1985) field theory has been used
to explain a range of social processes from organizational change to the emergence of
think tanks, yet has only recently been applied to studies of the state that are attempting
to understand broader environmental factors that structure alliances between groups,
according to Steinmetz (2017) as cited in McPike (2017). According to Evans (1997),
“state-society synergy can be a catalyst for development” (p. 178), while social groups
who are able to participate, take action and “co-produce” with the state are often more
effective in getting the outcomes they seek (Migdal (2001). In Thinking like a State,
James Scott (1998) argues that one of the first tasks of the modern state was “the
administrative ordering of nature and society,” i.e., to structure its environment and to
characterize and count characteristics of the environment (e.g., to count people, trees, and
property values). The creation of land-use maps based on surveys creates what Scott calls
“legibility,” i.e., enabling the state to “read” the environment, whether natural or urban
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(pgs. 44, 50-51). Scott discusses another characteristic of states attempting to impose
modernity: an ideology of “high modernism.” This is an unbounded confidence in the
ability of science and technology to produce progress toward a well-ordered, rational,
better world. A key aspect of high modernism is the belief that if a place looks wellordered, it must function better. Scott links high modernist ideology to twentieth century
urban renewal. He is particularly critical of famed city planner Le Corbusier, who
proposed the complete replacement of large sections of cities with his geometrically
simple, orderly designs in which millions of people would live. While Le Corbusier was
never able to complete any of his extravagant designs, his ideas were tremendously
influential in the city planning community. Urban redevelopment efforts that stressed the
removal of disorder and its replacement with modernist “superblocks” became standard
practice in American cities, including in downtown East Biloxi, from the 1930s through
the 1970s (Scott, 1998, p. 104-117).
A disconnect exists between Scott’s (1998) “high modernist” policies and actual
outcomes along the Gulf Coast. The tension provides an opportunity to gain insight on
the challenges that emerge with local implementation. When coasts urbanize, the regimes
of federal, state, regional, and local governments are in full force. They use infrastructure,
investment schemes, and other initiatives in the name of economic development and in
line with seminal studies of the city as an urban growth machine (Molotch, 1976). Just as
they are the forces most likely to resist globalization pressures when voters become
mobilized, local and state governments also are inclined to cater to the tourism and
development industries, particularly following moments of crisis. Absent local resistance,
or even local presence as disasters disperse full-time residents, officials eager to attract
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growth and expand tax revenues jump on the tourism bandwagon with ever-morepermissive planning, zoning, and land use regulations. As Molotch analyzed fifty years
ago, a common desire for growth pervades nearly all local activities: beyond the
straightforward logic of economics, the pursuit of growth shapes the political system as
well as the work of locally dependent socio-cultural organizations such as museums,
foundations, media companies, and sports teams (Molotch, 1976; Sant and Simons, 1993;
Charlier and Bologa, 2003; Klein et al., 2004; Davenport and Davenport, 2006).
Examining how Bayou Petit Caillou, Biloxi and Apalaciahola are governed and
the ways in which policies shape particular forms of governance is of central importance
to my research. The issue of “who governs” and to what effect is driven primarily by the
ways in which diverse groups of actors organize themselves around use value (land
value) and exchange value (cultural, historic and symbolic value) (Logan and Molotch,
2007). The urban growth machine’s success is often tied to the existence of an effective
state apparatus that can coordinate an agenda with a diverse network of use- and
exchange-value actors, bringing value and benefit to both. The dichotomy between
landscapes of economic production and landscapes of consumption becomes more
pronounced when this relationship is lacking (Mullins, 1994; Dredge, 2001).
The political-economy approach helps make sense of how societal influences
have changed government planning and policy making, even infrastructure development,
thereby influencing community values, attitudes and interests in tourism. But as historical
ecologists such as William Balée make clear, such changes cannot be viewed in isolation
from a historical framework that considers, in great detail, local contexts: the how and the
why that shape our understanding of the ways people choose to manipulate their
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environments within the constraints of state policy and regulation. There is also a
difference when the industry in question is tourism, whose economy depends on
designing or manufacturing near-seamless landscapes of production and consumption,
and when the geography in question is the coast. In their far-reaching study of Gulf Coast
ecosystems, Jordan and Benson (2013) observe that “the policy environment of the Gulf
Coast is rooted in the federal-state-local government hierarchy,” with some overlap
occurring at the intermediate governance layer through multi-county/parish or regional
partnerships such as planning councils and estuary programs (p. 4695). While localities
“are at the bottom of the governance hierarchy,” they are “ultimately responsible for vast
numbers of decisions that affect the environment and contribute positively or negatively
to sustainability” (p. 4694). These decisions include land planning and permitting,
infrastructure development, water and waste management, maintenance of seaports, and
many other activities affecting coastal resources. It is notable in this context that
Louisiana has delegated its coastal zone management program to coastal parishes (Jordan
and Benson, 2013).
Three state-centered policy cases and their trickle-down implementation to the
study communities frame the remainder of this section. First is the Morganza-to-the-Gulf
levee protection system in south Louisiana. The lower bayou communities of southcentral Louisiana share a complex system of federal, state and parish/community levees
(sometimes called “storm levees” or “drainage levees”) that provide varying levels of
protection. Levees, and the policies associated with their construction, generate confusion
regarding the locus of responsibility for levee construction and community protection, as
a number of these structures were built under the jurisdiction of parish levee districts, yet

37

supervision and standards extend all the way up to federal levels (e.g. The Army Corps of
Engineers). The complexity of levee authority and control is illustrated by the Morganza
to the Gulf levee project, which is designed to provide comprehensive protection to a
number of communities along the Gulf Coast, “but is cobbled together from a number of
newly proposed and existing community levees” (McMahan, 2014, p. 143)
Morganza-to-the-Gulf, chronicled in Chapter Two, is a federal, state, and locally
funded attempt to bring a more standardized approach to coastal levee protection by
aligning a 98-mile stretch of “grass-covered earthen levees, 22 floodgates on navigable
waterways, 23 environmental water control structures, nine road gates and fronting
protection for four existing pump stations” (“Morganza,” 2015, p. 1). Morganza was
authorized in the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 based on 2002 and 2003
reports. In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Army Corps of Engineers altered
its design for Morganza to include higher levees and improved guidelines for soil testing,
all of which drove up project costs more than 20 percent higher than the costs authorized
in 2007. Morganza was reauthorized in 2014, but excluded five communities from its
protective enclosure (Lovett, 2017), including Isle de Jean Charles, thereby either
ensuring its eventual disappearance or justifying the $48 million cost of relocating its
“climate refugees” (Maldonado, 2014; Finnegan, 2018, p. 1). Further, recent criticisms of
Morganza and Louisiana’s larger $50 billion, fifty-year Master Plan for a Sustainable
Coast call into question the state’s current approach to its shrinking shoreline, which
“rationalized the very practices sinking it. The Working Coast reifies the state’s fragile
marshlands through metrics that can only be realized through continued extraction”
(Randolph, 2018, p. 1-2). The politics of authority, responsibility, and control quickly
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blur when the “risks posed by global climate change continue to mount,” writes
Louisiana legal scholar John Lovett (2017, p. 25). Another case study analysis of the
Louisiana Gulf Coast is blunter: “the challenges to sustainability are so great that even
the most effective policies may not suffice” (Jordan and Benson, 2013, p. 4699).
One state away in Mississippi, the rise of state-sponsored gambling and the
process of choosing casinos over other forms of gambling enable us to understand the
broader political economy of a Deep South state that is known today as the “Las Vegas of
the South.” Writing when Mississippi lawmakers legalized gambling, Dombrink and
Thompson (1990, p. 8) named several factors that influence whether a state will allow
casinos to operate legally. These include (1) “political environment” factors such as the
economy and the state’s prior experience with gambling; (2) “political elite and active
interest” factors, including business and public officials’ opinions on casinos; (3)
“campaign sponsorship” factors, such as the credibility and financial commitment of
casino proponents; and (4) “campaign issue dominance” indicators, which gets at how
successful casino boosters are in reframing gambling expansion away from crime and
morality toward economic development. Dombrink and Thompson’s study concludes
with an observation that if one of the four factors exists in opposition to a casino bid, the
measure will fail.
Nelson and Mason (2003-2004) disagree with the Dombrink-Thompson Model as
a cut-and-dry interpretation without applicability to the politics of gambling in the South.
Mississippi became a “lottery state” as an act of both competition and desperation (p.
649-650). As the 1990 session of the Mississippi Legislature opened in January, 62
percent of respondents to a Jackson Clarion-Ledger poll voiced public support for a state
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lottery, and the state “seemed set” for its adoption (Nelson and Mason, 2003-2004, p.
650). Nineteen states had adopted lotteries in the previous decade, including Florida in
1986 and Virginia in 1987, while Mississippi’s border states of Tennessee and Louisiana
were actively considering it. The state was “mired in recession,” with “consecutive years
of budgetary shortfalls” and a political climate opposed to tax increases (p. 650).
Supporters were surprised, then to see the lottery test vote fail, only to witness popular
support for legalized gambling rise up to take its place.4 The Legislature’s March 15,
1990 approval of the Gaming Control Act legalized gambling in fourteen of Mississippi’s
eighty-two counties, including the three counties along the Gulf Coast that had never
recovered from the devastation wrought by Hurricane Camille in 1969 (and recently were
suffering from declining oil and gas prices and cutbacks from the federal defense budget)
and the eleven counties along the state’s western Mississippi River delta, which had the
lowest per capita income of any county in the nation in 1980. Mississippi was the fifth
casino state in the country and the first in the South. Within a few years, the state would
count more casinos than any other state except Nevada (Nelson and Mason, 2003-2004).
In their case study of Mississippi casino gambling, Nelson and Mason (p. 651)
theorize that “anticipatory diffusion” theory helps explain the “state’s enactment of a
policy innovation for fear that another state will make that innovation less effective by
enacting it first.” Competition from nearby New Orleans was enough to compel
Mississippi lawmakers to try their hand at attracting casinos first. Over time,
“incremental diffusion,” which occurs “when one state alters a policy innovation in the
course of copying it,” resulted in Mississippi removing both the betting limits and,
4

According to Nelson and Mason’s analysis (2003-2004), amending Mississippi’s 1890 constitution to
permit a lottery would have required two-thirds vote of both houses of the Legislature. Casino gambling
requiring a simple majority.
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eventually, the limits on casino licenses (p. 652), twin forms of what could be called
“tourism enhancement” (p. 654) Finally, the political-economic conditions of the state
were historically accepting of illegal casinos, and the Gulf Coast had an infamously lax
regulatory climate, as Chapter Four shows. Boosters were able to persuade conservative
colleagues that casinos would be private enterprises; that Mississippi had a “better claim
to the riverboat gambler tradition” than Midwestern states; and that the casino bill was of
local importance. The law allowed for a local-option approach in which citizens of each
affected county could technically vote to ban the gambling referendum (Nelson &
Mason, 2003-2004). In this way, Mississippi Coast residents bought into a state-led
campaign that would quickly upend the local economy, and create the conditions for the
seemingly limitless spread of the gambling industry. With no restrictions on the number
of casino licenses; no limits on bets, losses, or a gambler’s days and hours; and a reduced
tax rate, the “abbreviated politics of casino adoption” spawned what Nelson and Mason
(p. 655) term an “after-politics” of controversy that continues today.
Western Florida’s share of the Gulf of Mexico is about half the size of the
Louisiana Gulf Coast, yet the state has twice as many “priority areas” within its coastal
zone management program (Jordan and Benson, 2013, p. 4691-92). While Louisiana
considers coastal use permits, pollution control and wetland mitigation state concerns, it
delegates much enforcement authority to local parishes. Florida, in contrast, considers it
the state’s duty to protect public access; consider the cumulative and secondary impacts
of coastal projects; oversee ocean resources including aquaculture, centralize community
resiliency issues, including planning for sea level rise; coral and hard bottom ecosystem
mapping; and so on. As Jordan and Benson observe:
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“The five states that bound the USA Gulf Coast share interests in maintaining
clean beaches, productive fisheries, diverse intact habitats to support fish and
wildlife, thriving maritime industries, and community resilience to extreme
events and sea level rise. Nevertheless, these and other relevant interests vary
from state to state in degree and character, as do governance structures,
policy environments, and relative importance of the coast, both
geographically and economically” (p. 4693).
Although Florida’s 1985 Growth Management Act is cited, one of the policies
missing from Jordan and Benson’s Florida list is the 2001 Florida Building Code (FBC),
a historic piece of legislation that took almost a decade to come to fruition. The state’s
role in authorizing uniform building codes did not come easy. It took the disaster of
Hurricane Andrew in 2001 to bring attention to the fact that inferior “construction
practices in place during the 1980s” coupled with poor building code enforcement were
insufficient in protecting people and property from such a powerful windstorm, and
“unnecessarily magnified the extensive damage” (Simmons, Czajkowski and Done, 2018,
p. 156). In their case study analysis of the building code legislation, Simmons,
Czajkowski and Done uncover the origins of the movement in the three Florida counties
of Broward, Dade, and Monroe that were already complying with the South Florida
Building Code standards. Beyond this cluster of counties, some communities scattered
across Florida also were taking it upon themselves to adopt stronger local codes. These
local grassroots efforts caught the attention of the Florida Building Code Commission,
which in 1996 partnered with wind engineers to study whether to recommend statewide
building code standards. The Florida legislature accepted the commission’s
recommendations in 1998 and in 2001 they became one of the strictest building code
laws in the state, effectively wrenching control of building code adoption from individual
localities.
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With full implementation of the statewide building code, the expectations were
high that windstorm losses from extreme events such as hurricanes would be significantly
reduced moving forward. A few studies following the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season
confirmed these expectations. But the long-term impact of the FBC has emerged only
recently in Simmons, Czajkowski and Done’s (2008, p. 63) analysis of a decade of data
following implementation from 2001 to 2010 for all Florida ZIP codes. Based on ten
years of paid insured loss data, the researchers found that Florida’s universal building
codes reduced windstorm losses by up to 72%. Their results also suggest that the building
codes pass the benefit-cost analysis - meaning expected benefits exceed cost of
implementation by a margin of $6 in full reduced loss to $1 of added cost, with a payback
period of approximately eight years. In their concluding comments, the researchers
remark how important data like this are “to gauging potential political support, or
nonsupport, for enactment of the new codes” (p. 17).
The economic effectiveness of mandatory statewide building codes have
implications for ongoing policy discussions from a Gulf Coast and national perspective,
but these implications often fall on deaf ears in southern states historically resistant to
centralized authority. Florida’s experience with centralized state control predates the
Florida Building Codes. The state’s Growth Management Act of 1985 required that Local
Comprehensive Plans include a coastal element to address hazard mitigation and protect
coastal environmental resources. Each locality was required to designate a Coastal High
Hazard Area, within which development densities would be established in accordance
with the capacity of local transportation systems to evacuate the population (PuszkinChevlina and Esnard, 2009). The law was not without critics, but, as Puszkin-Chevlina
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and Esnard write, “Hurricane Andrew revealed the multifaceted vulnerabilities of South
Florida’s coastal communities and incited public support for better building codes and
development practices.” It was a “focusing event” at the state level whose repercussions
in the aftermath of the 2004 “focusing events” (Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan
Jeanne, Dennis) and 2018 “focusing event” (Hurricane Michael) continue to ripple
(Puszkin-Chevlina Esnard, 2009, p. 303).

2. Coastal Gentrification and Urbanization
The changes occurring in Gulf Coast communities cannot be understood using a
single line of inquiry, theory, or paradigm. The urbanization process in the coastal setting
is dynamic, involving complex social, cultural, spatial, economic, political, and
ecological relations. Along the northern Gulf Coast, local economic bases are shifting
from a reliance on natural-resource extraction to a dependence on the global coastal
tourism and agro-food industries that depend upon government support and high-risk,
large-investment capital inputs (Marshall, 2009). Within the fishery, a key feature of
globalization has been a profound loss of control over every aspect of the production
process due to changing fisheries policy, privatization, and aquaculture development. The
result is that local fishers no longer “determine what, how much, by what method and for
whom” fish are caught (Whatmore, 1995, p. 37). At the same time, as Chapter Two will
show, indigenous Gulf Coast citizens are slowly retreating from the increasingly
unaffordable, ecologically contaminated, at-risk coast.
While the dynamics of coastal urbanization escape neat categorization, the coastal
gentrification approach can help to frame the discussion in its consideration of the hand-
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in-glove relationships between economic restructuring and tourism growth. Rather than
viewing tourism expansion, suburban growth, and commercial fishing decline as separate
happenstances, coastal gentrification sees the collapse of the commercial fishing
economy as inextricably linked to tourism growth and development. The two are not
mutually exclusive but closely impact each other. When the fishing economy takes a
dive, the declining property values of dockside space become attractive investments to
new gentrification interests. This finding supports the emerging view of gentrification as
a geographically rootless expression of political economy, as a manifestation of the
growth of the affluent at the expense of the working class in capitalist society, and as a
consequence of economic restructuring. Researchers mostly split into three camps in
theorizing gentrification: those who side with geographer Neil Smith’s (1979) supplyside analysis; those on the consumption side who think the rent gap is only a partial
explanation of the gentrification phenomenon; and those like Collins (2013) who warn
that other processes such as counter urbanization and rural restructuring may be at play
when considering the situation facing communities experiencing patterns of increasing
prices and decreasing affordability.
In these communities, residential development along the coast is more about
lifestyle, privileged access to landscapes and amenities, and possibly capital gain, than
middle class recolonization of space. Other recent gentrification scholarship favors the
consumption approach because it considers gentrification as a multi-faceted phenomenon
whose relevance extends beyond the urban inner city (Hines, 2012). Amenity migrations,
or the desire of urban people to live in the countryside, not only consume rural landscapes
and recreational opportunities, they also contribute to new types of rural production: most
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obviously through restoration of historic buildings, but also via artistic creation and
performance, and small businesses providing niche goods and services (Guimond and
Simard, 2010; Hines, 2012; Collins, 2013; Hurley and Ari, 2018).
This broader conception of gentrification offers a way to understand the changes
occurring along the Gulf Coast. The contemporary view of gentrification, divorced from
urban inner-city geography, views the process as a change in the social composition of an
area and its people as well as a change in the nature of an area’s housing stock.
Alternately, the classic urban rent-gap theory considers gentrification in the context of
long-term shifts of investment and disinvestment in the built environment. Neil Smith’s
work focuses on the specific relationships between land and property value, and in
particular how disinvestment makes capital reinvestment possible. He stresses the
production of urban space in terms of the actions of producers (builders, developers,
mortgage lenders, government agencies) and consumers (buyers). Smith argues that in
the nineteenth century, most cities had a “classical land value gradient,” with the highest
land values at the center and the lowest values toward the periphery (Smith, 1979, p.
540). Suburbanization made land values in the inner city plummet and suburban property
values increase. The devalorization of the inner city provided the basis for subsequent
profitable reinvestment. The rent-gap theory hypothesizes that gentrification can occur
only when the gap is wide enough to ensure a profit (Smith, 1979).
In contrast with Smith and important in the context of coastal urbanization along
the Gulf Coast, researchers are increasingly finding that the existence of a rent gap is not
a necessary or sufficient condition for gentrification to occur. Instead, the existence of a
pool of new middle- and upper-class potential gentrifiers is viewed as a necessary
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prerequisite for gentrification to take place, as is a group of potentially gentrifiable homes
or vacant land where new properties can be built (Rigolon and Nemeth, 2019). The
concept of urban inner-city gentrification has relevance to the Gulf Coast setting because
of two socioeconomic parallels: locational advantage and the local population’s
vulnerability to displacement. Rural gentrification, researchers long ago noted, can be
remarkably similar to the gentrification process that occurs in inner cities around the
world (Parsons, 1980; McLaughlin, 1986; Little, 1987). In rural agricultural or fishing
villages, for example, depopulation comes when occupational opportunities in rural areas
are removed—such is the case in Gulf Coast commercial fishing communities when the
industry takes a downturn. The economic slump alters the housing situation when the
original population moves and services disappear (Phillips, 1993, 2004, 2005; Smith,
1979). Similar to what happens in inner cities, rural settings are ready for “gentrification
investment” following this period of “de-investment and devaluation” (Phillips, 2005, p.
6).
The view that rural gentrification involves the same tensions as urban inner-city
gentrification is relevant to the Gulf Coast because of the impacts of hurricanes and
environmental disasters on rural fishing villages and agricultural communities from
Texas to Florida. Yet the concept remains unexplored in the literature. Phillips (2004)
discusses how disasters in the agricultural and fishing economies can spur rural
gentrification because of their socioeconomic impacts on traditional lifestyles, but there
are few case studies exploring how this twofold process unfolds at the local level.
Gentrification is an undeniable presence along the Gulf. Twenty-five years ago,
commercial fishers in Florida were labeled an “endangered species” because decades of
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coastal development, tourism, and federal fishing regulations had pushed them to the
fringes of the state economy (Smith and Jepson, 1993, p. 40). This critical issue is
currently facing Gulf Coast fishing communities that are experiencing varying degrees of
environmental degradation and economic restructuring due to the declining value of
commercial fishing products and rising value of consumption in the service and leisure
economies.
Coastal gentrification and tourism can be seen as one process as coastal areas
around the world transform from quaint fishing villages into privatized spaces for tourists
and the elite. A major driver of increasing coastal gentrification pressures along the Gulf
Coast is the marketing and promotion of tourism led by business leaders, realtors, and
developers, and the policy changes they successfully influence. The gentrification
literature is beginning to consider the roles tourism marketing and tourism-friendly policy
changes play in the gentrification process. When examining why residents in changing
coastal communities have had mixed success battling the development of tourism in their
backyards, it is useful to consult tourism theories that focus on conflict between
permanent residents and vacationers, and how this conflict can restrict or expand tourism
growth, depending on who holds the power to influence policy. By framing the
discussion in terms of tourism gentrification and political economy, we can begin to
understand the fuller picture of who wins and who loses when change happens in Gulf
Coast communities.
Tourism gentrification as a new urban form is an emerging field of study that
attempts to critically frame an understanding of leisure in the context of changes in land
use, policy issues, and development, and these impacts on host communities and class
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relations (Mullins, 1991, 1992, 1994; Paniagua, 2002; Urry, 2002; Gotham, 2005;
Gladstone 1998, 2006). Historically, tourism growth can be traced to changes in touristic
behavior beginning in the postwar era when vacations became increasingly individualized
as well as shorter, more frequent, and activity-based (Jacobsen, 1997; Sharpley and
Sharpley, 1997; Müller, 2002). The research on tourism patterns during the 1960s and
1970s focused mostly on touristic motivations, patterns of second-home ownership, and
planning issues. In recent years, tourism scholars have interpreted the trend as an effect of
the globalization process and post-industrial economic restructuring. The arrival of
greater economic prosperity in most industrial economies has led to higher disposable
incomes, fewer working hours, and longer periods of leisure time (Sharpley and Telfer,
2002). Greater affluence and more leisure time encourage second home ownership. As
tourism spreads, so does class polarization. Relations imposed by regime changes in the
global, post-industrial economy have fragmented and divided social relations and civil
society and led to many contemporary discourses on social divisions within urban society
(Wilson, 1987; Zukin, 1991; Sassen, 1991; Hornsby, 1993; Room, 1995; Jargowsky,
1997; Buck, 2001; Gerometta et al., 2005).
In the contemporary tourism literature, one of the most controversial conflict
issues concerns exclusion and displacement, the question of whether tourism demands
force permanent residents from their homes. Within the field of second-home tourism and
displacement studies, researchers argue that permanent residents are displaced due to
high demand for tourism development, especially in exclusive locations (Jordan, 1980;
Sharpley and Sharpley, 1997; Fountain and Hall, 2002; Folkesdotter, 2003; Gallent et al.,
2003, 2005; Visser, 2004; Henderson, 2018). This argument relates to gentrification
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theory because the transnational tourism development boom is based on the local price
inflation of dwellings, generated mainly by external demand for second homes (ranging
from condominiums to time-shares to, increasingly, vacation rental by owner) in the area.
As tourism expands, locals are priced out of the region. At the same time, there also tends
to be a movement to eliminate locals from working in formal tourism establishments. An
accompanying privatization of space worsens inequalities among social classes in
spatially segregated tourist destinations (Tosun et al., 2003; Bianchi, 2004; Gladstone,
2006). The influx of outsiders in the form of second-home owners Anglicizes traditional
fishing communities and destroys local customs and culture through forced depopulation
(Bollom, 1978; Phillips and Thomas, 2001). This is the case in many attractive rural,
mostly mountainous or coastal areas where price levels have recently skyrocketed.
However, other researchers have argued that the depopulation trend in these locations is
caused by a more general restructuring of the rural economy than the might of
gentrification-oriented real-estate boards and developers (Clout, 1972; Shucksmith, 1983;
Barke, 1991; Keen and Hall, 2004; Müller, 2004; Müller et al., 2004; Selwood and Tonts,
2004). These researchers argue that a decline in traditional agriculture, fishing, and
manufacturing has resulted in rural unemployment and out-migration, leading to empty
dwellings and new uses as second homes or tourism developments (Müller et al., 2004).
The debate underscores the issue of perspective. Fearing a slump, village boosters
seek to feed the growth machine by attracting new economies. But what goes unnoticed
in much of the gentrification literature is the trickle-down effect such restructuring has on
locals, who tend to be much more cautious and wary of change because of the ways in
which new land uses impact their property taxes and services. Neil Smith’s view of
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gentrification as taking on the character of the French “revanchist city” of the late
nineteenth century is apropos here. Smith (1996, p. 60-65) contends that, more than
anything, “revenge” exemplifies contemporary gentrification efforts as marginalized
groups distinguished by race, class, and gender, are blamed for the squalor of the
American city, resulting in punitive and regressive policies (italics are mine). In this way,
elites investing in Gulf Coast communities can attribute waterfront squalor to the actions
of commercial fishers who lack pride of place rather than to a shoddy and haphazard
municipal trash pickup system or just another side effect of the latest Gulf Coast disaster.
Gentrification steps in when newcomers take action and seek consequences, such as
filing a complaint with the city sanitation department or office that fines blighted
property owners against old-timers whom they think are exhibiting undesirable
behaviors.
Gentrification, more than anything else, is the materialization of class powers.
The phenomenon occurs across the spatial scale, in cities and suburbs and rural settings
where relationships are changing between people and where they live and where new
limitations are reducing access and promoting exclusion (Butler, 2007). The difference
between Neil Smith’s gentrifying London of the 1960s and the process as it takes place in
exurban, rural, and coastal settings is one of extremes. As more people assume the role of
the gentry, they “feel obliged to express who they are by where they live and with whom
they share their neighborhood” (Butler, 2007, p. 163).To insist that “upscaling” coastal
landscapes are simply reflections of housing changes or broader economic shifts is to
ignore the very real class dimensions framing the displacement process, a process that
increasingly is taking place beyond the urban working class neighborhoods of the inner

51

city, and directly impacting our nation’s fragile coastlines. In some ways, the term
“gentry” has come full-circle and now may be closer to its etymological rural roots in the
high society of the rural British countryside. There are various and particular ways in
which external tourism gentrification pressures play out over the long run in specific
local settings, particularly in the fishing- and/or agriculture-dependent coastal areas that
are the focus of this dissertation.
While the gentrification literature is fraught with debate over winners and losers,
sociologists largely agree on tourism’s benefits. Most researchers believe tourism has the
most serious dislocating effects and yields the fewest benefits for locals when large-scale,
high standard facilities—such as gated recreational fishing subdivisions and casino
gambling franchises—are rapidly introduced by outside developers into an otherwise
poorly developed or inequitably divided area. The tourism mindset that follows this
influx of newcomers puts pressure on resources whose supply is inelastic, such as food,
fish and environment. Thus, while tourism frequently has short-term benefits for locals
who are directly involved in its perceived employment and economic opportunities, it can
cause longer-term hardships for the rest of the population and the community at large
(Cohen, 1984; Williams, 2004; Hall, 2005; Mansfield & Jonas, 2006).
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3. Hurricanes, Disaster Theory and the Geopolitical Economy of Reconstruction
Since 1950, nineteen significant hurricanes have struck the Gulf Coast study area
between south Louisiana and the Florida Panhandle.5 As specific types of disasters,
hurricanes are intertwined with the intimate histories of each case study community and
cannot be disentangled from most of the significant change events that have occurred
within the Gulf Coast during the study period. While hurricanes fall under the general
risk of “water” identified in the dissertation title, an umbrella category inclusive of
hazards related to rising water, saltwater intrusion, floods, tropical storms, mudslides,
violent winds, and intense droughts, hazards that can be both chronic and sudden, each
hurricane disaster is a singular severe weather event whose lessons and implications
endure for decades. Histories of water offer more personal and local insights into
histories of climate and climate change, and there are increasing attempts to understand
water's role in mediating relationships between climate, weather, and society (Morgan,
2018). Integrating these histories and coming to terms with the factors that distinguish
hurricane disasters from socio-technical and other disaster events has shaped the disaster
studies field, as well as disaster theory and disaster social science fields, for decades
(Killian, 1954; Scott, 1990; Enarson, 1998; Huffman, 1989; Few, 2003; Smith, 2004).
Since the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons, disasters and crises have gained increasing
attention, while scholarly treatment of hurricane disasters has become more critical, more
complex, more historical, and more comparative, focusing on the social and political
elements that emerge from disaster situations in particular “crisis cities” (Gotham, 2007;
Freudenburg, Grambling, Laska, and Erikson, 2008, 2009; Gotham and Greenberg, 2014;
5

Hilda - 1964; Betsy -1965; Camille - 1969; Agnes - 1972; Eloise -1975; Frederic -1979; Elena -1985;
Andrew -1992; Opal -1995; Lili - 2002; Charley - 2004; Ivan - 2004; Dennis - 2005; Katrina - 2005; Rita 2005; Wilma - 2005; Gustav - 2008; Ike -2008; Isaac - 2012; Michael - 2018
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Rohland, 2018), and moving away from the trend in disaster literature to focus on
administration, process, and tools (response, planning, preparation, mitigation, and
management) (Sementelli, 2007).
In Sentenelli’s (2007, p. 499) disaster taxonomy grid, disaster theories are
graphed on a two-dimensional quadrant according to whether they have high or low
concerns for tools, process, and standard operating procedures. This research is
concerned with the socio-historical aspects of disaster and crisis. In this framework,
social theories have high concern for process and low concern for tools. They are
strategic, abstract approaches with a social and sociopolitical lens, “almost entirely
process oriented, focusing on the means and methods of action rather than classical
outcomes (mitigation, repair, relief)” (Sentenelli, 2007, p. 499-500). In Sentenelli’s scan
of the intersection of disaster and social theory literature, he finds a narrowly focused,
“case by case strategy” whose parameters include a “specific geography, geopolitical
framework, or type of disaster” (p. 504). He also teases out a lack of theory development
and need for disaster research to build out Stallings’s (2012, p. 283) Weberian
observation that disasters reveal “aspects of social structures and processes hidden in
everyday affairs.”
As Fowlkes and Miller’s (1982) brought to light in their report on the social
construction of the Love Canal disaster, disasters are opportunities to illuminate and
elucidate the inner workings of people, organizations, groups, and communities as much
as they are opportunities to assess resilience and uncover the stressors described in
Section 4. More than any other disaster theory explored, Stallings argues that critical
social theory has the potential to be “one of the most effective means to understand how
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issues of marginalization can develop alongside more common issues of class, race, and
gender in the context of crises and disaster. Understanding the processes of
marginalization, alienation, and oppression in the context of disasters and crises could
lead to powerful insights into the social, economic, administrative, and political elements
of disasters and crisis” (Stallings, 2007, p. 505, italics added for emphasis).
My research is inspired by Stallings’s call for approaches that are not shy about
revealing the “messy, dynamic, and fundamentally unscientific elements of crisis and
disaster” (p. 506). By analyzing history, power, and community response, I hope to fulfill
Stallings’s demand for research that provides more insights into the wickedly human
elements of disaster, the “uncomfortable, possibly irrational, and otherwise sobering
questions,” (p. 508) from poverty to marginalization, from displacement to loss of
livelihood. I find Eleonora Rholand’s (2018) recent account of infrastructure and
metropolitan New Orleans’ history of hurricane adaptation a compelling addition to
Stallings’s disaster studies call-to-action. Rholand writes about how hydraulic
interventions and other efforts to render wetlands dry also provided a means to subdue
unruly local populations and extract value from landed property. Rholand’s long-term
historical perspective centers on “disaster memory.” The finding among disaster
researchers is that “the average half-life of disaster memory [is] about one to one-and-ahalf generations,” meaning that knowledge may be one of the most understudied
“precondition[s] for adaptation” (p. 6). According to this theory, if natural disasters occur
less frequently, risk-awareness and preparedness also decrease and a “disaster gap”
ensues (p. 6). They are no longer part of the “cultural fabric” of a community (D’Oney,
2008, p. 21).
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“... adaptation options are embedded in time and, in the case of Louisiana,
in a wider local, national, and transatlantic historical context. However,
there is no determinism in technological and scientific development with
regard to adaptation. … the availability of adaptation options through the
interplay of science and technology does not guarantee what has been
called successful adaptation. Time and again, political priorities and
cultural values got in the way of what with hindsight may appear to have
been obvious choices” (Rholand, 2018, p. 6-7).
Rholand’s five themes of adaptive practices include levee building, evacuation,
disaster migration, disaster relief, and insurance. Each of these themes appears at
different points in time in the case study communities presented here, just like they do in
Rholand’s history of the city of New Orleans’s full hurricane chronology.

4. The Capacities of Coastal Communities to Emerge from Adversity
In Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder (2012), Nassim Taleb writes
provocatively of change, uncertainty, and how human systems respond to stress. Written
as a critique of the risk management industry, with its pursuit of stability in the face of
stress, Taleb’s work proposes an alternative approach to the literature on resilience. He
argues that it is not possible to plan for uncertainty based on observations of the past—to
be resilient—for two reasons: future uncertainties are “black swans,” unique, unknown,
unpredictable, and unwitnessed, and socio-ecological systems are facing complex, multisector challenges, or wicked challenges, that have never before been seen. “Antifragility
is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the
antifragile gets better,” Taleb writes at the start of his book (p. 3). In other words, a
system (people, things, institutions, and ways of life) that thrives in uncertainty is a
system that not only responds well to stress, but also becomes more robust in the face of
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threat and adversity. Antifragility is an approach that is not based on complexity theory
or traditional systems engineering and complex adaptive systems engineering disciplines;
it rejects the premise of solving problems through methods that conform to a certain set
of assumptions. “The general assumption in all of these methods is that the stressful
events or hazards will result in negative system outcomes” (Johnson and Gheorghe, 2013,
p. 159) while antifragility allows for the possibility that some systems might actually get
better with stress (Taleb, 2012). Antifragile systems are “counterintuitive” because they
benefit from uncertain conditions (Babovic, Babovic, and Mijic, 2018, p. 499).
Scholars and practitioners are increasingly writing about Taleb’s antifragile
concept. Some have attempted to develop a framework for analyzing and measuring
antifragility attributes or indicators based on complex adaptive systems theories in
disaster risk science (Johnson and Gheorghe, 2013; Jebari, 2014; Jurjonas, 2018). Others
are applying the concept to guide infrastructure planning and management in cities
(Beck, 2013; Babovic, Babovic, and Mijic, 2018) or civic infrastructure systems such as
electric power supply, telecommunication, gas, and water distribution (Didier et al.,
2018). Others argue for the elevation of the “breakthrough concept” of “antifragility”
over “resilience” (Martinetti, Moerman and van Dongen, 2018, p.12; see also Wright et
al., 2017; Jurjonas, 2018; Strong Towns, 2018). Jurjonas and Seekamp (2018, p. 139)
theorize that antifragility is closer to, perhaps even synonymous with, “adaptive capacity
as a place on a spectrum from vulnerable to resilient.” Italian scholars Federica Fotino,
Mario Calabrese, and Mattia Lettieri (2018, p. 23) argue that “resilience” denotes the
ability to recover or adjust to misfortune or change while returning to the same shape or
substance as before. In contrast, “antifragility” means being pliant to change, changing
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shape but not identity or essence. “Antifragility allows organisations to cope with shocks
and disruptions while leveraging them to become stronger and more creative and better
able to adapt to each new challenge to be faced” (Fotino, Calabrese and Lettieri, 2018, p.
23).
Writing about rural coastal community resilience, Jurjonas (2018, p. 137) reflects
on the fact that research on resilience and adaptation to sea level rise has produced
numerous frameworks that attempt to measure vulnerability and resilience to shocks and
exposures of a broad range of coastal urban areas, from beach tourism communities to
small island nations and developing countries (e.g., Schwarz et al., 2011, on the Solomon
Islands; Moreno and Becken, 2009, on Fiji; and Sales, 2009, on Cavite City, Philippines).
Indicators in research on environmental sociology as well as disaster and hazard risk
management include population patterns such as outmigration following disaster; poverty
levels; average incomes; flood insurance participation; and property value (Jurjonas,
2018). In his Rural Coastal Community Resilience framework, Jurjonas (2018, p. 138)
argues for the “need to link resilience and environmental sociology literature to address
rural coastal communities in a way that conceptualizes their unique and compounding
vulnerabilities and enables capacity-building dialogue.” The Rural Coastal Community
Resilience Framework considers physical exposures to both sea level rise and saltwater
intrusion while placing rural communities on a spectrum of “opposing forces” between
resilience and vulnerability. “The influence of each theme will either pull a community’s
adaptive capacity toward resilience or make it more vulnerable to a negative future
outcome” (Jurjonas, 2018, p. 139). Put a different way, the rural resilience framework
suggests that communities with high vulnerability and low adaptive capacity to the
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shocks Taleb describes in Antifragile could eventually collapse. Jurjonas goes further
than Taleb in operationalizing anti-fragility as a descriptive concept loosely synonymous
with adaptive capacity. The rural resiliency framework includes five opposing themes on
the vulnerability (“do-nothing scenario”) to resilience (“adaptation as a way of life”)
spectrum (p. 146).
While the tool is specifically designed to enhance community engagement in rural
coastal climate adaptation planning efforts, I find it to be a helpful list of indicator
variables that, grouped by theme, paints a picture of what adaptive capacity specifically
looks like for coastal communities. I adapted and consolidated Jurjonas’s findings in the
bulleted list below (2018, p. 147-8):
● Theme 1: Livelihood Dependency vs. Livelihood Diversity
○ Livelihood dependency indicators include household food security; natural
resource dependency; livelihood uncertainty caused by environmental or
market changes; and loss of employment after disaster
○ Livelihood diversity indicators that can reduce the threat of failure in
resource-dependent systems include livelihood portfolio (the presence of
choices leads to greater adaptive capacity); crop diversity; and livelihood
options for coastal communities exposed to greater risk
● Theme 2: Poverty vs. Prosperity
○ Poverty in the aggregate influences disasters in every way (preparedness,
impacts, response, recovery, and reconstruction), but specific vulnerability
indicators include marginalization, which limits access to services; social
and socioeconomic status; and special needs population demographics
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(infirm, transient, homeless, and institutionalized populations are
disproportionately vulnerable)
○ Prosperity indicators include how wealth is spread or transferred in local
economies; economic development resources; critical infrastructure
including communication, transportation, and energy distribution; tax
base; health including mental and social well-being in addition to the
absence of disease; and resources including money, information,
technology, tools, raw materials, and services to meet community needs
● Theme 3: Unsustainable vs. Sustainable Development
○ Unsustainable development indicators include ecosystem fragmentation
(as measured by sediment starvation, which reduces coastal resilience);
wetland loss; development in floodplains; and agricultural expansion or
intensive agriculture practices whose runoff damages the ecosystem
○ Sustainable development indicators include ecosystem goods and services
that benefit people and protect from natural hazards; storm mitigation; and
nursery habitat
● Theme 4: Community Disengagement vs. Cohesion
○ Community Disengagement indicators include urban migration (loss of
talent and human capital exacerbates disparities and poverty); job loss;
unstable populations, high turnover and outmigration; climate migration;
and future expectations (hope for the future)
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○ Community Cohesion indicators include a culture of coastal adaptation;
institutional trust; communication connection; place attachment; and
frequency of community interaction
● Theme 5: Rigidity vs. Agency
○ Rigidity refers to inflexible government institutions that resist or refuse to
adapt or respond to change. Indicators include isolation/remoteness
(distance from centralized services); lack of trust in planning processes;
uncertainty regarding impacts and outcomes, which affect participation;
and institutional capability to build adaptive capacity
○ Agency refers to the capacity of people or groups to act freely and affect
the future. Indicators include self-determination (through perseverance
communities can implement programs they design); flexibility in
management systems for the “democratization of adaptation”; locus of
control; and self-efficacy
Another systems framework from engineering attempts to define antifragility
based on complex adaptive systems theories, and clarify what “antifragility attributes”
look like when systems respond to hazards, or stress (Johnson and Gheorghe, 2013, p.
159). This is useful to understanding disaster-derived problems, and how communities
might develop more effective response and recovery systems. Johnson and Gheorghe
define “complex adaptive systems” as (1) “responsive” to dynamic environments where
“things are always changing: conditions, constraints, threats, opportunities, technology,
knowledge, requirements, and so on. The ability to make internal adjustments in response
to, or in anticipation of, external environmental changes, is the essence of being adaptive”
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(p. 161); and (2) able to “learn from experiences,” meaning that complex adaptive
systems are able to adjust, revise, and improve (p. 161). Like Jurjonas (2018), Johnson
and Gheorghe characterize the ways in which systems respond to events on a continuum.
In their framework, however, the continuum includes three points:
● At one end of the continuum is fragility. Stress causes fragile systems, or
characteristics of systems, to fail or degrade. While fragility is similar to
Jurjonas’s (2018) vulnerability definition, Johnson and Gheorghe (2013, p. 161)
argue that vulnerable systems fail because of their “degree of exposure to stress”
while fragile systems fail because they are “easily broken regardless of the nature
of stress they are exposed to.”
● Robust systems are “unchanged by stress”; they are stable, growing more robust
or stable even as stress intensifies over a range of time. Robustness is loosely
similar to reliability except that “reliability is remaining unchanged within
specified limits while robustness is remaining unchanged outside” those same
parameters (p. 161).
● Antifragile systems, according to Taleb’s (2012) definition, get better with stress
through what Johnson and Gheorghe call “smaller doses” of stress. Rather than
weakening systems, regular exposure to small stressors can actually strengthen
and protect from extreme events. Examples of antifragility include biology; forest
fires; tragic events like airplane crashes that inspire continuous improvement in
industry and technology; and software like “Chaos Monkey,” the media company
Netflix’s software application that intentionally generates failures in order to learn
how to improve (p. 162).
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Based on this continuum, Johnson and Gheorghe’s antifragile model considers a
set of ten analytical criteria to determine where a system fits among the “tipping points”
of fragile, robust, and antifragile descriptors on the antifragility curve. These criteria are
tools to help stakeholders, policymakers, and governments “score” how the systems in
place in their communities respond to stress. In their example, an antifragile analysis of
the U.S. smart power grid produces an average score of -4.3 on the -10 to 10 scale used in
the fragility continuum. Based on this result, the researchers conclude that U.S. power
grid systems “would be considered fragile and would degrade with exposure to the
stress” of a weather event (p. 166). Following a lengthy analysis, Johnson and Gheorghe
reflect on the fact that the antifragile simulation model is imperfect. It assumes “first
order relationships between stress and system performance when in fact the relationships
might be of higher order”; needs clearer definitions of selection criteria; needs better
methods for disaggregating results; and should consider applying “multiattribute
decision-making,” rather than a “two-dimensional analysis” in order to get at a fuller
picture of how systems survive threats (p. 167).
It is clear from both resilience frameworks presented here that, in cases where
communities are already experiencing risk or disasters related to climate change, history
and context matter as much as disaggregated data scored on a continuum of change.
Researchers have shown that particular histories, economic disadvantages, and political
constraints work together to exacerbate and help create the conditions that make some
communities more prone to risk than others. Emerging research also suggests the same
systems that create conditions of vulnerability continue today unabated (Martinich et al.,
2013). Martinich and colleagues have demonstrated that, particularly along the Gulf
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Coast, social and economic class predict who is most likely to flood more than anything
else. That is because flood-prone communities tend to have the fewest engineering
protections in place against high water. This suggests that it is not merely historical
systems of oppression, but also contemporary ones, that create inequities in disaster
patterns (Freudenburg, Gramling, Laska and Erikson, 2008), and that a richer historical
analysis is needed to better understand the multidimensional factors driving the varied
outcomes we see within urban, suburban and rural communities along the Gulf Coast.

Conclusion
The next three empirical case study chapters are organized thematically and
chronologically into five similarly named sections. The grid in Figure 1.2 captures the
organizational structure of the case study material. This framework provides the
architecture for the argument, rationale and analysis synthesized in the cross-case
analysis in Chapter 5.
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Chapter Two: Case Study, Bayou Petit Caillou, Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana
Introduction: Buying Time on the Coast of Southeast Louisiana

Image 2.1: The study area highlighted in red contains Bayou Petit Caillou in south-central Terrebonne Parish,
Louisiana, approximately 75 miles southwest of New Orleans.

Up until recently, the urban development of the southeast Louisiana coast that
accelerated in the aftermath of the 1984 New Orleans World’s Fair showed no signs of
slowing. After the 2005 storms, Louisiana State University demographers predicted
Lafayette would be the next New Orleans, and Houma would be the next Lafayette, with
Terrebonne Parish’s population peaking at 125,000 by 2020, up from 107,000 in 2008. At
the time, planners acknowledged that population growth in Terrebonne and Lafourche
parishes was not necessarily a good thing, but would come at the expense of coastal
wetlands and water quality, and put increased pressure on aging sewerage and drainage
systems, roads, schools, fire and police.
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A recent state analysis has corrected the record, finding not only has the coastal
Louisiana population plummeted, but that coastal communities are leaving the water en
masse. Between 2005 and 2015, the case study area of Bayou Petit Caillou lost 17
percent of its population. Employment trends are on an even steeper decline, with jobs
decreasing in Cocodrie, Chauvin and nearby bayou towns by as much as 50 percent
between 2004 and 2014 (LA SAFE, 2018).6 As LA SAFE states in its literature, each of
its recommended recovery projects takes into account two facts. First, southeast
Louisiana’s most vulnerable coastal communities will need to contemplate resettlement
over the next fifty years. Second, current migration trends northward are an indication of
the population patterns that will become the new normal in the twenty-first century as the
retreat from coasts around the world becomes all but inevitable.
“As much as we are doing to restore and rebuild our coast, we will face a higher
degree of flood risk and land loss over decades and generations to come” (LA SAFE,
2018). This acknowledgement is a century in the making, but there likely will not be
another century to enjoy it. As one community leader told a newspaper reporter in August
2017, “My ancestors arrived in south Louisiana in the 1780s, eight generations ago. We
don’t have eight generations in the future. What I’m trying to do here is buy another 75,
80 years. What’s going to happen in 50 years? I think this is all under water” (Gass, 2017,
p. 1).
The five sections of this chapter provide a framework for understanding one south
Louisiana community’s experiences with the coast since the turn of the twentieth century,
when a get-rich-quick schemer from the Midwest bought nearly 1.5 million acres of

6

LA SAFE (Louisiana's Strategic Adaptations for Future Environments) is an effort created by Louisiana
Governor John Edwards to create and implement adaptations to ongoing coastal land loss and rising seas.

67

swampland from the Atchafalaya Levee Board and a small family of Cajun entrepreneurs
brought the Gulf Coast shrimp industry to Chauvin. The economic history of Bayou Petit
Caillou is traced in the first section, Arrivals, from these early days of natural resource
extractors—trappers, fishers and landmen—through the emergence of oil and gas
development from the 1930s through the 1970s. The intersection of conservation, tourism
growth, economic development, and the policies that helped shape them are outlined in
the second section, Fast Times, which traces patterns of boom-and-bust investment from
the 1970s through Hurricane Andrew, a turning point in the life and death of Bayou Petit
Caillou. Section three, Retreat, explores the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew and the
struggle to protect, preserve and profit from the water in the decades leading up to the
Deepwater Horizon oil explosion in 2010. The fourth and final section, Adaptation,
concludes this chapter with an examination of the situation facing Bayou Petit Caillou as
it looks at the next fifty years.

Arrivals: ‘A gracefully grotesque and rough-hewn landscape,’ 1890-1970
The story of Bayou Petit Caillou in the twentieth century is a story of isolation
and discovery, or invention and survival, of local agency and external pressure, of
insularity and pride, of community collapse and resistance, and of the commodification of
a Cajun culture once described as “probably the largest unassimilated nationality group in
America” (Gilmore 1933). It is not a unique story, but it is contextual, and the context is
one of place and power. The story of Bayou Petit Caillou is a story of the birth of Cajun
French Louisiana, a story of the transformation of a plantation parish economy from
sugarcane to fishing to oil to tourism, and a story of the ecological collapse of a delta
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once considered a wasteland, but that foreshadows the great changes to come as coastal
communities along America’s sinking shores grapple with their own life and death
through the twenty-first century and beyond.
From above, Bayou Petit Caillou is the middle finger of Terrebonne Parish’s five
bayous, which extend into the Gulf of Mexico like a hand floating on the sea. The palm
of the hand is the parish seat of Houma. Terrebonne is Louisiana’s largest parish, but
today the “good earth” is an anachronism, representing a time before nearly 90 percent of
parish acreage was composed of water, and counting. Terrebonne is in the middle of the
Louisiana Gulf Coast and has been for centuries one of the most remote places in the
western world. Prior to the Spanish Colonial era beginning in 1763, few people lived in
what is today Terrebonne Parish. Although an appendage of Lafourche Parish, which was
the locus of early and dense French settlement, Terrebonne Parish was only sparsely
occupied by ephemeral camps of hunters, trappers, and fishermen. Pirates found the
labyrinth of coastal bays and bayous conveniently and effectively concealed their
hideouts; what Watkins (1939, p. 28) calls their “pied-a-terre.”
Who lives where, and for what reasons, are important questions in the shaping of
lower Terrebonne’s distinctive settlement patterns. In addition to Bayou Petit Caillou’s
predominantly Cajun French population, the Terrebonne Parish study area includes
African American and American Indian tribal communities. For freed slaves, Cajuns and
American Indians, the central location of Bayou Terrebonne functioned as a vertical
linkage from the developed higher ground along Bayou Lafourche and the city of Houma
to the five-finger, lower-lying bayous of Dularge, Grand Caillou, Petit Caillou and
Pointe-aux-Chenes (Mires, 1988). Along these lower bayous, the community settlement
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patterns set forth in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can still be seen today,
where the present geographic footprint of tribal cultures in Louisiana is enmeshed with
the settlement patterns of Cajun exiles and newly freed slaves of the nineteenth century
(Brasseaux, 2005, p. 127). The 1850 census of Terrebonne Parish indicates that small
tribal communities existed along all five Terrebonne Parish bayous, while the famous
American Indian studies pioneer John R. Swanton working in 1907 found six tribal
communities in the Lafourche-Terrebonne coastal marshes. The 1920 census of
Terrebonne Parish shows just one American Indian family living on Bayou Petit Caillou,
which is the only bayou in the parish that did not house a state-sponsored or missionary
Indian school during tripartite segregation, which ended in 1964, according to school
board records and oral histories. Neighboring bayous that parallel Bayou Petit Caillou
continue to be home to five independent, state-recognized tribal communities including
four in Terrebonne Parish: the United Houma Nation, the Pointe-au-Chien Indian Tribe,
the Isle de Jean Charles Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw Indians of Louisiana, and the Grand
Caillou/Dulac Band of the Biloxi Chitimacha Confederation of Muskogees.
Along Bayou Petit Caillou, or “little pebble” in French, are the settlements of
Chauvin and Cocodrie. Named after two brothers, Hypolite II and Louis Chauvin, the
town of Chauvin has historically been an insular village full of ritual and rooted in the
Catholic faith. Father Jean-Marie Joseph Denecé (1825-1911) settled at Petit Caillou soon
after his ordination during the Civil War. He organized the parish on Nov. 9, 1864 to
serve “the Acadian and Houma people of southern Terrebonne” (Browning, 2016, p. 11).
Fr. Denecé built a church and rectory, opened an adjoining cemetery, and established
missions up and down neighboring bayous. After his death, priests residing on Bayou
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Terrebonne served this remote section of Catholic Francophone Louisiana until 1948,
when Archbishop J.F. Rummel canonically erected St. Joseph Parish, Chauvin, to serve
the booming postwar town seventeen miles south of the parish seat in the city of Houma
(Browning, 2016).
The first postmaster in Chauvin was a descendant of it founders. Albert Eloie
Chauvin operated the post office inside his general store where he learned the ancient
Chinese art of processing and canning fresh seafood. In 1875, according to family
history, Albert Chauvin loaded a boat with produce and furs and sailed to New Orleans,
where he sold his wares at the French Market. Albert Chauvin’s entrepreneurial ventures
took root among his five sons Ruffin, James, George, Leonce and Guy, who together
formed Chauvin Brothers, which continues today as one of the longest-running familyowned businesses in south Louisiana.
Like the Chauvins, most people in the study area have historically identified with
the Cajun French culture, and gone to work as Cajun fishers, farmers, and sharecroppers,
working for wealthy sugarcane plantation owners and alongside descendants of slaves
through the mid-20th century.7 Lacking land, power and language, very few of the Cajuns
in Terrebonne Parish operated plantations or owned slaves directly. They were former
peasant farmers hemmed in by swamps along the Louisiana coast, compelled by
necessity to work as day laborers on sugarcane fields, and to teach themselves to hunt,
trap and fish within the alluvial lands of Bayou Lafourche and, after 1795, Bayou
Terrebonne (Western, 1972; Brasseaux, 1997).

7

These descendants continue to live in a segregated African-American community in Chauvin called
Smithridge, named after sugarcane plantation owner and Confederate Col. Benjamin F. Smith.

71

Large demographic and economic movements in the late eighteenth century
profoundly influenced the course of Acadian history in Terrebonne Parish. By 1803,
Acadian exiles and their descendants had established settlement patterns that have
endured through the present, continuously adapting along the way to larger economic,
environmental and social forces ranging from forging a plantation economy with their
none-Acadian neighbors in the early nineteenth century to creating a niche for themselves
in the region’s burgeoning economy as artisans catering to ‘King Sucrose’ (“King,” 1997;
Brasseaux, 1997, p. 200). The resulting complexity of Acadian society was compounded
by economic changes wrought by the transportation revolutions of the late nineteenth
century and the technological revolutions of the present age.
Bayou Petit Caillou can be seen as a microcosm of these adaptations within the
context of its people, land, and sea. In the mid-1800s, the Terrebonne Parish government
joined the transportation revolution when it began dredging canals and deepening and
widening bayous in order to make it easier for fishers and traders to traverse the southeast
swamps of coastal Louisiana. The government took over canal dredging and maintenance
from private industrialists such as Robert Barrow Sr., a prominent local plantation owner
in the early 1880s who conceived of Company Canal, the 1829 waterway connecting
Houma to the Mississippi River on the east and to the Atchafalaya River on the west.
Despite failing to turn a profit during the canal boom, Barrow and his company, Barataria
and Lafourche, continued to maintain and operate it until after the Civil War, when
shippers and parish governments realized a modernized waterway suitable for commerce
and transportation was key to Terrebonne’s future (“The Great Divide,” 1997).8 By 1890,

8

Robert Barrow Jr. finally sold the family canal to the federal government in 1925. It later became part of
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. Today the canal is considered a major cause of coastal land loss.
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the parish police jury had purchased two of its own dredges to continue this work,
connecting oyster beds to the plethora of oyster shucking and processing warehouses that
lined the banks of bayous Terrebonne, Grand Caillou and Petit Caillou. Cutting shortcuts
between bayous for navigation was an expensive economic gamble designed to meet the
needs of the local elites who owned the means of production, and it paid off, particularly
after plans were approved to extend the Louisiana Western railroad, a branch of the
Southern Pacific, through the bayous in 1905. By 1907, the parish had purchased two
additional barges and was taking credit for conducting 80 percent of the dredging activity
that had single-handedly paved the way for the fledgling oyster industry’s path to
prosperity at the turn of the twentieth century. The result was a dramatic transformation
of the landscape. M. B. Hillyard, from New Orleans, was a voluminous travel writer
whose descriptions of voyages to the Louisiana Gulf Coast were picked up by
newspapers across the country and in Europe (Grady, 1910). In 1907, Hillyard voyaged
down Bayou Petit Caillou, and his impressions provide a rare account of the
transformation Chauvin and Cocodrie were experiencing as their economies shifted from
sugarcane farming to seafood processing.
“When last here, say fifteen years ago, Little Bayou Caillou was then
spoken of as a sort of large ditch, nearly filled and mainly useless for
drainage. In point of fact one [could] cross it in a buggy without difficulty
in many places then. Bayou Terrebonne the writer does not remember, but
it is said that it was a sort of depression in the town and entirely outside
the category of navigation. Now, boats ply from here to New Orleans, and
bayous Terrebonne, Grand and Little Caillou have their waters covered
with many craft of one character and another, whose employment hinges
on the oyster business” (Hillyard, 1907, no page).
In Hillyard’s writing, Chauvin and Cocodrie functioned as twin cities whose
economies went hand in glove, with Chauvin playing commercial host to oyster shucking
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warehouses and Cocodrie, where the bayou dead-ends, providing access to oyster
grounds and primitive camp-style lodging for fishers and oyster tongers and shuckers.
With its “low-pitched unpainted homes often with thatched roofs, sometimes dark with
weather-wear …” it was “a gracefully grotesque and rough-hewn landscape” (Hillyard,
1907, no page).
Driving the Bayou Petit Caillou economy were big city elites who were likewise
adapting to changing times. Located near Chauvin in lower Terrebonne’s natural gas
fields, Terrebonne Sugar Company’s Presqu'ile plantation contained one of the largest
sugar factories in the United States and one of the largest producers of cane sugar in
Louisiana, mastering a refining technique that later spread around the world. Its officers
were the financiers behind the turn-of-the-century oyster economy before the Terrebonne
Sugar Company’s collapse during the stock market crash of 1927 (Planter and Sugar,
1917; Browning, 2016). While sugarcane production eventually resumed, it was never the
same; the sugarcane factories themselves were finally disassembled in the 1970s and
relocated to Guatemala (Browning, 2016).
In the early twentieth century some of the world’s biggest seafood canneries were
in Houma, and in the age before refrigeration there were high hopes for the Houma
oyster. Dr. Leon H. Jastremski, founder of the Pelican Lake Oyster and Packing Co., was
one investor who forecast consumption of the Houma oyster would double by 1920.
Jastremski owned one of four oyster shucking companies on Bayou Petit Caillou, but he
got his start canning shrimp. In the early twentieth century he expanded the cannery to
include a shucking department, machine room and fifteen double cottages to house 150
laborers imported from the “oyster city” of Baltimore, the nation’s leading seafood
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packing hub (Sears, 2015). Jastremski admitted “the capital of the company is mainly
raised by home folks.” The economics of the oyster industry meant that shucked oysters
saved about 80% of weight and transportation costs. Shuckers themselves earned an
average of $3.75 per day, or seventy-five cents per one thousand pounds of shucked
oysters (Hillyard, 1907). Decades later, after Governor Huey P. Long used oil money to
launch the U.S. 90 road paving project connecting New Orleans to Houma, and ushering
in the spread of public works, hospitals and schools to bayou communities, with Englishonly books and policies that prohibited speaking French in schools, Jastremski’s son,
Stanwood Duval “Tiny” Jastremski, again expanded the Pelican Lake factory to include
canned shrimp, oysters and vegetables and relocated operations to West Park Avenue in
downtown Houma.9

9

In 1934, inspired by other landmen, Long founded Win or Lose Oil Company, with a business model
based on inside dealing. Long leased state lands to himself and his associates at bargain rates, then released the tracts at heavy markups to oil companies for their development. No one knew, and when it
finally became known, well after Long’s death, no one did anything to reimburse the state hundreds of lost
millions (Houck 2015).
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Image 2.2: Trespass notices began appearing regularly in local newspapers as individual land owners,
lumber companies, and later oil and gas, land and mineral rights companies, sought to protect their property
from hunters, trappers, fishers, Spanish moss pickers, and wood-cutters. Companies like the Houma Cypress
Co. dredged access canals including the Ranch-Ashland Canal, which connected the study area to its sister
community along Bayou Grand Caillou. (Source: The Houma Courier, January 31, 1920).

Oysters were officially a major industry, but under constant threat of ecological
contamination from canal-building and population growth. The greater Houma area’s
population grew by 335 percent, from 1,500 to 6,531 residents, between 1890 and 1930,
and accelerated through World War II with the construction of the Gulf Intracoastal
Waterway, a continuous 9-by-100-foot channel that connected Houma to New Orleans in
1936 (Alperin, 2005). While the state began leasing seed grounds in the Gulf toward the
end of the 1900s, by 1960, over 70,000 acres were under contract, booming to 138,000 by
1970 and to 400,000 at century’s end (Houck, 2015). Rising alongside the oyster boom
was the south Louisiana canal system, which rapidly expanded with rising consumer
demand for goods between 1887 and 1930. Both enterprising businessmen and coastal
communities worked together to cut artificial waterways through the swamp to reduce
travel time and provide access to important markets. As a result, by 1930, prior to the
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tremendous surge in canal building associated with the petroleum industry, the coastal
landscape was marked by a number of transportation canals. The system was small, but
adequate, built to serve local communities like Chauvin and Cocodrie and providing the
necessary connectivity required for commerce.
Down Bayou Petit Caillou, the prewar population boom was not unfelt, as oyster
and shrimp canning businesses continued to expand; as public agencies cleared, dredged
and deepened canals; and as residents did the backbreaking work of farming, trapping
and oyster fishing, and the Catholic Church rooted the community in ritual and faith.10 In
the late 1920s, a young merchant, Desire Theriot, was one of few local people who, like
Albert Chauvin a generation before, regularly traveled outside Bayou Petit Caillou. It was
during a business trip to Biloxi, Mississippi, 160 miles northeast of the Cajun coast, that
Theriot learned about a new style of trawl that was producing major hauls from the Gulf
of Mexico and bringing economic riches to Biloxi shrimpers. The young entrepreneur
quickly recognized an opportunity to expand his seafood business, diversify the income
stream of the seasonal oystermen and provide a better life to his community (Gordon,
1991).
Through Theriot’s efforts, livelihoods changed from oystering to commercial
shrimping nearly overnight as workers learned to build and repair nets and adapted their
boats for sea trawling. Theriot is widely credited for not only bringing offshore
commercial shrimping to Terrebonne Parish, but also starting the Blessing of the Fleet

10

Father Jean-Marie Joseph Denecé (1825-1911) settled at Petit Caillou soon after his ordination during
the Civil War. He organized the parish established on Nov. 9, 1864 by Archbishop J.M. Odin, C.M., to
serve the people of South Terrebonne. Fr. Denecé built church and rectory, opened the adjoining cemetery,
and established missions on neighboring bayous. After his death, April 2, 1890, priests residing on Bayou
Terrebonne served this section
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shrimp festival after he witnessed a similar celebration in Biloxi. Theriot asked St.
Joseph’s Catholic Church Rev. Joseph Coulombe for permission to perform the blessing
in Chauvin as a way to build community around the new industry and usher in the first
shrimp season. The two men believed the church blessing would facilitate the
community’s adoption of shrimping and lift up the community. With the church’s
endorsement, the Blessing of the Fleet became an annual event in the early 1930s. The
religious ritual provided a sense of security for the fishermen and their families in facing
the uncertainties of change, especially the dangers that would be incurred in moving their
work from the slow-moving waters of neighboring bayous into the unknown offshore
waters of the Gulf of Mexico twenty-seven miles away (Gordon 1991, p. 8).
Paralleling the economic development of Bayou Petit Caillou in the first two
decades of the twentieth century was a larger trend of land grabbing that would
eventually alter the coast’s future. Much of the land in coastal Louisiana today, including
90 percent of Terrebonne Parish, by some estimates, is owned by large landholders, often
out-of-state corporations, who own not just the royalties and mineral rights to their plots
but also access to them from the coast. The trend began in 1900, when Midwestern
capitalist Edward Wisner arrived in New Orleans with a get-rich-quick scheme to buy up
“unsuitable” coastal land for pennies on the acre, then resell it to aspiring northern
farmers as prime agriculture. Over the course of fifteen years, Wisner purchased nearly
1.5 million acres of swampland west of the Mississippi River, including 800,000 acres
alone in the Atchafalaya Basin from the Atchafalaya Levee Board, which he bought for
an average of 25 cents per acre. The land acquisition constituted the levee board’s entire
holdings (“Large,” 1900). In exchange, the levee authority thought it would have the tax
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base it needed to build and maintain miles of levees protecting the Atchafalaya Basin. As
Wisner set his sights on more land acquisitions, he also had some convincing to do. In
1907, he wrote, “The Five Million Acres of Marsh and Swamp land around New Orleans
is in its present condition a public nuisance. Reclaimed it will be the most productive and
valuable body of contiguous farming land in the world” (“Large,” 1900, p. 1)
Marsh reclamation along the Louisiana coast is an old practice, dating back to
French colonization. The chain of title began with assignment of tract numbers during the
first U.S. land census of Louisiana, which began immediately after statehood was granted
in 1812. Thirty-seven years later, those lands were officially designated swamplands by
the U.S. Congress and in 1878 were granted to the Louisiana Land Reclamation Co.,
Wisner’s predecessor in title. After 1900, enterprising northern investors like Wisner
successfully convinced levee boards to sell large tracts of “worthless” marsh, then
founded management companies like the Louisiana Meadows Company (which later
became Louisiana Land & Exploration) to hire workers to drain and develop it and, later,
landmen to survey and lease the rights to it (Bryant, 1964).
Citing threats of overpopulation and fears of food shortages, people of the time
supported Wisner’s strategy, even if they did not quite understand it. Albert Phenis, a
special correspondent from the Manufacturers’ Record, predicted in 1907 that a few
million dollars spent draining the swamps of south Louisiana would produce revenues
that would duplicate the former wealth of the entire cotton crop of the South in a single
year. “Considering the amount to be expended, this is probably the most gigantic
investment opportunity ever given to any country in the world, for this 10,000,000 bales
of cotton would mean an annual addition of $500,000,000 to $600,000,000 to the value of
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the South’s agricultural production.” Three of Wisner’s proposed swamp reclamation
projects took place in Terrebonne Parish, according to Clifford Smith, whose father T.
Baker Smith working in 1915 was one of Louisiana’s early modern wetlands surveyors
(Clifford Smith, 2003). In total, only fifty swamp reclamation projects were completed
before Wisner’s death in 1914, and only four remained productive through the latter part
of the twentieth century (Davis, 1973). A hurricane one year after Wisner’s death
destroyed most of the levees and drainage work Wisner had managed to complete and, in
the decade that followed, lawyers for Wisner’s widow seized control of the land and sold
it to Louisiana Land & Exploration, as Louisiana Meadows was renamed in 1927.
Like many large land companies, LL&E almost went bankrupt until the discovery
of oil on its property made the trustees major players in the international oil and gas
industry. Concentrated land ownership also benefited oil companies working in the threemile coastal zone. Instead of dealing with many small landowners, companies only had to
negotiate leases with a few large landholders. In 1930, none of this was known to a
traveler to Houma who described the city as the fur capital of the United States, “a brisk,
prosperous little city, with shrimp, oyster, and fish-packing interest in addition to
activities as an outfitting place for trappers. On its streets one rubs shoulders with the
famous ‘Cajuns’ of the state” (Graves, 1930, p. 406).
Just two years earlier, Terrebonne Parish’s first oil and gas canal was dredged
near Bayou Petit Caillou after speculators discovered oil and gas fields in south
Louisiana’s coastal salt domes. The 1928 project was the first in a series of twelve oil and
gas access canals dredged across the bayou through 1990, when growing alarm over the
effect of dredging canals on land loss and subsidence pressured a few oil companies to
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funnel some profits to wetlands remediation projects (“Wetlands,” 1992). Experimenting
with the logistics and economics involved in working in the marsh and swamp, it was
near Cocodrie that the Texas Company first used a submersible drilling barge for inland
waters in 1933 (Gramling and Hagelman, 2005). With this invention, water-based
techniques became more sophisticated, and significant mineral exploration occurred in
1937 and 1938 when 29 new fields were discovered, nearly doubling the 30 developed
between 1902 and 1937 (Davis, 1973).
In the Houma City Directory of 1938-39, a total of 22 businesses were listed as
“oil and oil services.” This would grow to 260 by 2001. These businesses were either
directly engaged with oil production, like The Texas Company and Louisiana Land &
Exploration, or service groups like Schlumberger, Halliburton, or Reed Roller Bit which
came into the area to support drilling activity (Sell and McGuire, 2008). Over the next
seventy-five years, these companies would become international in scope, building their
empires off the coast of Louisiana through a web of 191 separate pipeline systems
containing more than 10,000 miles of pipeline and oil service canals “that ate the coastal
zone like PAC-MAN” (Houck, 2015, p. 203). The pattern of extraction, with ever bigger
canals serving ever bigger oil industry tankers for consumers with ever bigger appetites
for cars and homes, accelerated subsidence, which scientists later learned continues long
after actual oil production activity ends. These lingering, layered effects worked together
to transform the character and identity of the south Louisiana delta into a national
“energy sacrifice zone” (Maldonado, 2014, p. 115; 2019), which can be seen as part of a
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larger “extreme energy extraction” map that has mobilized communities across the Gulf
Coast.11
The impacts of oil and gas development on Bayou Petit Caillou in the postwar
period were subtle, then sudden. The discovery of oil brought a massive influx of
Protestant whites from northern, western and Midwestern states to the insular bayous of
south Louisiana, along with a flurry of new money for unprecedented infrastructure
projects, including two steel bridges over Bayou Terrebonne and Bayou Petit Caillou
(1941). Around the same time the Texas pipeline pathway was set from Houma to Port
Arthur through the marshes around Cocodrie, Archbishop J. F. Rummel canonically
erected St. Joseph Parish in Chauvin. Two years later, Bayou Petit Caillou was described
in a New York Times travel article using similar language as the 1907 travel piece. Oil
and gas exploration was nowhere to be found. Chauvin and Cocodrie were still connected
by an oyster shell road. A continuous line of shrimp-drying wharves still dotted the
landscape between the two outposts. At the dead-end in Cocodrie, “trappers cabins
scattered through the marshy country. The houses are stanchioned on the south side
anchored by guy wires against the wind” (Beaty, 1950, p. 1).
When the first offshore oil rigs were proposed in the early 1950s, shrimpers and
oilmen clashed, a period in local history immortalized by Jimmy Stewart in the 1953 film
“Thunder Bay.” But the logistics of shipping oil and gas supplies for drilling through the
marsh required that ship channels be created and pipelines laid. It was intense, heavy
labor, with wages too good to turn down. As one wildcatter recalled, “When they found
out what we were paying, the Cajuns stopped complaining” (Bernard, 2003, p. 37).

11

For a list of southern participants in the Extreme Energy Extraction Collaborative, see
http://www.stopextremeenergy.org/south.
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Gradually, local residents stopped resisting, and then actively contributed to creating this
unique transportation system. They also were some of the first workers to be employed
by the refineries and chemical plants that sprang up inshore, offshore, and along the
Mississippi River. Locals would not know for decades exactly how oil and gas activities
collectively contributed to coastal land loss, destroying an estimated 1,103 acres of
wetlands in the vicinity of Cocodrie from 1955-1978 (Yu, 1992). But they did sound a
series of alarm bells that went ignored for decades beginning almost as soon as they
landed on the first rig (Houck, 2015).
Wealth from the oil industry along with rapid population change attracted new
recreational tourism interests to the Louisiana bayous. Inspired by the state’s oldest
fishing tournament, the Grand Isle Tarpon Rodeo, which dates to 1928, weekend
saltwater fishing rodeos and competitions grew en masse after World War II and the
offshore oil boom, which introduced Texas, Baton Rouge and New Orleans oilmen to
coastal seaports like Cocodrie for the first time. Oilmen began to buy out trapper huts and
replace them with ever more elaborate recreational fishing retreats. Reflecting this retreat
to the coast, the state motto was coined “Sportsmen’s Paradise” in 1958, the same year
the Louisiana Intracoastal Seaway Commission was organized as a private nonprofit to
manage, develop and conserve Louisiana’s suddenly valuable coastal water resources.
Demand for increased access to the coast drove pressure to provide previously
unimaginable transportation and infrastructure upgrades. Each consecutive year saw
another expensive transportation project completed. The state road commission approved
the construction in 1960 of Louisiana Highway 56, a two-lane paved highway replacing
the oyster shell road connecting Chauvin to Cocodrie. One year later, the Houma Tunnel
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was built beneath the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, linking car traffic from the north to the
southern Terrebonne bayous at a cost of $3 million. In 1962, the originally 150-feet-wide
Houma Navigation Canal opened, providing a navigation channel between Houma and
the Gulf of Mexico south of the eastern end of Isles Dernieres. The Old River lock,
located eleven miles downstream of the Old River Auxiliary Structure at the location
where the Mississippi and Atchafalaya Rivers once connected, was finished in 1963 at a
cost of $15 million.
Between 1930 and 1970, the oil and gas decades brought thousands of new
residents to Terrebonne Parish, where the population grew from 6,531 people in 1930 to
30,922 in 1970, a 374 percent increase. Like Houma, the city of Lafayette is a case in
point for examining how the oil industry rapidly changed Acadiana. What in 1940 had
been an agricultural town of about 19,200 was transformed by 1950 to a thriving
petroleum city of 33,500. In both Houma and Lafayette, the surge in population brought
with it new stores, restaurants, theaters, hotels, bakeries and automobile dealerships.
Indeed, “the buggies and leisurely pace of an earlier Cajun day have given way to all the
furor and speed of modern wealth and initiative” (Bernard 2003, p. 37). As one south
Louisiana editorialist noted during Oil Progress Week, “Yes, the oil industry has found
solid root on our soil. We are happy to salute all of its components, from the policy
makers behind mahogany desks to the sweating roughnecks in the fields. … They truly
make every week another period of economic progress” (Bernard, 2003, p. 38). The
marriage of shrimp and petroleum was uneasy from the beginning, but as the petroleum
industry implanted its roots in the area economy the relationship became inseparable. In
1967, Morgan City changed the name of its annual Labor Day street festival, which was
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organized in 1936 to unite frog and alligator hunters, shrimpers, crabbers, dock workers
and oystermen, to the Louisiana Shrimp & Petroleum Festival.
Interviewing with the Louisiana Sea Grant in the early 2000s, one former
shrimper described the pre- and post-World War II changes brought on by the arrival of
oil and gas like this: “We’d go to the coast every weekend, but nobody went past the
islands. Nobody went into the Gulf of Mexico until after the Second World War, when
they began to explore for oil and gas in the Gulf of Mexico.” Another resident who
experienced the oil boom described what it did to her childhood landscape: “You see on
your right when you pass over the bridge? All that water they have? That used to be cattle
grazing pasture. We used to play Cowboys and Indians in the back of them trees. There’s
hardly any more trees left. It’s unbelievable!” (Louisiana Sea Grant, 2010).

Fast Times: The Rise of Conservation and Tourism, 1970-1992
The oil industry not only shaped the politics and economics of Louisiana, it
shaped the environment and culture. By 1965, the Louisiana State Health Department
effectively closed Cocodrie’s oyster beds indefinitely due to pollution from population
growth and canal-digging. Bacterial contamination from frequent overflows of raw
sewage led to malfunctions of the Houma treatment plan that sent untreated wastewater
down the Houma Navigation Canal directly into oyster beds (“Health,” 1972). Reflecting
on the unintended consequences of growth, development and local livelihoods, Oliver
Houck wrote in 2015, “Everyone had relatives who worked on the rigs or in service
companies to the rigs; made machine parts for the rigs; crewed on mud barges, dredge
barges, and/or tankers; laid pipe; ran computer programs and seismic tests; ran title and
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land surveys; provided legal work, insurance, and bank loans; and worked in the
refineries or stores and bars that served the crews. Coastal residents called Texaco simply
‘the company,’ as if there were no other employer to mention.” In areas once dotted with
cattle farms and citrus orchards, population pressures along with increased industry and
waste dumping polluted the Cajuns’ traditional fishing, trapping and hunting grounds. In
1970, Terrebonne Parish ranked first in Louisiana in the production of natural gas, third
in the production of crude oil, and among the worst in water quality (Wilson, 1972).
Competing interests along the coast created the need for more regulation and new
regulatory authorities to oversee areas of water quality, flood control, navigation,
conservation of fish and wildlife resources, and environmental enhancement. After the
Louisiana brown pelican was declared extinct in 1963, demand increased for a
coordinated coastal zone management plan, but the Seaway Commission had no budget
and was for the most part inoperative until 1970, when the Louisiana Coastal
Commission formed. The commission was made up of more than twenty members: one
from each of the 12 parishes under its jurisdiction; two appointed by the Governor from a
list submitted by both the Louisiana AFL-CIO and the Louisiana Chamber of Commerce;
and several appointed by the governor from the state at large. The commission had the
authority to coordinate planning efforts; recommend coastal studies and programs
consistent with state and local interests represented by members; and plan, establish,
construct, own, operate and maintain navigation channels to supply freshwater, prevent
saltwater intrusion and support drainage and flood control. The commission actively
participated with other state commissions in establishing a coastal zone management
plan, and allocated funds to the Seaway Commission and to state universities for studies
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relating to coastal zone management affairs. From the beginning, though, the coastal zone
commission’s composition was fraught with tension, and met with a storm of resistance
from coastal parish legislators. The conflict underscored the competing interests between
people in the coastal parishes and those in central and northern Louisiana. “If coastal
zone management must become a reality we feel it is time for the coastal parishes to
stand up and demand their proper share of control,” wrote a Houma Daily Courier
editorialist in 1975 (“Coastal,” 1975).
In 1978, after the Commission reversed a state permit for an oil access canal, it
was between the ages of seven and fifteen to attend school regularly and punishing
parents who failed to comply. As enforcement, the state created “visiting teacher”
positions, combining roles of truant officer and social worker. Educators greeted the
influx of students who spoke French in the Acadiana parishes with rules that mandated
English-only classrooms and punishment that included verbal and physical abuse. For
twenty years, through the beginning of the 1960s, hardly any French-speaking student
was immune from punishment, and the consequences were disastrous for the language,
pushing the Cajun French dialect to extinction. About 83 percent of Cajuns born in the
early twentieth century spoke French as their primary language; the number dropped to
21 percent for those born between 1956 and 1960; to 12 percent for those born between
1966 and 1970; and to 8 percent for those born between 1971 and 1975. “French became
a mystery to most postwar Cajun children, a peculiar code their parents slipped into when
they wanted to speak in confidence” (Bernard, 2003, p. 34). The year 1968 was a banner
year for attempts to bolster the status of French in Louisiana, but in many ways it came
too late. This is the year that created the Council for the Development of French in
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Louisiana (CODOFIL); state laws that mandated French instruction in public schools,
teacher certification in elementary school French, bilingual television programming, and
printing of legal notices and public documents in French; and the Institute of French
Studies at the University of Southwest Louisiana.
At the same time Cajun culture was its most threatened, tourism spending on the
Cajun coast was at its highest. By the end of the 1950s, tourism ranked as Louisiana’s
largest industry. Along with bridges and commerce, construction of Interstate-10 further
bolstered the visibility of the Louisiana bayous, generating more than $500 million
statewide in 1968, up from $290 million in 1954. Just as in the development of oil, local
Cajuns were torn. They wanted to protect and preserve their heritage, but they also
wanted their share of the wealth.
From the late 1960s through the 1970s, Cajuns participated in creating their own
brand of “cultural tourism” by packaging their heritage as a commercial product in music,
art, television, film, food, literature and dance. On Bayou Petit Caillou, the best example
is Lagniappe on the Bayou, a community festival that started in 1969 as a way to pay
down $350,000 in debt accrued at St. Joseph’s Catholic Church, which couldn’t afford
interest payments, according to the late Father Brunet (Foret, “Vanishing Points,” n.d.). A
1971 documentary produced by University of Southwest Louisiana students captured the
packaged tourism of the three-day festival in its depiction of the traditionally dressed
Lagniappe Signers, decorated commercial shrimp boats, and abundance of Cajun food.
During 1994, its final year, the fair attracted 30,000 visitors to Bayou Petit Caillou.
National factors and the coming of economic bad times, as taxes, inflation,
interest rates and fuel costs rose in the 1970s, coupled with local factors such as parent
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perceptions of Cajun French as a dead language, contributed to Cajun apathy toward
cultural preservation. As the French language was abandoned to history, the last two
decades of the twentieth century heralded into existence a commodified Cajun identity
bred by a national infatuation with Cajun culture and a tourism boom that economically
benefited Acadiana but also disrupted its remaining folk rituals. In the midst of these
transformations, Bayou Petit Caillou’s dependency on oil decreased while its attachment
to tourism increased as the devastating oil glut of the 1980s cut the economies of Chauvin
and Cocodrie to the bone, and south Louisiana experienced the first in a series of mass
exoduses of people and business from the coast.
What had been an energy crisis for most Americans during the late 1970s was a
windfall for the oil-rich parishes of the Louisiana coast. In a 1979 presentation to the
Morgan City-based Desk and Derrick Club, Hugh Fisher, representing the Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Company, traced the journey of a day’s worth of fuel drawn from a drilling site
in Cocodrie. The “Muskrat Line” pipeline cut 355 miles through once impassable
marshlands, swamps and bays to reach the oil-rich delta south of Bayou Petit Caillou.
The pipeline produced one billion gallons of gas daily, and on this particular day, Fisher
described the fuel winding its way through the underground tunnels of Louisiana up to
the New England states where, 1,800 miles away, a housewife turned on her stove so she
could cook dinner over a gas flame in her kitchen (“Gas,” 1979).
While the contribution of oil and gas revenues to the state budget had steadily
fallen throughout the decade from their peak of 70 percent in 1970, the oil crash of 1981
came at the height of south Louisiana’s prosperity. In 1980, nineteen of Louisiana’s
twenty wealthiest parishes were in south Louisiana, and Money magazine named
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Lafayette one of America’s ten richest small cities. By 1983, the trickle-down effect of
the oil glut came swiftly, hurting not only those employed directly by the oil industry but
ancillary businesses as well. A Louisiana State University economics professor found that
for each terminated oilfield worker, two others lost their jobs (Bernard, 2003). The
Houma Metropolitan Statistical Area (the combination of all of Terrebonne and
Lafourche parishes) lost nearly one quarter of all its jobs in the major downturn between
1982 and 1987.
Caught in the web were entire communities of workers, businesses, courts,
construction firms, surveyors, universities, lawyers, legislators, regulators, levee boards,
police juries, churches, civic leaders and the Army Corps of Engineers. At the center of
the web was the legacy of Edward Wisner’s turn-of-the-century swampland reclamation
project: the five private land corporations that by 1980 owned 25 percent of the entire
Louisiana coastal zone.
Some characteristics of these powerful yet little known companies are worth
mentioning. Two of the five land corporations were subsidiaries of General Motors. Most
of the major shareholders of the largest, Louisiana Land & Exploration, which earned
$1.2 billion in 1980, lived in Texas. Another, the Land and Royalty Owners of Louisiana,
gained a reputation as one of the oil and gas industry’s most active lobbies against
wetland protections and pollution controls. The early 1980s were topsy-turvy for the oil
and gas industry in Louisiana, providing a pattern that would endure through the present.
Despite economic gains and losses, the industry remained the dominant economic engine
in the state, successfully resisting unwanted regulation locally and nationally. In the face
of struggle, industry leaders strengthened alliances with the state as well as the larger
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landowners who controlled access to the coast (Houck, 2015). When the price of oil
plummeted, drilling dramatically declined and many residents lost their jobs; the HoumaThibodaux’s 20 percent unemployment rate in the late 1980s drew national attention.
Some residents returned temporarily to fishing or trapping while others sought
employment elsewhere. Payrolls from refineries and chemical plants prevented the oil
industry from completely destroying the local economy and provided a relatively stable
base for rebuilding (Houck, 2015).
Complicating this web, two parallel trends were emerging in early 1980s coastal
Louisiana: the wetlands of America were becoming a national treasure and Cajun
entrepreneurs were figuring out how to attract New Orleans tourists to the swamp. No
longer the “wastelands” of Wisner’s time, coastal wetlands were increasingly seen as
irreplaceable resources to be protected and sustained. A rising environmental
consciousness even infiltrated the Catholic Church, with the Diocese of HoumaThibodaux taking the lead in the early 1980s on urging parishioners to support the
Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Interfaith Stewardship Plan, a citizens’ action plan for the
coastal zone. “We are morally obligated, as stewards of God’s gifts, to protect and restore
our coastal wetlands,” wrote the bishop in a letter to the congregation (Houck, 2015, p.
268). Sensitivity to the wetlands led to the creation of two organizations that would play
important advocacy roles in the next two decades. In 1988, the Coalition to Restore
Coastal Louisiana was formed, quickly raising awareness of the coastal plight through its
first publication, “Coastal Louisiana: Here Today and Gone Tomorrow?” Two years
later, the Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary Program was founded to protect and
restore the 4.2 million acres of land and water that lie between the Mississippi and
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Atchafalaya rivers—the Wisner lands that continue to be ground zero of Louisiana's land
loss crisis.
Tourism interests joined forces with those on the side of awareness and advocacy
in defending the coastal environment from development threats. Three types of tourism
will serve as examples of the strange bedfellows borne out of seemingly conflicted
coastal Louisiana interests: recreational fishing, swamp tourism and culinary and culture
tourism. Recreational fishing nearly doubled during the 1970s as the tourism economy
extended down the bayous and more amenities were built to make the long drive from
Baton Rouge and New Orleans worth it. Increased fishing led to increased conflict over
Louisiana’s fishing resources, and one of those conflicts concerning the commercial use
of gill nets made it all the way to the Louisiana. Supreme Court before it was dismissed
(Margavio, Forsyth, Laska, and Mason, 1996).12
Another emerged in 1975, when outspoken, controversial Bayou Petit Caillou
fisher Randolph LaBauve gave away one thousand bumper stickers proclaiming “Save
Our Commercial Fishermen | Sportsmen Go Home.” LaBauve was protesting the influx
of Baton Rouge recreational fishers in local waters and proposed restrictions on
commercial fishing techniques that would send the industry “back to the horse and buggy
days” (“Outsiders,” 1975, p. 1). LaBauve’s fears played out in the years to come. In
1978, the National Marine Fisheries Service began a research program to reduce the
mortality of turtles caught in shrimp trawls. The method selected to protect sea turtles
was the Turtle Excluder Device (TED). A TED is a type of escape hatch in a shrimp net
that allows sea turtles to exit the net while retaining the shrimp catch. Shrimpers fought
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The case was brought by Cocodrie fishermen Randolph and Kerry LaBauve, who aggressively fought
the state gill net law enacted in 1974.

92

bitterly against TEDs, but in 1987 TED regulations were implemented that required all
U.S. shrimpers to use TEDs while fishing in U.S. waters (Durrenberger, 1992).
Within the context of rising concerns over fisheries management and increased
interest in recreational fishing, a handful of concerned anglers began meeting to discuss
banding together to promote responsible stewardship. They never used the word
“environmentalism,” but these politically conservative anglers found themselves pushing
for the same restrictions as environmental groups. In 1984, just ahead of the Louisiana
World Exposition, Louisiana became the third state behind Texas and Alabama to house
a chapter of the Gulf Coast Conservation Association, later renamed the Coastal
Conservation Association. The CCA would grow in power and prominence through the
1980s and 1990s to become a driving force behind the coastal Louisiana tourism boom
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the recreational fishing laws that made the
coast one of the most lucrative fishing zones in North America.
In the time leading up to the 1984 World’s Fair in New Orleans, other tourism
types emerged to take advantage of the state’s fastest-growing industry sector. One of
these industries was swamp tourism, and the woman behind it was Annie Miller. Miller
had experienced the best and worst of the oil boom and bust. As a child, she grew up
trapping alongside her parents. To provide for her two children, she continued to hunt,
fish, and live off the land while her partner, Eddie, went to work offshore on an oil rig.
One day in 1956, Eddie fell 40 feet from the rig during a violently windy afternoon.
When doctors later announced he was paralyzed from his neck down, Annie was
horrified but she didn’t miss a beat. The couple married in Eddie’s hospital bed, with his
broken neck supported by sandbags. Because of Eddie’s injuries, his movement was
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limited. So, wearing white garden gloves, Annie would trap snake, mink, muskrat,
raccoon, otter and nutria, and Eddie would drive the boat. They made a living this way
for twenty years, daily witnesses to the wetlands.
It was around 1979 when Betty Reed, from the local Houma-Terrebonne Chamber
of Commerce and director of the first county tourist commission, the Bayou Country
Tourist Information Center founded in 1975, approached Annie Miller about promoting
Houma tourism. A savvy businesswoman, Reed sold Miller on the concept as a way to
show another side of Terrebonne Parish beyond sugar cane plantations, to bring
awareness to the wetlands, and to get ahead of the opportunities the World’s Fair might
present to bayou communities. What started as a basic nature ride in a two-seat marsh
buggy quickly developed into a surprisingly successful business for the Millers, who
quickly upgraded to an 18-passenger boat to accommodate families on their twice-a-day
tours. Alligator Annie’s tours were first broadcast in 1980 on a television program called
“PM Magazine.” Thanks to the publicity, and to the fact that the once-endangered
alligator was making a comeback in the early 1980s, business boomed, so much so that
Miller later nicknamed a favorite gator, “Boomer” (Krupa, 2003). “I think people are just
finding us. We are really sort of unexplored as Cajuns,” Betty Reed explained in a story
on Terrebonne’s tourism boom (Thibodeaux, 1986). As Annie Miller’s swamp tours
became more brazen, tourists and the media flocked to her little Alligator Lane home off
Bayou Black Drive. After the World’s Fair, other south Louisiana swamp tour businesses
started up, and Alligator Annie’s exploded. By 1991, 20 swamp tours were operating in
Louisiana. Today, more than 30 mark the southern edge of the state, and new tours
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continue to open, from small country tours such as Miller’s to the large, air-conditioned
boats south of New Orleans (Krupa, 2003).
Annie Miller influenced nearly every other swamp-boat owner in the Terrebonne
Parish area, including Jim and Bill Munson and Black Guidry. Her success at drawing
visitors to the Terrebonne area led the local government to declare sections of the marsh
and bayous as “alligator preserves.” Her efforts to preserve the swamps also earned her
acclaim from ABC’s Good Morning America, CBS, Southern Living magazine, the Wall
Street Journal and the Los Angeles Times. In 1991, Annie Miller was named Louisiana’s
Minority and Woman Business Person of the Year. In 1997, former Gov. Kathleen
Blanco, then head of the Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism, gave Annie
Miller, who died in 2004 at age 89, an award for founding the nature-based tourism
industry in Louisiana (Krupa 2004). Annie Miller`s success marked the beginning of a
thriving swamp tourism industry centered in Houma. Within a 17-mile radius, attractions
sprung up overnight, from a wild animal farm to an Indian village. Visitors could
experience life in a typical trapper`s cabin, rent a Cajun camp for crawfishing, crabbing
and fishing, or spend the day hauling shrimp on a commercial trawl boat (Krupa, 2003).
Around the time of Alligator Annie’s retirement, another longtime Cajun tourist
attraction on Bayou Petit Caillou closed its doors forever. La Trouvaille was a familyowned restaurant located inside a weathered wooden house in Chauvin built in 1883 by
farmers Alice and Gerard Fanguy. The concept was the brainchild of Gene and Wylma
Dusenbery, who started the restaurant after her son’s July 4, 1978, death on an oil rig. La
Trouvaille filled a social void in Wylma Dusenbery’s life as the mother of 12 growing
children, who, as the Dusenbery singers, played rollicking Cajun music during every
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meal, inviting guests on Cajun quests from around the world to join in. During their early
years, the Dusenbery Family Singers—the group has a few Cajun French albums—
traveled extensively across the country, performing in Utah, California, Washington,
D.C., and Atlantic City, N.J. In 1983, they toured 18 cities in France, giving 11 concerts.
Like Alligator Annie, La Trouvaille grew up with the budding swamp tourism industry.
As it became a popular destination on tourist bus routes from New Orleans and Baton
Rouge to Lafayette, the restaurant became filled with hundreds of antique hats from
France, Germany, Russia and Italy, salt and pepper shakers, specialty plates and scores of
placemats decorated with mementos, postcards, pictures, newspaper articles and thankyou notes from the restaurant’s hundreds of fans worldwide. The restaurant’s success
astounded Wylma, a modest Cajun French woman who married Eugene “Papa Gene”
Dusenbery, a Terrebonne Parish native whose roots trace back to a great-grandfather
from Holland, more than 50 years ago (Krupa, 2003).
Demographically, the 1980s were a roller-coaster of a decade that foreshadowed
even more volatile times to come. Terrebonne Parish posted its highest postwar growth in
1982 (3.41%) and posted its lowest in 1987 (-2.48%). Hit hardest by the oil slump were
the shrimp and petroleum hubs of coastal Louisiana. Along Bayou Petit Caillou, as
Chauvin’s residential population declined in the 1980s, construction of recreational
fishing camps exploded and wetlands deteriorated at their highest rates yet. In 1980,
about one hundred fishing camps existed in the lower portions of the bayou, in and
around Cocodrie. In 1990, the census counted 299 camps. With this threefold increase
came pollution problems. An extensive study of Bayou Petit Caillou’s sewage and
drainage problems was commissioned in 1992 by the Barataria-Terrebonne National
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Estuary Program. The study found 46 percent of camps had had a sewage discharge
violation. Further, the study found that the ten and a half mile stretch of land that extends
south of Chauvin into Cocodrie included an impressive inventory of recent development.
A list compiled by the study’s authors counted seven hundred homes and camps in
Cocodrie, four hundred of which had no approved sewage disposal system; two boat
repair facilities; a dozen seafood docks; eight oilfield docks; one fire station; three
restaurants; three lodging places; two grocery stores; two stores; six boat launches; ten
house boats; and one marina with twenty slips. Ten years later, the number of fishing
camps grew to 557.
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Image 2.3: A new Louisiana’s Bayou Country sign welcomes visitors to Cocodrie. In the background is
LUMCON, the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium.. In 2017, water covered the LUMCON grounds
on 43 days, prompting marine officials to open a second marine education campus in the city of Houma.
(Source: Photo courtesy of John Solet, September 11, 2018).

Terrebonne’s population slowly climbed back to its pre-recession levels until
Hurricane Andrew decimated the area in 1992, destroying 360 homes, damaging 2,900,
sinking 30 percent of Louisiana’s barrier islands, and causing $55 million in local
damages. Since then, while the parish population has remained flat, the population itself
has retreated north. Dulac native Amanda Parfait was starting her junior year at Ellender
Memorial High School in Houma when Andrew hit, and she described the demographic
consequences to a reporter covering the twentieth anniversary of the storm. “The
neighborhood I lived in was full of families. We had a lot of friends nearby. The
aftermath of this storm began the ‘ghost town’ effect in the Grand Caillou/Dulac
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community. People started moving to Ashland and Houma, and it started to affect
businesses down there too” (Buskey, 2012, p.1).

Restore or Retreat: Morganza to the Gulf, 1992-2010
The contrast between locals and visitors living and recreating along Bayou Petit
Caillou grew stark in the years after Hurricane Andrew. The late Norbert Domangue
(1932-2011) was widely considered the unofficial mayor of Cocodrie, and the last nativeborn Cocodrie resident up until his death in 2011 at age 79. In 2003, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Lili, Norbert reflected on the different sides of Cocodrie he had witnessed in
his lifetime. As locals moved up the bayou, seeking higher ground and more affordable
housing, more tourists came to the coast to take their place, Domangue told a newspaper
reporter. They built weekend camps in gated communities or rented homes for the
summer, and sometimes he barely recognized the place of his childhood (O’Brien, 2003).
The situation Domangue described in 2003 did not develop overnight, but it
rapidly accelerated after Hurricane Andrew. Weekend fishing camps had existed
alongside trapper cabins and full-time homes since the rise of tourism in the postwar era,
when working families retreated to the rural bayou swamps and wetlands for a weekend,
a summer or an occasional getaway. Likewise, the transformation of the Terrebonne
coastline into a haven for the affluent is not exceptional. The interplay of interests along
the Louisiana coast and the various factors at the local and state levels that drove tourism
development along the coast in the latter decades of the twentieth century are many.
Loosely written state tax laws that exempt second homes from most property taxes
allowed owners of fishing camps to pay almost nothing for their waterfront vacation
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homes and led to the recreation camp building boom of the 1990s. Along with the camps
owned by rich out-of-towners are the businesses that serve them, including restaurants
priced higher than most locals can afford, invitation-only fishing rodeos, private charter
fishing companies, gas station tourist shops, marinas, and for-profit boat docks.
Weekend traffic congestion, marina tie-ups, price gouging and other nuisances
certainly drive a wedge between locals and visitors, but the most serious consequences of
the tourism boom between 1995 and 2005 were rising housing costs, increased fisheries
regulation, restricted access to once public estuaries, and out-of-reach flood insurance
rates. In a study conducted in the late 1990s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers found
that, based on eighty-two flooding events over a 108-year period of record, the
probability of a hurricane affecting the Louisiana coast in any given year is 76 percent. At
the time, Terrebonne had experienced at least three major flood events in the past fifteen
years. By 1995, the rate had climbed to seven flood events in twenty years. Elevations
along Bayou Petit Caillou, a thirty-mile long waterway, range from 8 feet in parts of
Chauvin to under 2 feet in southern Cocodrie.
As a result, locals retreated. The unincorporated community of Chauvin saw its
full-time population drop from a high of nearly 3,600 in 1980 to a low of 2,912 in 2010.
Parish planners expect the population of Chauvin, where 95 percent of Bayou Petit
Caillou residents reside, to decline by an additional 8 percent by 2020. The parish’s first
master plan, completed in 2003, incorrectly predicted development patterns from the
1990s and early 2000s to continue through 2020. In their estimate, Boudreaux Canal
would continue to be the dividing line. South of Boudreaux Canal toward Cocodrie, land
use would convert to accommodate more recreational camps.
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Image 2.4: Located next to Boudreaux Canal, this historic Chauvin elementary school closed in 2016, reflecting
an ongoing depopulation of the coast. Nine years earlier, a second Chauvin elementary school, Little Caillou,
relocated to Boudreaux Canal due to declining enrollment. Now students along Bayou Petit Caillou attend one
elementary school at Upper Little Caillou. (Source: Photo courtesy of John Solet, September 11, 2018).

As the full-time population retreated to higher ground, single-family residential
developments would follow suit. Two of the land-use goals set forth in the original parish
master plan were “preserve and enhance the rural areas of the parish” and “protect
existing wetlands while providing controlled growth in specified areas.” Later, under a
section called “Hurricane Threats,” was a conflicting strategy: “[Government] should
develop a plan for the long term or relocation of people displaced by hurricanes or
tropical storms, particularly those below or at the poverty level, to the northern areas of
the parish” (“Master,” 2003). Such was the political and economic climate in which
coastal residents found themselves before the 2005-2008 storms and floods. Unable to
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fight the coastal land loss battle on their own, none could take solace in the fact that their
government was going to help them (Solet, 2006).
By 2005, the forces were in play to continue the residential depopulation of the
southernmost coastal parishes. Hurricanes Rita in 2005 and Gustav and Ike in 2008
flooded 80 percent of Chauvin’s 1,000 households, but not one recreational fishing camp,
where the average elevation is 16 feet. With water creeping into communities that had
always been high and dry, the Morganza to the Gulf levee protection system first
developed by the Army Corps of Engineers after Hurricane Andrew took on added
urgency. In 2006, Terrebonne Parish elites formed the Morganza Action Coalition
(MAC) to promote federal authorization and funding of Morganza to the Gulf, a 98-mile
lock, levee and floodgate system designed to protect Terrebonne’s five bayous. Since
then, MAC has aggressively promoted the Morganza system and pushed for authorization
and full funding of the project in Washington and Baton Rouge.
MAC’s efforts began in force during the 18-month Louisiana Speaks Regional
Plan for South Louisiana, a 2007 campaign supporters called the largest and most
inclusive regional planning outreach initiative ever conducted in the United States
(Fraiche, 2007). The three broad goals of the Louisiana Speaks planning process were
“recover sustainably, grow smarter, and think regionally.” It was an attempt to bring
together a region that had lost more wetlands to erosion, subsidence, and resource
extraction than any other place in the country. A newspaper editorial at the time
described the situation facing Terrebonne and Lafourche parishes as a “battle … for the
future of our community.” It warned silence would spell the end of a coastal culture
rooted to the water. “Anyone who thinks it’s anything less need only look 40 or 50 miles
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east to St. Bernard Parish, which was virtually wiped off the face of the earth by Katrina
and continues to struggle not just to return to normalcy—but to redefine it” (Magill,
2006). Around the same time the editorial appeared Terrebonne and Lafourche leaders
led a caravan to the Mississippi River Commission meeting in New Orleans to repeat the
same point: The nation depends on Louisiana’s coastal communities to supply energy and
seafood, yet their need for flood control and wetland restoration has been ignored for
decades. “We are not condos on the beach. We are producing new value for the rest of
the country,” said one Terrebonne official at the New Orleans meeting.
Despite several aggressive attempts to draw attention to the Louisiana Speaks
planning process, poor attendance and a general lack of interest among residents marked
the public forums and a follow-up survey questionnaire from the start, despite the fact
that four critical local economic development and coastal restoration projects were at the
center.13 While generally well received in planning circles, in Terrebonne and Lafourche,
the Louisiana Speaks surveys in particular were met with considerable skepticism and
protest. Reggie Bourg, then a state Senate Democrat representing a coastal fishing
community in Terrebonne, criticized the one-size-fits-all nature of the multiple-choice
questions. In a 2008 interview, Bourg said he thought the questions were oversimplified,
ineffective, and written and approved by outsiders who knew little about struggling
coastal communities in Louisiana: “We have enormous issues down here that don’t
translate well on a multiple-choice survey. A lot of us thought that was a pretty dumb
way to do things. And when you look at the results, they don’t really tell you anything
you don’t already know.”

13

These included Morganza to the Gulf; Houma Navigation Canal upgrades; an elevated La. 1, the only
road linking energy hub Port Fourchon to the rest of the country; and barrier island restoration.
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At public forums, residents in the audience demanded more freedom to discuss
what mattered to them. Throughout the Louisiana Speaks coastal forums, locals told
detailed, emotional, often sophisticated stories that did not follow the state planning
script. Locals’ stories touched on habitat destruction, land loss, overfishing, and
misplaced priorities of local government officials who preferred economic growth over
protecting the water and rarely attempted to connect the two. A steadily growing vacation
population and consequent development and tourism urbanization, particularly in the
southernmost fishing settlements in the Barataria-Terrebonne estuary, had polluted small
bayous and filled waterways that commercial fishing boats freely navigated just a few
years ago. For one concerned citizen at a Lafourche Parish forum, “there are just too
many people in these extremely sensitive areas. That’s what we all need to be talking
about.”
A Houma public hearing several days later, on Jan. 31, 2007, attracted one
hundred twenty people to a government meeting room where Louisiana Speaks planners
again promoted the five-question coastal survey. Just minutes into the presentation,
however, several local residents decided they had had enough. They interrupted the
planners mid-speech by demanding a shift in emphasis to what mattered most to them:
the fourth and fifth survey questions pertaining to transportation and development and
coastal restoration, respectively. The fourth question on growth asked respondents
whether they favored uncontrolled sprawl, current growth patterns, or compact, regulated
urban growth dependent on public transportation. The fifth question asked respondents
(a) whether property owners should have unrestricted rights, (b) a better balance was
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needed between community safety and property rights, or (c) stricter building rules for
everyone should prioritize safety in flood-prone areas.
A local chamber of commerce leader criticized the survey questions and answer
choices as “issue light,” saying an array of complex local variabilities made it difficult, if
not impossible, to summarize community needs in the standardized survey style. For
example, several residents added, an emphasis on community safety logically leads to
mandated building restrictions in flood-prone areas. But such a directive would deal the
Houma-Thibodaux region, most of which lies within a floodplain, a blinding economic
blow. “You can’t just write off a whole region of the state, and you just can’t ignore our
situation here,” said one outspoken business leader during the public forum. “These
questions were written from a Baton Rouge perspective. However much you may not like
it, you all need to understand that our local economy is tied to the water that surrounds
us. We flood all the time because of that. The government and the planners might not
want it that way, but we need this water and we’re not giving it up. You can’t just take
away our livelihoods in one fell swoop.” Planner Glen Bolen responded by characterizing
the Louisiana Speaks plan as a “living document” intended to reflect “community
values,” not tell residents, business leaders, or legislators what to do.
But the discussion brought to the forefront a central conflict that characterized not
just the Louisiana Speaks planning process, but decades of attempts to create a unified
coastal plan. In coastal parishes such as Terrebonne and Lafourche, interests in protecting
the coast cannot be separated from the economic reality of a coastal economy where
livelihoods depend on the water. The input of local residents who live with this conflict
made an impression on planners, who in March 2007 again surveyed residents in the
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nineteen-parish Louisiana coastal zone to get a better handle on rebuilding priorities.
About 93 percent of survey respondents expressed support for spending more public
money on efforts to protect the coast, an abnormally high approval rating that sent a clear
message to state planners about coastal priorities. However, two-thirds of respondents
also approved of measures to increase jobs and vocational training, attract and retain
companies, improve oil-and-gas infrastructure, and expand navigation and ports.
The survey results had coastal-restoration advocates and economic development
promoters alike scratching their heads. One local business owner in Terrebonne Parish
said he was “stunned” only 23 percent of respondents expressed a desire to expand trade
and shipping and only 21 percent approved of fostering knowledge-based businesses.
Reflecting back on the survey results later in the year, he described it as a “blow” to
development and growth advocates. “That really confused me. I don’t know where they
think the future is, but it’s not in preserving culture and history. We have to get real
around here. The only way we’re going to make it is if we have a more dynamic and
diversified economy.” Coastal restoration advocates, for their part, were similarly
puzzled. The leader of a local environmental group said she did not understand how
residents could support both coastal restoration and coastal urbanization: “This has been
the heart of what we struggle with around here, the fact that you can’t have both. But
residents don’t want to hear that. They don’t see the contradiction.”
The Louisiana Speaks team combined the conflicting survey data with citizen
input to craft the final parish-level recovery plans unveiled at community meetings in
May 2007. At the meetings, state representatives attempted to summarize their findings
by acknowledging that both parish plans recognize the risks associated with living in

106

south Louisiana but also that many of those risks are “manageable with proper planning.”
The basis of the Louisiana Speaks plan for Terrebonne and Lafourche is coastal
restoration and flood protection—the plan endorses the state master plan for restoration
and levee projects, including Morganza to the Gulf. But most of its recommendations for
both parishes hinged on infrastructure upgrades that, if funded, would stimulate
considerable development in vulnerable coastal areas. The Louisiana Speaks parish plans
called for flexible zoning laws to encourage high-density development in existing
urbanized areas. However, the plans did not distinguish between urbanized areas in lowlying coastal areas—such as the sportfishing community of Cocodrie and the Port
Fourchon energy hub—and dense areas on higher ground such as Houma and Thibodaux.
It was the Louisiana Speaks plan’s “endorsement of everything,” as one audience
member opined at a Lafourche public meeting in May 2007, that frustrated many locals.
One lower Lafourche resident put it bluntly: “How can you be for coastal restoration and
then encourage population in the coastal zone? I understand about hurricane protection,
but you all should realize that hurricane protection doesn’t make us any safer. We should
be saying in this plan that we want to stop any kind of development that takes away one
more acre of our wetlands. That should be in the first sentence.” Others in the crowd
expressed skepticism over how to pay for implementation of the plan’s ambitious goals.
“Don’t worry, everyone. This is going to sit on a shelf somewhere just like all the other
plans and all the other studies,” a central Lafourche developer spoke over the crowd.
Three weeks later, the Louisiana Speaks plan for Terrebonne Parish, unveiled at a
May 30, 2007 meeting in Houma, met with similar criticisms, even though the revised
plan reflected many of the concerns voiced in Lafourche earlier in the month. Some of
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the changes were minor, but others reflected a philosophical shift in the state’s planning
approach in coastal communities that was directly influenced by local input. Instead of
calling for controlled and concentrated development in all urban areas, the bone of
contention for many at the Thibodaux meeting, the new draft stated that major
development should occur in only a handful of locales on the highest ground. The one
significant exception the plan acknowledged was Port Fourchon, a low-lying, vulnerable
energy hub at the water’s edge that neither can be pulled back to safer ground nor easily
protected. About 26 percent of the nation’s oil and 26 percent of its natural gas flows
through the lower Lafourche Parish port. Because Port Fourchon cannot be moved or
surrounded by levees, the Louisiana Speaks plan suggested limiting economic
development projects surrounding it “as much as possible without affecting industry,” in
some cases relocating businesses farther north to the coastal communities of Golden
Meadow and Larose.
Despite the plan’s shift in development priorities, Terrebonne residents insisted
on more concrete details about which places were being defined as “urban” and “on the
highest ground.” Some residents were relentless: “We need you to tell us this information
now. We’re not going to endorse anything if we don’t know what you’re talking about.”
Several residents also raised the question of how much the Louisiana Speaks
recommendations would cost. They were told that the effectiveness of the plan rests in
the state’s master plan for coastal restoration and hurricane protection, which includes the
$1 billion Morganza to the Gulf levee alignment and several projects to build back
wetlands. Without these initiatives funded and under way, both economic development
and coastal restoration would be a hard sell, a Louisiana Speaks official said.
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Most residents who participated in the Louisiana Speaks public forums were
outspoken supporters of coastal restoration projects that did not threaten the fishery- and
natural resource-dependent local economy. Once the planning process ended, the local
debate continued about whether wetland and barrier island restoration—preserving
nature—should precede or accompany economic development—preserving jobs. In the
aftermath of Louisiana Speaks, public discourses on the future of coastal Terrebonne and
Lafourche increasingly emphasized economic development to stimulate new jobs in the
coastal zone even while residents continued to lament the loss of coastal habitat. The
following summer, around the one-year anniversary of Louisiana Speaks, the Terrebonne
Economic Development Authority, a post-Katrina agency, held a retreat to brainstorm
ways to improve the local economy. One of the group exercises asked participants to
write headlines that captured their visions. None of them mentioned coastal restoration.
In fact, the mock “headline” that attracted the most enthusiasm contradicted the very
purpose of efforts to protect residents whose livelihoods require them to live in low-lying,
at-risk coastal communities: “Terrebonne’s levee system nears completion and spurs
economic boom.”
In the years preceding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, even local grassroots
groups with purported coastal-restoration missions began to embrace economic
development projects as tools to stimulate waterfront investment. In an April 2008
interview, the president of the Houma-based Morganza Action Coalition said all residents
in the coastal zone benefit from a booming economy, even if new development projects
require tampering with an already fragile ecosystem. “There are a host of federal and
state agencies that deal with construction in the coastal zone and that monitor coastal
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activity as it is. It’s regulated enough. Our position is that, locally, we don’t need to do
anything more to stop business from coming here. What we do need to do is fight for
hurricane protection so that the businesses we already have—and those we may have in
the future—can successfully do business here in this region.”
In September 2008, the Houma-Thibodaux region’s vulnerability to hurricaneinduced storm surge made national headlines for the second time in three years when two
hurricanes—Gustav on Sept. 1 and Ike on Sept. 17—swamped both coastal parishes,
causing millions in damages, flooding 2,500 homes, and prompting the federal
government to declare a fishery-resource disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. At emergency
and government meetings in Terrebonne and Lafourche immediately after the storms,
discussion focused on rebuilding destroyed sewerage and water infrastructure, helping
displaced families find housing, and other critical short-term concerns. Early recovery
conversations also emphasized the importance of long-term, large-scale plans to restore
the coast and better protect residents through measures such as home elevations, which
has proven to be the best way to prevent flooding in Terrebonne, which lacks levees high
enough to prevent storm-related flooding in most bayou communities, according to a
local planning official in a 2009 interview. When it comes to repeated, severe home
flooding, Terrebonne ranks second in the state, behind Jefferson Parish. Though elevation
requirements are meant to save homeowners from flooding in areas where the risk is
great, parish officials have challenged their accuracy, fearing they will stymie local
development.
By the end of 2008, and with updated federal flood maps looming that meant
higher insurance rates and elevation requirements for many coastal homeowners, state
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and parish officials began worrying again about stunting economic development through
a designation of severe flood risk. Though elevation requirements are meant to save
homeowners from flooding in areas where the risk is great, parish officials have
historically challenged their accuracy, fearing they would stymie local development and
even snuff out tourism. In December 2008, knowing the National Flood Insurance
Program is the sole source of flood insurance for 16,100 homes in Terrebonne and 12,500
in Lafourche, government officials requested a year delay before adopting the maps,
which were released weeks before Gustav and Ike and represented the first update since
1985. The maps put much of Terrebonne and all of south Lafourche in a high-risk flood
zone, despite the fact that south Lafourche is encircled by a hurricane-protection levee. In
early 2009, Terrebonne and Lafourche parish officials decided to contract with private
experts to help appeal alleged errors in the FEMA maps.
Around the same time as the FEMA flood map controversy, Terrebonne Parish
received word that it would be the first in line to receive a portion of the $6.1 billion in
disaster assistance the federal government approved for states hit by disasters in 2008.
Administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the money is
distributed in phases. Louisiana’s share of the first part of the money was $438 million.
About 10 percent of that must be spent on “affordable rental housing.” Of that pool, $10
million was already set aside for Terrebonne to be used for repairs, public projects,
housing assistance and other post-storm needs related to Gustav and Ike. The state’s plan,
approved by HUD, detailing how that money should be spent emphasized levees and
infrastructure, economic development, and housing.
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Although local officials immediately characterized the money as an “economic
stimulus,” residents who suggested spending ideas at public meetings in early 2009
favored using all the federal aid on levees and hurricane protection. “I say we put every
penny we have into our levees,” said a coastal resident in Terrebonne. When the expected
aid, totaling $122 million for Terrebonne and $33 million for Lafourche—the most
money allotted to any region in the state and the largest pot of federal money either parish
had ever received in the wake of a Gulf of Mexico storm—was announced, local officials
drew up a list of priority projects to submit to the state, and ultimately HUD, for
approval. The list included spending $73 million on levee projects; $15 million on
drainage improvements; $15.5 million on housing; and $2 million on economic
development and recovery projects including a cold storage facility for commercial
fishers, a generator, and a loan program for hurricane-affected businesses.
In the wake of the 2005 and 2008 hurricanes, Terrebonne’s planners turned to the
parish master plan adopted in 2004 for guidance. Not only did they find the $700,000
master plan out of date, but they realized it offered little guidance in steering the recovery
of a parish on the hurricane frontline, a place where coastal communities are facing
extinction, rapidly depopulating with each passing hurricane season, even as the northern
end of town has seen a population boom and the development of eight new motels since
2005, a 52 percent increase. In June 2009, parish officials began soliciting public
comments once again to start the process of updating the master plan. According to a
local planning official, few of the ideas generated during the Louisiana Speaks postdisaster planning campaign survived, and none made it into the second Terrebonne
master plan. Such are the dynamics of a coastal Louisiana parish whose future is literally
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changing day to day. “We just don’t find it has much relevance to our specific situation
since the storms. There is a real disconnect between what we’re experiencing on the
ground and the situation stated in the Louisiana Speaks parish plan.”

Conclusion: Restore, Retreat or Adapt, 2010-2019
When the BP-leased Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded,
killing 11 workers, it set a chain of events into motion that fundamentally changed the
conversation in south Louisiana (Freudenberg and Gramling, 2011), from one of
restoration— disaster-proofing flood-prone communities—to one of adaptation—
resettling families to higher ground in an effort to buy time and postpone the inevitable.
The spill was an assault on a fragile environment, an affront to big business, and an
impeachment of the regulatory credibility of government (M’Gonigle, 2013). It also did
not change much. As M’Gonigle writes,
“The BP disaster could have kicked off a critical examination of the dominant
economic and political order. But its containment and astute political management
meant that a serious challenge to America’s oil addiction never appeared on the
public radar. After all, to challenge oil is to challenge what oil fuels—a growing
economy that demands cheap and reliable primary resource inputs” (2013, p.
1012).
Research indicates that people’s experiences with disasters like the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill may be understood best in terms of social processes—the mechanisms
by which communities are divergently vulnerable to disaster-related disruptions, and how
within these communities both individual and household vulnerability can vary (Cutter,
2003, 2006; Cope and Slack, 2017). The complexity of social vulnerability is one way to
frame how the “restoration to adaptation” shift happened in southeast Louisiana
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communities in the aftermath of the 2005 storms and the 2010 oil spill. As Cope and
Slack note in their 2017 analysis of data from the census and Community Oil Spill
Survey, a place-based index of social vulnerability helps explain the characteristics that
make people and communities uniquely susceptible. In their factor analysis, Cope and
Slack find that communities at a “rural disadvantage” due to poverty and unemployment,
and those with low-income families, general geophysical and socioeconomic instability,
aging populations over 65, high poverty and concentrations of mobile homes account for
93% of the total variance among social vulnerability indicators measured (Cope and
Slack, 2017, p. 229).
But this case study argues that social vulnerability must be positioned within the
context of coasts as landscapes of power (Zukin, 1991). Historically, recovery and
reconstruction efforts following Louisiana Gulf Coast storms have exacerbated tensions
between public and private interests in the use and demarcation of valuable waterfront
land (Freudenberg et al., 2008; Charlier and Bologa, 2003; Griffith, 2000). Surges in
reconstruction following damaging coastal storms have historically stimulated
development pressures in Louisiana, for one because of the change opportunities that
surface after disasters (Colton, Kates, and Laska, 2008; Flint and Luloff, 2005; Platt,
1999). And for another, federal, state, regional, and local governments have tended to
promote coastal urbanization and tourism development through the provision of
infrastructure, investment schemes, permissive zoning regulations, and other initiatives in
the name of accelerating economic development (Freudenberg et al., 2008; Bagstada,
Stapleton, and D'Agostino, 2007; Smith and Brent, 2001; Dean, 1999; Logan, Whaley,
and Crowder, 1997).
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The case of Bayou Petit Caillou is a story of the loss of isolation. The case shines
a light on the historic pattern of local and national interests combining to exploit a coastal
community’s resources, particularly since the 1960s when hotels, second-home
developments, and sportfishing marinas emerged, depriving local residents of dockside
space along the coast, damaging wetlands, restricting navigation channels, and polluting
popular swimming holes (Solet, 2006).
Coastal land ownership, land-use policy, post-disaster planning, and government
intervention in the market via taxes, subsidies, and insurance, all influenced coastal
development patterns and decisions in south Louisiana. At play here are major themes in
contemporary social scientific studies of coasts: political responses to environmental
threats; the politics of coastal development; the role of nongovernmental and
environmental groups in shaping the coastal agenda; and the “terms of trade” between the
owners of the land and the coastal residents who are experiencing the consequences of its
use—from fishers anxious about the unintended effects of new mitigation projects (fixing
one problem only to create another) to local tourism boosters fixed on ever-more-creative
ways to draw more visitors and businesses to sportsman’s paradise. As Kousis (2004)
notes in her study of protests against a wastewater treatment plan in Catalonia and a fossil
fuel plant in Portugal, while planners and the public may oppose projects considered
environmentally damaging, a combination of political and private forces predictably team
up to ensure such developments proceed.
“Before the BP settlement, this whole master plan was an academic exercise.”
Those were the words of Louisiana Gov. John Bel Edwards during a spring 2017 meeting
with coastal stakeholders: local levee board members, advocates, legislators, lobbyists,
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landowners and state officials. Everyone nodded their heads; they knew exactly what the
governor was talking about (Alford, 2017, p. 1). After years of trying to convince the
world that Louisiana was washing away, and after thirty years of master planning, coastal
planning, public meetings and policy summits, the gigantic pile of money needed to
jumpstart the state’s $50 billion coastal master plan was finally on its way to the Bayou
State. At stake in the wake of the 2016 BP oil settlement are two substantial sums of
money. First is the roughly $10 billion to be paid out to Louisiana over the course of
fifteen years for legal settlements. Second is the $140 million annually that will be
gleaned from offshore oil revenue, beginning in 2018-2019 through the federal Gulf of
Mexico Energy Security Act, or GOMESA (Alford, 2017).
The combined cashflow has contractors, parish governments, engineers,
landowners and many others trying to get ahead of the competition to come, while
elected officials are getting more serious about their oversight roles, and scholars critique
the state’s ability to build local capacity to implement the coastal master plan (Knox,
2017). Spending priorities are being questioned with a fresh intensity; bills have been
introduced at the Capitol to address how some of the incoming revenue should be
distributed; and protection advocates are facing off against restoration supporters, with
both arguing that their respective projects are critical to the state’s core mission (Alford,
2017). As erosion and subsidence relocate the coast and its byproducts further north, the
proverbial table where deals are made is growing larger. Occurrences of saltwater
intrusion have been found as far north as Baton Rouge and officials in the River Parishes
region are reporting unprecedented backwater flooding connected to lower-lying areas.
Gov. Edwards, convinced that Louisiana has reached a turning point, declared an official
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state of emergency in 2017 for Louisiana’s coast. Make no mistake—the state’s plan to
save the coast is being funded and implemented on a grand scale that promises high
hurdles. The National Wildlife Federation has said that Louisiana is “embarking on the
largest restoration effort in U.S. history” while the Public Affairs Research Council
recently compared the process of putting the state’s blueprint into action with tackling a
“five-dimensional jigsaw puzzle” (Alford, 2017, p. 1).
The fight to protect the coast has evolved well beyond an academic exercise. It’s
now an administrative and political battle that the entire state will see play out through
the fourth decade of the twenty-first century. With real money now at stake, Louisiana’s
$50 billion, newly revised 50-year coastal master plan has shifted its emphasis away from
a years-long focus on restoring all that has been lost and saving every swamp, marsh and
community. Instead, the state is engaging in triage, acknowledging, however
begrudgingly, that some communities cannot be saved and some people will have to
move to higher ground. Louisiana’s official focus has shifted from restoration to
adaptation, to reducing risk. It is a public acknowledgement that the state lacks the time
and money to continue along the same restoration and mitigation path it had been on
since the late 1980s.
The trickle-down effect of BP oil money to Terrebonne Parish will largely support
the Morganza to the Gulf hurricane protection plan that was put together by the Army
Corps of Engineers after Hurricane Andrew. Recently dubbed “The Great Wall of
Louisiana” by Taxpayers for Common Sense, one of Morganza’s key features, and the
linchpin of Terrebonne’s hurricane protection system, is a $366 million lock on the
Houma Navigation Canal. Engineering for the lock complex, underway about two years,
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is expected to wrap up in 2019, with the lock completed by 2022, partially paid for with
BP settlement funds (Magill, 2017). Once opened, the 110-foot lock complex will be the
single biggest public works project in parish history. Its twin purpose is to block storm
surges that could inundate Houma and other inland communities, and channel fresh water
from the Atchafalaya River through the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and into marshes in
central and western Terrebonne, preventing saltwater intrusion. Once Terrebonne’s
coastal lock systems are completed within the next three years, almost every community
in the parish will be protected.

Image 2.5: This aerial image depicts a section of the Morganza to the Gulf hurricane protection project. The
Bayou Petit Caillou canal floodgate and associated floodwalls were completed in 2016 at a cost of $19.8 million.
(Source: Photo courtesy of T. Baker Smith from aerial video taken on July 18, 2017).
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The economic consequences of land loss for Louisiana and the rest of the country
in a future without action to protect and restore the coast are, for now, understood. From
1932 to 2010, Louisiana lost approximately 1,880 square miles of land, and state and
federal officials project another 1,750 square miles are at risk of being lost by 2060.
Coastal restoration projects will stem the tide, but not by much, and not forever. In the
meantime, the Cajun culture continues to change. In 2018, the Diocese of HoumaThibodaux announced that south Louisiana is no longer predominantly Catholic. The area
has seen one-third of its Catholic population leave the faith during the past forty years
(Copp, 2018).14
The unsentimental tone of contemporary planning and adaptation conversations is
a stark contrast to the plans of yesteryear, but reflects the realities facing the future of the
coastal zone. In 2017, more than 80 percent of Terrebonne Parish citizens participating in
a community planning process led by LA SAFE (Louisiana's Strategic Adaptations for
Future Environments) agreed with a vision proposed for high-risk coastal environments
that includes “fewer permanent, full-time residences and more seasonal, recreational and
workforce housing.” More recently, a fall 2018 poll conducted for the National Audubon
Society on behalf of Restore the Mississippi Delta found that 49 percent of coastal
Louisiana voters think land loss will affect them directly this year, 70 percent in five
years, 77 percent in 10 years and 79 percent in 20 years. In a region comprised of
Terrebonne, Lafourche and St. Mary parishes, 60 percent think coastal land loss will
affect them this year, 75 percent in five years, and 81 percent in both 10 and 20 years.

14

During its inception on March 2, 1977, the diocese counted about 67 percent, or 132,000 people in the
area, as Catholic. In 1987 that number decreased to 129,510; 1997, 125,185; 2007, 114,945; and 2017,
90,293.
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With business and property more at risk than ever, Terrebonne’s population is in
decline amid a global crude glut and resulting low prices that have sparked layoffs and
work slowdowns throughout Houma-Thibodaux’s oil-based economy. Across the region,
an astonishing 83 percent of homes, valued at $13 billion, are at risk of damage or
destruction from hurricane storm surge flooding in Terrebonne and Lafourche parishes
alone (CoreLogic, 2018). State figures show the area has lost roughly 13,000 jobs since
the oil bust began in mid-2014. Census figures show that between 2000 and 2010, 15
percent of Montegut, 11 percent of Chauvin and 30 percent of Dulac residents left those
communities, where many have suffered repeated flooding. Efforts are under way to
relocate residents of Isle de Jean Charles, whose population has dwindled along with the
tiny island itself (USHUD, 2016), “an episode emblematic of growing concerns about the
equity of retreat” (Henderson, 2018, p. 657), to a 515-acre parcel of land in Schriever,
“where a subdivision will be built to house those who are in harm’s way on the island”
(Yoshonis, 2019, p. 4). Henderson (2018) goes on to theorize that “an ideal strategy for
retreat, or at least one that overcomes many of the current challenges faced by retreat
measures, would have several features: flexibility to address the unpredictability of sea
level rise, relatively modest costs, and the capacity to overcome legal uncertainty and
political opposition” (p. 657).
In contrast, Louisiana’s coastal master plan emphasizes voluntary buyouts to
move more than 8,200 homes out of flood-prone areas in Terrebonne and Lafourche. The
plan does not specify where the money will come from, nor the manner in which entire
communities will be resettled. It leaves the job of determining which specific homes and
communities would receive aid in the hands of parish governments, and it leaves
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questions of economic, cultural and human costs unanswered. “Migration and
environmental change are a research frontier,” (Simms, 2017, p. 410), and Louisiana is
on the front lines as coastal communities like Bayou Petit Caillou learn to embrace
adaptation as a way of life in the twenty-first century.
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Chapter Three: Case Study, Apalachicola, Franklin County, Florida
Introduction: ‘The most important thing in a century’

Image 3.1: The study area highlighted in red contains Apalachicola, located at the tip of the Florida Panhandle,
approximately 200 miles southeast of Pensacola.

Apalachicola Bay, an estuary recognized by the United Nations for its uniqueness,
once produced 10 percent of the nation’s oysters and 90 percent of Florida oysters. No
longer. The story of the Apalachicola oyster’s demise provides a lens into a larger legal
and political tug of war between twenty-eight Florida gubernatorial administrations, three
states, six rivers and two basins that dates back nearly a century. In 2018, after thirty
years of litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court finally weighed in on the so-called “water
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wars” conflict dividing the states of Georgia, Alabama, and Florida over control of water
flows into the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and the Alabama-CoosaTallapoosa River Basin. Florida v. Georgia pitted the thirsty megalopolis of Atlanta and
the farmers of southwestern Georgia against conservationists and seafood producers
along a stretch of the Florida Panhandle known as the Forgotten Coast.15 Both states
argued they need the fresh water, which starts in the foothills of the Blue Ridge
Mountains and in a spring just south of the Atlanta airport, before meandering hundreds
of miles on its way to the Gulf of Mexico via the Apalachicola River. But for decades the
Georgia agricultural lobby had been winning the war, aided by decisions from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers dating back to 1946. Often in such Supreme Court disputes
over boundaries or water rights, interstate arguments center on growth. But in
Apalachicola, the argument was environmental and historical-ecological, about getting
back what was, and it gained the court’s sympathy. More fresh water flowing down the
Apalachicola River would not only help preserve the basin’s fragile ecology, it would
also provide the perfect degree of bay salinity required to sustain the oyster industry, and
thus a 250-year-old way of life.
In its 5-4 decision handed down on June 27, 2018, the court took a rare—if not
unprecedented—stance, seeming to suggest that in water disputes between states, the
health of an aquatic ecosystem can be considered alongside drinking water and farming
concerns. The court sided with Florida when it remanded the case back to the special
counsel with instructions to reconsider Florida’s proposal and evidence. Now the task for

15

In 1967, the magazine Holiday coined the phrase “Forgotten Coast” in describing a stretch of Old
Florida from the Panhandle to the Everglades. The story featured color photographs of Weeki Wachee,
Tarpon Springs and St. Petersburg (Johoda 1967).
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Florida is to prove how an increased freshwater flow would help Apalachicola Bay
“bounce back” (Beitsch, 2018, p. 6).
As the saga continues, there is a tinge of irony to arguments in favor of protecting
the Apalachicola oyster economy. Because it might be too late. Since 2012, the lack of
freshwater flows combined with over-harvesting and predation have severely damaged
the Apalachicola oyster population. In 2013, the Apalachicola Bay was declared a federal
fisheries disaster area, and in 2016 it was named the most endangered river basin in the
U.S. Restoration efforts over the past five years have included a re-shelling program,
stricter regulations on harvests, and monitoring daily hauls, but they have done little to
stem the tide. Apalachicola Seafood Workers President Shannon Hartsfield has estimated
that scores of oyster fishermen have either moved away or abandoned a way of life that
sustained them for generations (Ash, 2016). Backing this up are Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission records dating back to 2001, which show over 1.2 million
pounds of oysters were commercially collected annually in Franklin County for over a
decade. The number peaked in 2012 with just over three million pounds before
plummeting to just under 400,000 pounds in 2016.
Longtime Apalachicola city attorney Pat Floyd described the situation happening
in 2018 as “probably the most important thing in a century for Apalachicola. This is the
best ecosystem and the most pure water body in the Northern Hemisphere. So is that
something worth giving away without a fight? ... If we can make a dent and get the fresh
water down here, this can revive and populate the oysters the way they have been”
(Associated Press, 2018, p. 9).
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This chapter considers Apalachicola’s struggle to preserve its working waterfront
and protect the environment upon which it depends as a result of careful decision-making
and deliberate dialogue involving local actors who were actively engaged in plotting the
future of what their community was going to be. The chapter explores Apalachicola’s
twentieth century development by weaving this thread of continuous local agency within
the context of constant external pressures to succumb to Florida’s sun, sand and sea
tourism economy as well as ecological and environmental threats beyond local, regional
and state control. Section one, Arrivals, explores how Apalachicola’s peripheral position
on the Forgotten Coast endured through World War II, even as developers rose in
prominence to influence policy in Tallahassee and Washington with their “convincing
promises of paradise” built on images of sunshine, palm trees, and endless tourist
consumption (Barnett, 2007, p. 8). In section two, Fast Times, the ways Apalachicola
resisted change in the postwar period through the economic recession of 2008 are
explored within the broader context of Florida’s efforts to manage its postwar population
growth by purchasing endangered lands for open space, mandating building codes in
coastal counties, introducing comprehensive planning to municipalities, and adopting
Smart Growth mandates. Special attention is paid to the impact of two bridges built thirty
years apart: the 1935 John Gorrie Memorial Bridge linking Apalachicola to its Franklin
County neighbors across the bay, and the 1965 causeway spanning Apalachicola Bay to
then-undeveloped and largely uninhabited St. George Island. The conclusion, Adaptation,
considers how decisions like Florida v. Georgia and disasters like the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill will affect the future of rural Franklin County, which has as much
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coastline as the state of Alabama but fewer than 12,000 residents, and the larger
ecosystem dynamics that surround it.

Arrivals: The ‘big little county’ along the Forgotten Coast, 1870-1940
Travelers have long believed that the Florida peninsula possesses “exotic Edenic
qualities” (O’Sullivan and Lane, 1991, p. 2).
Whether traveling by Spanish galleon or by auto-train, generations have
come to Florida with hopes of restoration or re-creation. Ponce de Leon’s
quest for the fountain of youth in La Florida, the land of flowers, was only
the first recorded account to identify the state symbolically with the idea
of regeneration. Huguenots fleeing religious persecution, Creek Indians
escaping British domination, African slaves seeking freedom, nineteenthcentury tourists escaping industrial cities, and twentieth-century Cuban
refugees searching for political freedom and economic opportunity—each
new wave of immigrants and visitors has carried to Florida a dream of a
new life in paradise. Such visions have profoundly shaped the peninsula’s
history and culture (O’Sullivan and Lane, 1991, p. 2-3).
After the Civil War, Florida was one of the least populated states in the Union
with fewer than 200,000 people, compared to a national population nearing 40 million.
By the 1870s, “a pilgrimage of pleasure” was in full swing farther north on the Atlantic
coast at such resorts as Atlantic City and Cape May, New Jersey (Lencek and Bosker,
1998, p. 1). The development of fashionably elite resorts—the conspicuous consumers all
workers strove to become in Thorstein Veblen’s The Theory of the Leisure Class
(1899)—was spurred by the growth of extensive cheap rail service, a growing middle
class with disposable income, and a spreading social belief in the healthful benefits of the
seashore (Stokes, 2007). As early as 1823, Charles Vignoles recommended St. Augustine
as a winter haven for the ill, remarking on “the geniality of the climate, the beauty of the
orange groves, the vicinity of the ocean, and the quietude of the place” as contributing
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“greatly towards the restoration of health to consumptive persons” (Miller, 1998, p. 10).
The level of tourism promoted by medical authorities and travel writers concerned about
“swamp miasmas,” consumption, bronchitis, rheumatism, exhaustion, old age, and
infertility helped develop places such as St. Augustine and Jacksonville, whose
population of 28,429 made it the state’s largest city at the turn of the century (Miller,
1998) By the late nineteenth century, Henry Flagler’s dream to develop east Florida in a
tripartite scheme of railroads, hotels, and land developments was viewed as the engine
that could drive the rest of Florida’s growing economy into the twentieth century (Miller,
1998).
Like much of the Florida Panhandle, the Apalachicola economy before and after
the Civil War was largely immune to the coastal tourism frenzy sweeping the Atlantic
coast. Agents of the house of Forbes & Company of New York, who carried on a vast
trade with the U.S. government, purchased Franklin County land from the U.S.
government in 1804 and, later, from Spain (Ziewitz and Wiaz, 2004). The firm owned all
of what is now Franklin County until 1820, when Forbes sold its possessions to Mitchell,
Innerarity and others, who went on to organize the Apalachicola Land Company. The
company expanded the trading business inaugurated by Forbes by recruiting capitalists
from the Northeast to relocate to Pensacola (Ziewitz and Wiaz, 2004). The strategy
worked, and the Apalachicola settlement grew rapidly. The city was incorporated in 1829
by a company of wealthy New York speculators and within a decade became the third
largest antebellum cotton port in the U.S., just behind New Orleans and Mobile. By the
late 1830s, the earliest of coastal resorts had sprung up in the Panhandle, frequented by
northern newcomers and wealthy elites from the interior whose summer outposts on the
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Gulf were designed to escape hot, sickly summers (Ziewitz and Wiaz, 2004). It was not
until after the Civil War, however, that Apalachicola saw its first tourist development,
and not until decades into the twentieth century that the town received its first share of
Florida’s growing “sun-income” (Ziewitz and Wiaz, 2004, p. 50).
Although cotton made a brief resurgence after the Civil War, the Apalachicola
economy remained rooted in extracting resources from the land and sea, with sawmills
taking the place of cotton beginning in 1867, when construction of the first mill led to a
lumber boom that witnessed one to two mills built each consecutive year through 1890
(Rogers, 1986). By then, lumber had become the principal industry in Apalachicola
(Rogers, 1986). It turned around the languishing economy by providing an annual income
of $1.5 million, revived Apalachicola as a port city, and attracted a string of outside
investors to the Panhandle whose names still live on within the downtown historic
district, names like John Gorrie (South Carolina); James N. Coombs (Maine); and Oliver
Hudson Kelley (Boston).
Rising up alongside the lumber industry was oystering. Before the early 1880s,
the longtime oyster industry of Apalachicola was a small-scale, regional endeavor,
confined to catching the shellfish for shipment to the interior of Georgia and Alabama via
steamboat (Rogers, 1986). Once the packing of fish into cans became commonplace in
1883, cargo loads of canned oysters from Apalachicola were shipped by rail around the
nation. The Ruge Brothers Packing Company, the firm that started canning oysters in
gallon tins in 1850, following the invention of artificial ice by Apalachicola resident Dr.
John Gorrie, emerged to lead the way in oyster sales. The Ruge Brothers’ largest markets
for canned and shucked oysters made Apalachicola a household name in Kansas City,
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San Francisco, Portland, Oregon, and Denver, Colorado. The industry grew so quickly
and was so promising that the Florida state legislature in 1879 passed an act to protect
and regulate fisheries, authorizing counties to hire “fish bailiffs” as enforcers of illegal
catch (Rogers, 1986). Another state law in 1881 went further by encouraging individuals
to plant oysters in Florida public waters and establishing a process by which people could
be awarded exclusive oystering rights in designated waters by applying to the county
commissioners (Rogers, 1986). In 1889, a short-lived Florida Fish Commission attempted
to take responsibility for regulating Florida’s fishing industry away from individual
counties by creating an authority to annually investigate the oyster waters and oyster beds
of the state and recommend to the governor policies to increase both yields and oystergenerated revenues (Digest, 1893; Rogers, 1986).16
Despite its commercial promise in lumber and oysters, Apalachicola, like other
Gulf ports, struggled to make a case for itself to Congress for improvements to water
navigation and trade. In an 1895 editorial, The Apalachicola Times wrote on page 1:
“Here is the harbor of Apalachicola, acknowledged to be the second
largest
lumber shipping port on the Gulf, and the largest appropriation we have
been
enable to secure at any one time was $20,000—hardly enough to begin the
work.”

Some Apalachicolans even supported a scheme to separate from Florida and make the
area west of Apalachicola a part of Alabama, which was more likely to develop a deepwater port (Rogers, 1986). As the Miami area boomed in 1923, leaving the Panhandle
farther behind, author Clara Stillman reflected on the value of separating Florida into two
16

The commission was replaced in 1913 by a state Department of Game and Fish. However, two years
later, the state relinquished central authority to the counties. In 1917, the legislature reversed that decision
and vested ownership of game, birds and fish with the state, as it remains today.
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states, North Florida and South Florida, or three states, giving the Panhandle to Alabama
and allowing both the chance to be part of a regional economy with unified access to the
sea (Rogers, 1986). In March 1982, the proposal grew traction when state representative
Tommy Sandusky of Mobile drafted a resolution calling for a meeting among counties of
southern Alabama and the Florida Panhandle to consider the creation of a new state.
Those supporting secession argued that Panhandle residents had more in common with
Alabama residents than with the transplanted New Jerseyans and other northerners who
dominated South Florida and the Atlantic coast of the state. Although Alabama Governor
Fob James offered Florida $500 million to purchase the Panhandle, few politicians in
either Florida or Alabama supported “this kind of secession” (Stanonis, 2014, p. 27).
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Image 3.2: Paid for by fourteen seafood packing companies and investors, this 1925 advertisement
promoted the pollution-free Apalachicola oyster and appeared in newspapers across Florida. (Source:
The Tampa Tribune, February 11, 1925).

Through the early 1930s, Apalachicola’s turn-of-the-century battle for
infrastructure upgrades became a recurring theme, often pitting local business leaders,
many of whom were transplants from New England cities, against Tallahassee
lawmakers. It was a David versus Goliath tale that would resurface again and again
throughout the century as Northwest Florida struggled for its share of state prosperity.
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The construction of the 1935 John Gorrie Memorial Bridge linking Apalachicola
to its Franklin County neighbors across the bay, and the 1965 causeway spanning
Apalachicola Bay to then-undeveloped and largely uninhabited St. George Island, were
turning points in local history, both symbolically and practically. Franklin County
contains two incorporated towns, Apalachicola (the county seat) and Carrabelle, and
several unincorporated places—St. Theresa, St. James Island, Lanark Village, and
Eastpoint. Roughly 70 percent of the county is publicly owned by various state and
federal agencies; the St. Joe Company owns another 15 percent or 55,000 acres (Chapin,
2003; Gaither and Worthen, 2010). Until the 1935 Public Works Administration bridge
was built, Apalachicola was cut off from the outside world for more than a century,
served by frequently broken-down ferries and potholed streets (Rogers, 1986). But if the
new bridge to Eastpoint and beyond was a symbol of hope, flexibility, and connectivity,
the 1965 barrier island bridge was a symbol of change, for it ushered in a new era of
centralization and tourism expansion between St. George Island and Apalachicola that
eventually extended to markets as distant as Atlanta and Birmingham. A commercial
fisherman who fought against the 1965 span and second homes on St. George noted that
the bridge battle marked the beginning of forty years of fighting between developers and
local fishers over a host of resource-management issues (Eidse, 2006).
The increased connectivity threatened historic norms and practices, encouraged
tourism growth, and brought about social, political, and economic challenges that have
changed local lives ever since. Like the water wars described later in this chapter, the tale
of two bridges crossing Apalachicola Bay provides a lens into the changes occurring
along the rural Florida Panhandle and the Apalachicola River Basin in the Forgotten
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Coast of the mid-twentieth century (Trusty et al., 2012), when technology closed one of
America’s last frontiers and catapulted the dredging, filling, and paving of swamps and
forests once so impenetrable that, according to folklore, a Franklin County homesteader
named Cebe Tate dubbed a particularly fearsome tract Tate’s Hell after a seven-day
journey through the woods to track a panther that had been attacking his livestock
(Rogers, 1986; Standiford, 2002).
Two months after the Labor Day hurricane of 1935 destroyed the Key West
Railroad—celebrated as one of the greatest engineering feats of all time when it opened
in 1911 as a 153-mile-long extension of Henry Flagler’s Florida East Coast Railway—
thousands of Apalachicola residents donned their finest clothes and met near the
downtown fishing docks to celebrate the opening of the longest bridge most of them had
ever seen (Rogers, 1986).17

17

See also Apalachicola Times issues of Sept. 14, Oct. 26, and Nov. 2, 1935.
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Image 3.3: Tallahassee banks and car companies saw opportunity in the opening of the Gorrie bridge, as
this advertisement from Tallahassee-based Capital City Bank shows. (Source: Tallahassee Democrat,
November 5, 1935).

The opening of the $1.5 million, 6.5-mile John Gorrie Memorial Bridge had been
anticipated for more than a decade. It took WPA funding and an assortment of state and
local appropriations to construct the span connecting Apalachicola on the west bank of
the Apalachicola Bay to Eastpoint at the other end (Rogers, 1986). The bridge was
largely viewed as the “missing link” to the general traveling public and a way to
jumpstart the “remote and unexploited,” “dying” small town of Apalachicola by
connecting it to the Tallahassee and south Georgia economy (Rogers, 1986, p. 26). At the
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November bridge opening on Armistice Day, city leaders served mullet, shrimp and
oysters to 10,000 visitors and dignitaries including Florida Governor David Sholtz, who
spoke about the bridge breathing new life into depressed Apalachicola, and resurrecting
the boom times of Franklin County’s antebellum commercial past. The day ended with a
football game, fireworks and a gala dance (“Sholtz,” 1935, p. A1). In his remarks,
Governor Sholtz credited Apalachicola residents for advocating for the bridge, saying
“forty governors would not have secured this bridge if you people had not gone out and
plugged for it.” He went on to assert the “great need for a bridge to span Apalachicola
Bay” and that “a new day of prosperity for Northwest Florida is at hand.” Millard
Caldwell, representing the third Congressional district, said the opening of the bridge “is
Florida history in the making,” and predicted the Panhandle would experience in the next
few years a prosperity and growth “that will be as astounding to us as the realization of
this bridge today.” Caldwell ended by declaring Franklin County, from here on out, “the
big little county” (“Sholtz,” 1935, p. A1).

Fast Times: Revival and Resistance on the Redneck Riviera, 1940-1970
In the decades that followed its grand opening, the John Gorrie Memorial Bridge
did little to immediately change Apalachicola, although it was not for lack of trying. Just
as Texas and coastal Louisiana were experiencing their own oil and gas boom, Florida in
the early 1940s found itself in a similar predicament when the state decided to shift its
emphasis on exploration from the southern tip of the peninsula to the north and western
portion of the state. It was during World War II, but Florida’s motivation was not entirely
to help the war effort; just like their peers in Texas and Louisiana, state leaders were
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beguiled by the promise of new oil jobs and state revenues when they decided to lease
virtually all of Florida’s Gulf Coast waters—including everything hugging the shore to
more than ten miles out to sea across a 425-mile stretch between Apalachicola and
Naples—to one company, Arnold Oil Exploration, which was later bought by Coastal
Petroleum. The lease area totaled 3.6 million acres, about the size of Massachusetts
(Braslow, 1996).
A pattern similar to the early twentieth century Edward Wisner-Louisiana Land &
Exploration swamp leases unfolded. The issue in Florida was that the leases had no
termination date—they were essentially forever—and the annual rent came to just
$22,566.40, pennies on the acre (Braslow, 1996). Because Coastal Petroleum lacked
financing to drill for oil on its leases, it partnered with oil companies including Chevron
and Mobil, which spent $16 million drilling thirteen exploratory wells between 1947 and
1968. In all, twenty-two offshore wells were drilled, and each one failed to produce
commercial quantities of oil or natural gas. Coastal did succeed in marketing and
managed to sell enough shares to investors to keep the lights on in its Apalachicola
office—and to pay lawyers. Given to grandiose statements, Coastal’s longtime president
Phil Ware repeatedly claimed that offshore drilling would be an economic boon for
Franklin County. In one report, he declared that the St. George Island site contained 618
million barrels of recoverable oil (Braslow, 1996; Cotterell, 1996; Webb and Bates,
1999).
In the late 1960s, a dispute arose about the right to mine limestone beneath Lake
Okeechobee that resulted in a federal lawsuit that continued until 1976. Coastal agreed to
give up a large portion of its leased land but retained its rights to explore. It also
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surrendered portions from the coastline to more than four miles into the sea with one
stipulation: if any company were to strike oil and gas, Coastal would get six and onefourth percent of the money generated. From 1976 to 1990, things remained calm, and no
company asked to drill in the area. But when the Florida Legislature passed a law that
forbade oil drilling in the area because of environmental concerns, Coastal sued,
challenging the law because it took away the royalties under the 1976 settlement. By
1997, Coastal had sold 33 million shares to about 14,000 investors, still with no oil to
show for its money. However, the ongoing lawsuit provided Florida lawyers with steady
work churning out “takings” claims that the state deprived Coastal of hundreds of
millions of dollars in earnings in 1998 when it denied a permit to drill for oil off St.
George Island. It took thirty eight years for the Coastal saga to conclude when Circuit
Court Judge J. Ralph Smith in 2002 found that there was no proof of any oil in the area,
and the Florida Cabinet in 2005 paid the company $12.5 million to stop suing the state
for cumulative losses since 1953 of $36.6 million (Rackleff, 2009).
The Coastal saga inspired landmark legislation to protect Florida’s coastal zone
by dividing it into separate types of management areas, including “development” for
industrial or commercial activity, “conservation” for limited activity, and “preservation”
for no activity. In the wake of the federal passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act
of 1972, Florida was one of the first states to prepare for the enactment of a statewide
Coastal Zone Management Authority; between 1967 and 1978 numerous state laws and
constitutional amendments were enacted in the area of natural resource management,
including nearly $2 million for land acquisition in connection with the Apalachicola
River and Bay estuary system in Franklin County. It was the apparent conflict between
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economic growth and environmental degradation that fueled efforts to manage growth in
Florida, to literally plan paradise, and the result—the 1985 Growth Management Act—
succeeded in transforming Florida from a state with little interest in and regard for
planning into a state viewed within planning and environmental circles as a leader and
innovator in methods for managing growth (Connerly et al., 2012; Linkous and
Skuzinski, 2018).
In surveys of Florida’s county commissioners conducted by the University of
Georgia from the 1950s through the 1970s, county commissioners from the Apalachicola
basin expressed a strong desire to use the Gorrie Bridge as leverage to attract growth and
development in the Panhandle. However, Apalachicola remained a single-economy town,
relying almost exclusively on the commercial fishing industry, which annually accounted
for three-fourths of the city’s total retail sales through the end of the twentieth century.
Thirty years after Apalachicolans traded ferry rides for bridge travel, the $3.5 million,
1965 span to St. George Island finally brought the city and Franklin County the kind of
tourism traffic local boosters had long anticipated. The Bryant Patton Bridge was
designed to spur full-scale development of the island as a resort area, and it worked.
Tallahasseeans and vacationers from neighboring states purchased lots on the island for
retirement homes, weekend homes and speculation while the St. George Island Gulf
Beaches, Inc. development firm invested $1 million in paving, dredging and filling the
surrounding marshland in the years leading up to the bridge opening (Rogers, 1986).
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Image 3.4: Sales of St. George Island land were gobbled up even before the bridge opened in 1965. (Source:
Tallahassee Democrat, April 16, 1965).

St. George Island, once a desolate strip of sandy dunes inhabited mostly by goats
and hogs and considered a wasteland by many locals, quickly became Florida’s hottest
new coastal real estate market (Rogers, 1986). The number of cars crossing the 4.6-mile
toll bridge increased 69 percent from 1970 to 1974. In the decade after the barrier island
bridge opened, over 300 full-time, seasonal, and mobile homes were built on one-acre
beachfront lots. In the early 1970s, plans were submitted to Franklin County
Commissioners to construct thousands more second homes, a seven-mile paved road, and
underground utilities on a 3,000-acre tract of pristine beachfront property (Rogers, 1986).
A 300,000-gallon reservoir was constructed to service a vacationing population that was
139

expected to soar into the tens of thousands through the 1990s. Within less than ten years,
St. George Island had become the center of a bitter struggle over the fate of the entire
Apalachicola Bay watershed between, on one side, private developers and, on the
opposing side, local fishers and environmentalists (Rogers, 1986).
The 1960s battle over St. George Island involved local, state, and national
governments, and, like other coastal zone battles occurring in Florida at the time, called
on citizens to make a clear choice about the economic fate of Franklin County. The story
of St. George Island attracted national attention and fueled concerns that beachfront
development designed for tourists would destroy the region’s prized commercial fishing
docks. One newspaper editorial writer argued:
“There is no reason we have to let our bayfront turn into another Miami
Beach with a wall of buildings so dense it blocks off the breeze from the
water. While we may not be able to stop the migration of people into our
area, and we may not want to stop it entirely, we can pass strong zoning
ordinances which limit the density of the population and the height of the
buildings” (“Below,” 1974, p. A4).

Robert Howell, Apalachicola clerk of circuit court and advisor to the Franklin County
Commissioners, reflected the opinions of many when he told the local newspaper: “I
absolutely don’t feel that anything should be built along the waters of our county that
would harm the seafood industry … We don’t want anything to destroy the old
Apalachicola that we know” (“What,” 1974, p. 4). John James, the Franklin County Tax
Assessor, noted that protecting Apalachicola Bay by curbing waterfront development was
Franklin County’s “only priority” (“What,” 1974, p. 4). James noted that controls were
needed to stop beachfront property values from increasing an average of 35 percent to 45
percent each year. “I am opposed to anything that is not compatible with the seafood
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industry here. I love this place. I’d hate for us to get people-polluted and turn into asphalt
jungle. The land is so rich here” (“What,” 1974, p. 4).
The broader context of the rise of the sunshine economy in the 1960s meant that
tourism-retirement, citrus, and vegetables accounted for about half of Florida’s economic
base for the first time. In the meantime, the state’s “frontier” industries—lumber and
naval stores, cattle, and phosphate mining—fell to third place behind the maritime sector,
which was dominated by the federal military payroll (Mormino, 2005; Stronge, 2008). By
1960, around the same time Walt Disney began setting his sights on establishing an
amusement empire already perfected in southern California, Florida had become the
quintessential Sunshine State (Mormino, 2005; Stronge, 2008). Apalachicola continued to
resist tourism like the pending development boom on St. George Island throughout the
1960s, preferring to keep their traditions local and contained. In November 1964, city
boosters including the Chamber of Commerce, Rotary, Lions Club, Oyster Dealers
Association, and other civic groups, organized its first annual seafood festival, later
named the Florida Seafood Festival. The event featured a free seafood dinner, and
historic tours and speeches by dignitaries about the value of the seafood economy to
Franklin County (Rogers, 1986).
A few years later, recognizing the need to organize themselves, oystermen formed
the Franklin County Seafood Worker’s Association in 1967. While its initial purpose was
to set oyster harvesting prices and influence price stabilization, the organization quickly
grew in membership size and political authority, calling for strikes when dealers cut
prices, Tallahassee protest marches when politically connected businessmen wanted to
allow for mechanically dredging of oysters, and hiring attorneys to fight against

141

waterfront development proposals deemed incompatible with the seafood industry
(Middleton, 1986, p. 6).
In 1974, Apalachicola leaders who feared exploding growth in South and Central
Florida would penetrate the snake-infested swamps and forests of the undeveloped
Panhandle, commissioned a local architect trained at the University of Notre Dame to
craft the city’s first master plan. A series of editorials quickly appeared in the local
newspaper lauding the Apalachicola City Commission’s decision to begin plotting a
future unlike neighboring coastal cities such as Tampa Bay, whose polluted waters closed
to fishers in the early 1960s after developers tore down fishing sheds and erected highrise condominiums and hotels to reshape the city skyline. “The idea is to improve the
quality of life rather than merely increase the quantity,” a local editorial writer remarked
(“City,” 1974, p. 1).
But, like most political-economic decisions made in the tiny oyster outpost, the
city commission’s decision to join the nationwide master planning movement was not
unanimous. One commissioner who voted against the $4,000 effort feared the master plan
would place “too much emphasis” on “historic and possible tourism aspects” while
ignoring the importance of a vibrant commercial fishing industry that, in the mid-1970s,
directly employed more than 65 percent of the city’s 1,425 able adults in seafood-related
jobs (“City,” 1974, p. 1).
The commissioner was not alone. While most residents agreed a master plan was
critical to managing growth in Apalachicola, a sleepy fishing village where oystermen
continued to outnumber visitors through the 1990s, local disdain for expanding the
fledgling tourism industry framed much of the public master-plan debates. In some ways,
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Apalachicola’s resistance to tourism reflected the changing times. Gripped with a severe
gasoline shortage, citizens across the country increasingly lobbied lawmakers throughout
the decade to protect open space, air, and water, and control coastal development. In the
early 1970s, Paul Ehrlich (1968) appeared on “The Tonight Show” four times to warn the
country about a pending “population bomb,” while Rachel Carson’s (1962) Silent Spring
continued to influence both the international and locally driven environmental
movements (Gartner, 1983). In 1971, the Sunshine State, where 75 percent of people
lived in the coastal zone in 1975, became the first of the southeastern U.S. states to
permit citizens to file suit against government agencies to require them to enforce
pollution laws. Motivated in part by pollution concerns, Florida legislators in the same
year also slashed state expenditures for industrial promotion, marking the beginning of an
attempt to fashion the state as an environmentally conscious leader of the modern South
and eastern United States (Cobb, 1993).
Throughout the 1970s, the stark contrast between the rural and remote Old Florida
Panhandle and urbanized central and southern New Florida coastal communities was
increasingly bemoaned in newspapers and magazines by environmentalists, travel
writers, and local traditionalists. A January 1974 Better Homes and Gardens article
described Apalachicola, the state’s third-oldest city and Franklin County seat, as “Florida
as it used to be before the developers and the hotel builders created their synthetic Eden”
(p. 11). Reflecting the state’s newfound environmental awareness, Apalachicola Bay was
designated an aquatic preserve in 1970. In the weeks leading up to the master-plan
decision, Apalachicola editorialists urged city leaders to resist the lure of Florida’s
tourism “pitch” and railed against sprawling Orlando and Miami. They advocated
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creating growth controls to curb “commerce at any price.” At subsequent public
meetings, Apalachicola residents picked up on this point. They not only wanted a master
plan, zoning laws, and subdivision regulations, they wanted them specifically aimed at
protecting their fishing town and restricting new economic development projects along
the bay (“Florida’s,” 1974, p. 4).
While national events inspired local opposition to luring new industries in the
1970s, Apalachicolans had been aggressively fighting to preserve downtown commercial
fishing docks, warehouses, and processing plants since New Deal-era road and bridge
projects opened the isolated fishing outpost to coastal capitalism fueled by a new
motoring public. From the 1930s to the 1970s, local efforts to defend the commercial
fishing industry and resist waterfront hotels, second homes, and parks were unrelenting,
and overwhelmingly successful.
The publication of Apalachicola’s master plan coincided with another planning
document that reflected the town’s unwillingness to compromise the commercial fishing
industry. The 1976 economic development plan for the city declared the seafood industry
the “single most important economic generator in Apalachicola,” accounting for more
than $4 million of the city’s $6.1 million retail sales in 1973-1974 (“Apalachicola,” 1976,
p. 1). In his introduction to the economic plan, then-Mayor Jimmie J. Nichols wrote that
any planning effort undertaken in Apalachicola must first “protect our ecological
inheritance, and the value of our historical past in both an economic and cultural sense.”
The report went on to note that the tourism industry in Apalachicola was unsophisticated
and unorganized, consisting of several small roadside motels, one hotel, two sportfishing
lodges with limited overnight accommodations, and hundreds of churches, homes, and
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sites of architectural or historic interest but no guidebook or marketing campaign to lure
preservation-minded visitors. Instead of tourism, Apalachicola’s “true business activity is
anything that affects the growing and harvesting of oysters and shrimp. Oysters and
shrimp define everything that is important to the residents of this city. For more than one
hundred years it has been the source of livelihood, virtually the only business activity.
Like the oysters, the people of Apalachicola have a rather low tolerance for any kind of
interference. While friendly to outsiders, the line is drawn at any interference with the
oysters and shrimp. This in itself has been the source of many problems and will certainly
influence all future considerations” (“Historical,” 1975).
Apalachicola’s longtime dependence on the seafood industry kept families in
poverty and the river basin’s economy depressed. The six Apalachicola River basin
counties have historically been sparsely populated and economically underdeveloped. In
1970, Apalachicola’s median household income was $4,000; the statewide average was
$8,000. Seafood workers in the 1970s, many of whom suffered from high rates of
illiteracy, earned $4,000 to $5,000 annually. Franklin County’s per capita income of
$2,331 in 1974 was well below the state per capita income of $5,412 and the worst of the
six counties in the Apalachicola River basin (“Apalachicola,” 1977).18
The lack of alternate jobs forced a brain drain of educated young people out of
depressed Franklin County and into the booming coastal cities of Pensacola, Panama
City, and Destin, once named “the luckiest little fishing village in the world” (Jackson,
2003). Apalachicola’s small annual budget of less than $500,000 reflected the absence of
a sales tax and its total isolation from a major city and interstate. Despite budgetary and
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The per capita income of the other five counties in the basin were: Jackson, $3,910; Gadsden, $4,568;
Calhoun, $3,616; Liberty, $2,917; and Gulf, $4,108.
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geographic constraints, the economic development plan predicted Apalachicola would
become increasingly attractive to affluent retirees disenchanted by south Florida’s
overdevelopment.19 The city’s natural assets and maritime culture could draw thousands
of tourists, but the report’s authors doubted local residents would allow Apalachicola’s
economy to expand beyond seafood. The only new business that located in Apalachicola
between World War II and 1976 was Doxsee Food, which became the town’s largest
employer when it hired 110 people to process frozen food and repair boats
(“Apalachicola,” 1977).
The report concluded with a series of dismal statistics: Apalachicola is one of the
most economically depressed cities in Northwest Florida. Unemployment in the city is
the highest in the state, average income is the lowest in Florida, rendering its future
economic status shaky.
“Of the many problems, both existing and future, the most important
problem is that of changing the people’s attitudes of accepting the fact that
other industries can complement the seafood industry and exist
harmoniously. Businessmen’s attitudes, as well as that of many residents,
are pessimistic because of feared environmental exploitations that have
emerged in other cities. This problem must be resolved before any
economic development program can be properly assembled and
implemented” (“Apalachicola,” 1977, p. 43).
A citizen’s attitude survey included in the economic development report
underscores this point. According to the survey, most businesses in town were small
owner-operated establishments with one to three employees and activities focused on
sales and services related to the oyster business. More than 85 percent of Apalachicola
businesses were located on less than one acre of land, and most business owners reported
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being “satisfied with the slow rate of growth and did not want to relocate to a modern
industrial park.” Business owners also expressed much concern about disrupting the
seafood industry “under any circumstances” (“Apalachicola,” 1977, p. 48)
Before the growth pressures of the 1970s, it is clear that locals clung to
commercial fishing for two reasons: it was all they knew and, with only a single-industry
economy to rely on, they feared losing their livelihoods. Any attempts to recruit new
industry raised the threat of polluting a bay upon which thousands of people depended.
Locals defended commercial fishing because isolated Apalachicola provided few
alternative economic options for them. From the time Apalachicola developed its third
identity as a seafood village in the 1890s, choices were severely constrained for local
people—geography and economy made commercial fishing one of the few ways to make
a living in this remote outpost at the foot of the Panhandle.

Preservation and Resistance: 1970-2008
The town’s location at the end of the rural Apalachicola River basin had long
determined what the main occupation of its citizens would be. But with the expansion of
Florida’s sun, sea, and sand tourism in the 1960s and 1970s, locals suddenly had choices.
Through the 1960s, tourism in Florida’s Panhandle remained a “Redneck Riviera”—a
rough-and-tumble backwoods attractive mostly to a lower south demographic of tourists
from Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee and Mississippi searching for a low-key place to
unwind from May to September (Raines, 1978: Jackson, 2011). Places like Panama City
and Destin were frequented mostly by day trippers from Alabama and southwest Georgia
because the Panhandle route was so hard to get to, with slow-moving two-lane roads that
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consumed nearly a full day’s drive (Jackson, 2003, 2011). Things began to change in
1960 when Hollywood released “Where the Boys Are,” a film about a spring break trip to
Fort Lauderdale (Pasternak, 1960). The northern Gulf suddenly symbolized a good time
for college students and their parents alike (Jackson, 2003).
Motels, better roads, and a new tourism economy attracted more visitors and more
affluent southerners from the region’s growing suburbs, who invested in still inexpensive
and relatively unexploited real estate. Such was the state of the Panhandle through the
1970s, when two hurricanes—Agnes in 1973 and Eloise in 1975—damaged much of
Florida’s northwestern coast. In the aftermath of the two storms, developers descended on
the Panhandle, purchasing waterfront property at dirt-cheap prices and convincing the
state Department of Transportation to build beach roads—namely Highway 30A between
Panama City and Destin—to make the hurricane-impacted shoreline more accessible to
investors, hoteliers, and amusement park promoters. It was in this “atmosphere of
economic opportunism, freewheeling speculation, and hell-bent hedonism” that the term
Redneck Riviera was coined (Jackson, 2003, p. 319). The phrase originated in a New
York Times piece by Howell Raines about Orange Beach and Gulf Shores on the
Alabama coast, but it stuck among journalists searching for a caricature description of the
rural Panhandle from Apalachicola, Florida, to Bay St. Louis, Mississippi (Jackson,
2003).
As the coast was being repaired and surveyed by new investors, further upstream
metropolitan Atlanta was booming and southwest Georgia agriculture was expanding. In
1948, Atlanta was a much smaller place compared to the modern-day metropolis it has
become.
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The Rivers and Harbors Act, adopted by Congress in 1946, gave the Army Corps of
Engineers authorization to make improvements along the Apalachicola River Basin. The
plan included a proposal for a dam and reservoir at the upstream Buford site. Before any
discussion of whether water supply would be a benefit of the project, Atlanta did not
seem to place much emphasis on the Buford project as a part of its long-term plan for
providing water to its inhabitants. In 1948, the mayor of Atlanta boasted that, “Certainly
a city which is only one hundred miles below one of the greatest rainfall areas in the
nation will never find itself in the position of a city like Los Angeles” (LoCascio, 2015,
p. 331).20
In 1975, the Army Corps of Engineers completed the last of five federal dams in
Georgia which, when paired with ten privately funded dams already in operation along
the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, diminished water flow, and the Apalachicola River
began fighting for its survival. The Corps’ operations in Georgia were tweaked again in
1983, as additional water resources were held back from the rivers and the floodplain
dried even more along the Apalachicola River basin. The effects were not felt right away,
but would surface later as additional ecological, environmental and industrial forces
merged to change the future of the Apalachicola working waterfront in ways never before
imagined (Griffin, 2018).
It was during the 1960s and 1970s that the Panhandle was experiencing a
sociocultural shift, as the first wave of Baby Boomers came of age, reinvesting in their
childhood paradise (Jackson, 2003, p. 321). During the Reagan years, a time in which
more Floridians had been borne in northern states than in Florida as a result of in-
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That statement has since proven to be ironic because of the hardships Atlanta now faces in the realm of
supplying water for its residents.
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migration, banks lent money for coastal construction and boomers borrowed for second
homes (Jackson, 2003). Developers met the growing demand for coastal property with
high-rise condominiums, until then exclusive to the south Florida scene, in Panama City
Beach and Destin, and eventually a brand-new town. Seaside, Florida, described by Time
magazine as “the most astounding design achievement of its era,” was carved out of
eighty acres of beachfront property and quickly became the prototype for a new
Panhandle culture where “latte and Italian ices” trumped “beer and pickled eggs.”
Jackson (2003, p. 321) continues, “Folks who bought a Seaside home, or rented one for a
week or so, had many different inclinations, but redneckery wasn’t one of them.”
Carbon copies of Seaside—pastel homes with porches, tin roofs, and walking
trails to the beach—sprouted along the northwest coast in coastal subdivisions such as the
St. Joe Company’s WaterColor and WaterSound built atop the “yellow gold” of southern
longleaf pine and bald cypress forests (Ziewitz and Wiaz, 2004, p. 62). The culmination
of the “Seaside effect” is the transformation in tourism marketing literature of the
Redneck Riviera into the “Emerald Coast.” The shift materializes as New Urbanist
McMansions occupied by the southern nouveau riche replaced trailer parks and “cracker
cottages” (Jackson, 2003). The Panhandle’s resource-based economy, for so long reliant
on fishing and forestry, had become a diverse regional economy with pockets of
ecotourism (Jackson, 2003; Starnes, 2003; Ziewitz and Wiaz, 2004).
The temptation of a new tourist economy pitted Apalachicola’s local fishing
culture, and a way of life that had defined generations of Apalachicolan families, directly
against business leaders, environmentalists, governments and Panhandle tourism
investors. The same qualities that made the 180-square-mile Apalachicola Bay and 288-
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square-mile estuary one of Florida’s best spots for oysters, crabs, fish and shrimp also
attracted competing interests that threatened its future. By 1984, as the World’s Fair was
under way in New Orleans and Annie Miller’s swamp tourism was just beginning to take
off, Florida had already spent more money and effort protecting Apalachicola Bay—
buying land, cleaning up pollution sources, and mitigating risk—than any other body of
water in the state at that time. In the aftermath of Franklin County commissioners
approving commercial zoning of St. George Island in 1979, the main development battle
on the island cast oystermen against Tallahassee developers who wanted to build a $100
million, Hilton Head-style marina and condominium resort project on an 87-acre stretch
of St. George Island. That was in addition to the St. George Island Plantation
development already covering the westernmost five miles of the island with eight
hundred homesites. “We got nothing in the world against tourists. But we don’t want
tourists and developers coming down here and destroying our oysters. We want them to
enjoy the oysters,” said Fred Jetton, then-president of the Franklin County Seafood
Workers Association (“Apalachicola,” 1984, p. 17).
In the early 1980s, St. George Island developers promoted the attractiveness of
second homes and rental properties as a federal tax shelter. Before the landmark Tax
Reform Act of 1986 diminished this incentive, local real estate advertisements promised
investors long-term capital gains and short-term tax savings by deducting the cost of
construction, furniture, appliances, property taxes, homeowners’ association dues,
management fees and insurance. Jay Landers, who represented project developer Gene
Brown, a politically connected Tallahassee lawyer who used to own all of St. George
Island, argued that the island could accommodate additional development if wetlands
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were preserved and precautions were taken to protect the bay against sewage and storm
runoff. The deal-breaker was the five-acre, 162-slip marina, which the developer needed
to attract tourists interested in yachting and deep sea fishing, but which local officials and
oystermen alike agreed could irreparably harm Apalachicola Bay. After the county
commission voted in 1985 to delay expansion of the St. George Plantation project for up
to two years, Brown threatened, “I’ll strip develop it and get my money out of it. I
probably should have given up and done it years ago” (Leifermann, 1985, p. 26).
After a years-long legal battle involving bureaucratic red tape and deals gone
sour, and a maze of wheeling and dealing, Brown foreclosed on the property and ended
his development activities on the island in the early 1990s. Through the 1990s, the
Panhandle’s upscale transformation accelerated on St. George Island, but largely
excluded Apalachicola and much of rural Franklin County. Over the course of the
decade, tenacious local traditionalists consciously chose commercial fishing over an
alternate tourism economy that would have introduced hundreds of service-level jobs and
a new leisure culture to the city of Apalachicola. Apalachicola’s resistance to economic
development persisted, time and again, against external forces. Among Panhandle
developers, city and county commissioners gained reputations for unilaterally rejecting
waterfront projects if even one commercial fisher raised a red flag (Ziewitz and Wiaz,
2004). An Apalachicola realtor from Massachusetts who has lived in the area since the
late 1960s said seafood industry workers control the city’s purse strings. “The fishermen
rule this town. Don’t let anyone tell you otherwise. If they say no to a project, the city
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commission will say no to a project, and they’ll do it unanimously. Otherwise, they’d
never get reelected.”21
In 1985, Hurricanes Elena and Kate caused significant damage to oyster resources
in Apalachicola Bay, leading to highly restrictive regulations, on-water harvest check
stations, and intensive shelling operations on a subset of reefs (Berrigan, 1990).
Beginning in 1986, a revised landings and effort reporting system was required for all
commercially harvested marine species, in contrast to the prior voluntary reporting
program in place. Based on data I have analyzed since 1986, the number of Apalachicola
Bay oyster harvesters declined from about 1,000 in the late 1980s to around 400-600
throughout most of the 1990s and early 2000s, before increasing since 2008 to about
1,000 license holders. The number of oyster fishing trips follows a similar pattern, with
about 30,000 trips reported in 1988, declining to about 10,000 trips in the mid-1990s, and
then varying between 10,000 and 25,000 trips until 2006, when the number of trips
increased to about 40,000 annually in recent years. Oyster regulations in Apalachicola
Bay are currently managed using a system of seasons, spatial closures, bag limits, and
size limits, but on-water check stations and a bag tax to fund research and monitoring
programs were ended in the early 1990s.
As the oyster industry came under stricter regulations downstream, problems were
arising upstream in Georgia, where an extensive drought had forced Atlanta to implement
water-rationing strategies for the first time. After the effects of this drought, and with an
expected influx of an estimated 800,000 new residents over the next two decades, the city
of Atlanta decided to work with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in a plan to withdraw
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around 529 million gallons of water per day from the Chattahoochee River in the Lake
Lanier area. In 1990, Alabama responded quickly to this proposed withdrawal plan, filing
a federal suit against the Army Corps of Engineers Florida, which quickly joined the suit
in order to protect its own interest in the Apalachicola River Basin. The initial dispute
centered on water quantity as well as water quality and demanded normal river flow.
Alabama needed it to sustain its farming, industry, and hydropower, whereas Florida
needed natural river flow to sustain the major seafood and oyster industry surrounding
Apalachicola Bay. A series of agreements and compromises failed to find common
ground in the water apportionment dispute, understandable considering the fourteen
sectors of identified water users, including fisheries, manufacturing, and tourism. After
negotiations deteriorated in 2003, the dispute played out in the courtroom over the next
decade (LoCascio, 2015).
While concerns about the division of water flow inspired the Florida v. Georgia
litigation, the focus throughout has been not so much about sharing water, as it has been
about managing the flow of water between users. In the aftermath of the 1985 flooding,
Apalachicolans defiantly clung to their commercial fishing past despite a steady
drumbeat of pressure to diversify the local seafood economy and attract more tourists to
the Panhandle (Bell, 1986). Local resistance to tourism had succeeded in leaving the city
virtually unchanged since World War II. Apalachicola still had one flashing traffic light,
two small grocery stores, one fast-food joint, three dollar stores, one hardware store, and
one chain pharmacy—roughly the same business directory existed in 1950 as in 2008.
The closest shopping mall is in Panama City, about an hour and a half drive northwest. A
Super Walmart that opened in 2008 in Wakulla Springs, a bedroom suburb of
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Tallahassee, is about a 45-minute drive southeast. Citing the sensitivity of the area, the
state Legislature in 1985 declared Franklin County an area of “critical state concern,” a
designation that gives the state Department of Community Affairs broad powers to
review building permits and monitor growth. At the same time, the Department of
Natural Resources stepped up its presence to protect the oyster beds, issuing an onslaught
of regulations that limited work hours, oystering locations, and the size of oysters
harvested, and handing down fines, criminal citations and jail terms for violations. About
25 percent of the 2,000 misdemeanor cases handled in Franklin County Court in 1988
involved violations of Marine Fisheries Commission regulations, according to state
documents.
While oystermen fought with the Marine Patrol, Apalachicola property owners
found themselves going head-to-head with state agencies when their plans for building or
modifying homes were ruled to have an inverse impact on the environment. Real estate
speculators, timber companies, and other external development interests who had long
focused on building Seaside-style subdivisions, strip malls, and retail centers near Destin
and Panama City’s coastal suburbs were increasingly turning their gaze toward
Apalachicola in the heart of the wooded Panhandle. Since the early 1990s, in a state
where competition between environmental interests and development interests is keen,
economic development pressures had become increasingly difficult for locals to ignore or
resist. “When you stop to think we’ve only really been majorly polluting the Gulf for
what, forty years, it’s really scary that forty years from now we may have choked it
completely to death,” remarked Dewey Destin, a fifth-generation fisher and city
councilman in the Panhandle town named after one of his ancestors (Kaczor, 1992, p. 1).
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These fears were recognized, albeit belatedly, at the federal level when Congress
passed and President George H.W. Bush signed a resolution declaring 1992 The Year of
the Gulf of Mexico, complete with a public relations campaign based on the slogan
“America’s Sea—Keep it Shining.” The five states along the northern Gulf of Mexico
disagreed with the definition of “shining,” reflecting their conflicting economic priorities.
While Texas and Louisiana favored keeping the oil and gas industry shining in their
respective states, Mississippi wanted to sell the Gulf as a tourist destination and vital
ecological resource, and Florida’s west coast residents were nearly unanimous in their
opposition to offshore drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. In fact, no issue quite united
Floridians like a proposed 1992 plan to drill as close as ten miles from the Florida
Panhandle’s sugar-white sand beaches (“Coastal,” 1992). In explaining the “America’s
Sea” concept, campaign creator Kerry Kirschner noted, “People don’t stop to think about
the Gulf of Mexico. They’ve heard of New York Harbor and Chesapeake Bay and the
Great Lakes, but for the most part we have pretty much been ignored” (“Giving,” 1992,
p. 1).
Although politics and water in the Sunshine State once were controlled by
agricultural interests and, in Apalachicola at least, commercial fishing interests, in the
wake of the Year of the Gulf, farmers and fishers had been losing ground to home
builders and their $42 billion impact on the state economy (Barnett, 2007). By the 1960s,
Florida already had lost nearly half, or nine million acres, of its swamps, bogs, and
marshes to development. The tide began to turn in the 1960s and 1970s when water
pollution problems made action unavoidable. But as late as 2008, two-thirds of the state’s
lakes, rivers, and coastal waters were declared unsafe for fishing or swimming (Pittman
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and Waite, 2009). Florida’s “politics of paradise” questions the ideal of progress in a state
whose biggest economic drivers are tourism, development, and agriculture (Grunwald,
2006).
At the same time, state and federal fishing regulations that emerged in the 1960s
and grow stricter each year succeeded in discouraging a new generation of commercial
oyster harvesters and shrimpers from headquartering in Apalachicola. Into this minefield
stepped the organization Apalachicola Riverkeeper, which organized in 1997 to publicize
the degradation of a 25,000-mile intracoastal waterway system that drains the
Appalachian Mountains into the Gulf of Mexico and once was mighty enough to
transform Bainbridge, Georgia, 106 miles inland, into a port city (Call, 2017).
Riverkeeper chapters like the Apalachicola grew out of 1960s-era grassroots efforts to
restore New York’s Hudson River.
In the early aughts, the Apalachicola city and Franklin County Commission’s
reluctant approval of three waterfront development projects—combined with at least a
dozen coastal “boomburgs” fueled by Florida’s real-estate crush—threatened to alter the
integrity of Franklin County’s working waterfront once and for all (Lang, 2007; Packer,
2009). The trio of green gentrification projects included Apalachicola’s first hotel
condominium, the Water Street Hotel & Marina (proposed in 2005, opened in 2007); the
378-acre St. James Bay golf course subdivision (proposed in 1996, opened in 2003); and
the 762-acre SummerCamp vacation retreat for Tallahassee elites (proposed in 2001,
opened in 2006) developed by the St. Joe Company, the largest private landowner in
Florida. These projects exemplified the green gentrification trend coined in 2009 by
sociologist Kenneth Gould to describe the repackaging of the Brooklyn waterfront and
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Gowanus Canal for the well-educated and environmentally sensitive “sustainability
class” (Gould, 2009; Gould and Lewis, 2018).
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Image 3.5: Fred C. Millender, owner of Fred’s Best Seafood, poses outside his commercial processing house in
Eastpoint, Florida, in December 2007. Fred, who died in 2014, had been tonguing oysters on Apalachicola Bay
since he was a boy in the 1930s. 2007/PHOTO BY AUTHOR

In Apalachicola, the waterfront projects succeeded in setting the stage for the
transformation of a bay whose pristine shores remain mostly in public ownership but
increasingly threatened. Comprised of 545 square miles with more than 200 miles of coastal
shoreline, 87 percent of Franklin County is held in either state or federal hands through
protected forests, estuaries and nature preserves.
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Through 2008, most locals and business leaders continued to stress the
importance of reserving the waterfront for fishermen and preserving Apalachicola’s
maritime heritage—a tourism strategy that focused more on educating heritage-oriented
visitors about a working fishing seaport rather than luring them to town with niche
attractions. But few denied it would be easy to maintain this balance in a city of 7,500,
raising questions for preservationists, fishers, and developers alike on how long
Apalachicola could remain the heart of “Florida Wild” and resist the pressure to sell itself
as Old Florida’s latest undiscovered tourist trap (Arsenault and Davis, 2005).

Conclusion: Adaptation: ‘Hardly No Oysters There,’ 2008-2019
The 2008 recession and its aftermath had a far-reaching impact on Franklin
County, made worse by a consecutive series of threats to the region’s ecological health.
According to the Florida Department of Revenue, Franklin County’s tax roll for the
2012-2013 budget year was about $38 million, a 38 percent decrease from the 2008-09
budget of $50 million. Apalachicola’s tax valuation, which includes all property within
city limits, dropped by nearly 20 percent, from $210 million to $168 million, over the
same timeframe. Locally, the area’s 4,600-person workforce had a 7.1 percent jobless
rate with county government and an area hospital among the larger employers. But with
nearly 90 percent of the county’s land owned by the state or federal government, the local
implications of the national recession and Florida real estate crisis were not as grim for
Franklin County speculators and developers. The commercial fishing industry in
Apalachicola experienced an unlikely boom in the aftermath of the recession, with 1,400
licensed oystermen in Franklin County during the 2009-10 oyster season, a record. “We
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farm oysters here,” the head of the Apalachicola Bay Chamber of Commerce declared in
November 2009 (Trigaux, 2009, p. D1). Indeed, Apalachicola’s simple individualoperator, hand-tonging, small-vessel fishery working today is remarkably similar to the
one that began in the 1800s.
The post-recession resurgence did not last long as the deck became stacked
against the Apalachicola oyster industry. In fall 2009, the federal Food and Drug
Administration threatened to ban the sale by 2011 of raw, untreated oysters harvested
from the Gulf of Mexico during the five warm months between April and October
(Fausset, 2009). The plan sparked outcry from Southern politicians who feared it would
devastate the regional industry and was never enforced. But the furor marked a stark
contrast to previous collaborative efforts with the oyster industry, state regulators and
others on proposed rules and guidance, and came as a result of concerns over increasingly
polluted oyster beds. Most of the raw oysters eaten in the United States carry vibrio
vulnificus, but healthy consumers are unlikely to be affected by it. For those with
diabetes, liver disease, cancer, AIDS and other chronic conditions, the infection can be
deadly. About 30 cases of the infection are traced to Gulf Coast oysters annually, and half
of those cases are fatal, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The
policy change would have implications not just for oyster shacks along the Gulf Coast,
but raw bars around the country. In 2009, the Gulf Coast supplied 67 percent of oysters
consumed nationwide, and many of those oysters ended up in Maryland, Virginia and
other places where demand is high and the local supply is down (Kirkham, 2009).
Six months after the FDA pulled back from its oyster ban proposal, the chain
reaction of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill described in Chapter Two stretched eastward

161

across the northern Gulf of Mexico to touch Franklin County. Although oil never entered
Apalachicola Bay, the explosion affected the image of the Apalachicola oyster as
consumer consumption of Panhandle seafood dropped 30 percent in the summer after the
spill. Alarmed, state officials in an unprecedented move opened the winter oyster beds in
June 2010, three months early, and launched a “Florida Gulf Safe” marketing campaign,
setting up webcams at seafood stores, restaurants and docks so viewers could see how
safe Florida seafood is (“116,000,” 2010, p. 40). Ironically, that year Franklin County
produced 3 million pounds of oyster meat, worth $7.1 million in direct sales to area
oystermen for a total economic impact of $15 million. The Apalachicola oyster industry
did not see the 25 percent loss that Louisiana experienced since the beginning of the oil
spill. In fact, the industry was booming. The 2011 oyster harvest in Apalachicola was one
of the most productive ever, with 740 bushels per acre harvested, up from 384 bushels
per acre in 2009, according to county records (Gordon, 2013).
The real impact of the oil spill was in Franklin County bed tax collections, as the
county saw its tourism revenues drop about 15 percent in the year following the
Deepwater Horizon explosion. A $1.6 million BP marketing grant was awarded to the
county in 2011 to launch a “We’re Salty” campaign, an effort to promote Apalachicola as
a premier beach destination known for its food, history and nature (“Franklin,” 2011).
Then everything changed.
When Robert Livingston studied Florida’s Apalachicola Bay and River in the
1970s, he marveled at the ecosystem’s health. The bay produced a rich bounty of oysters,
shrimp, fish, and crabs. Those animals, in turn, supported a thriving fishing community
and seafood industry, the aquatic ecologist at Florida State University found. In fall 2012,
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Livingston was one of the first to find large declines in oyster landings, and his research
alarmed industry workers. As oyster trips declined dramatically over the next few
months, the words “oyster collapse” became part of the local lexicon, as large economic
losses and community concerns rose over the current and future status of oyster
resources, ecosystem health, and local economic opportunities. In Livingston’s words, in
the past, the ecosystem “was like a symphony orchestra. Now it is not. It is
dysfunctional” (Kwok, 2018, p. 3).
Speaking before the Franklin County Commission in 2014, 73-year-old oysterman
Fred Jetton recommended Apalachicola Bay be completely shut down for eighteen
months to allow for replanting, adding that “if the oystermen had some way to make the
grocery bill and the light bill I’d suspect 90 percent of them would vote to close it
because they know there is nothing out there” (Portman, 2014, p. 1). In response, Florida
received $6.3 million in federal grant money to reseed and restore the bay, with a tiny
fraction to be spent providing fishers like Jetton with vocational training, and another
$4.6 million in BP settlement funds to pay for bay restoration, but locals said it was not
enough, and argued for more money to employ oystermen and reshell oyster reefs. For
perspective, Florida’s entire share of the BP oil spill settlement was $3.25 billion (Sterm,
Sheikh, and Ramseur, 2017).
According to a report from the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services, oyster density at one major reef plunged from 430 oysters per square meter to
64 in one year. “I have never seen a fishery failure as severe,” testified Mark Berrigan, a
scientist who had worked for the State of Florida for three decades, in his Florida v.
Georgia Supreme Court deposition. “You went from making a good living, to not making
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a living at all,” fourth generation oysterman Kendall Shoelles told a television camera
crew in 2018 (Holton, 2018, p. 2). Using the best available data to assess what
mechanisms may have driven the collapse of the Apalachicola Bay oyster fishery, a
Florida Sea Grant-funded Oyster Recovery Team found that the causes were not
overfishing, pollutants from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, or low freshwater inputs
caused by drought conditions upstream, as many locals believed at the time, but a
combination of lower-than-average numbers and low survival rates of juvenile oysters in
the years preceding the collapse. The authors concluded that, while the Apalachicola Bay
oyster fishery had proven resilient to periods of instability throughout its 150-year
history, it is now at a crossroads in terms of whether it will continue to exist or risk
irreversible collapse. How to allocate Deepwater Horizon oil spill restoration funds, and
decide which restoration and management practices to adopt, are choices that will
determine the long-term viability of the Apalachicola Bay oyster fishery (Pine, 2015).
It is a complex situation, scientifically and politically, and as with most questions
about entire ecosystems, simple answers prove elusive. Yet as the Florida v. Georgia
legal dispute has shown, the blame game continues to be a key component of both states’
positions. David Kimbro, an ecologist now at Northeastern University in Nahant,
Massachusetts, was one of the scientists pulled into the dispute. During a 2017
presentation at the Ecological Society of America meeting in Portland, Kimbro told the
audience, “You have the State of Florida screaming at the State of Georgia that they
exacerbated the drought. You have the State of Georgia screaming back at the State of
Florida. It’s kind of like a football game” (p. 3).
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Researchers are midway through a five-year study, funded by BP money, on the
best, most cost-effective way to replant oysters. In a detailed presentation in November
2017, representatives from the University of Florida and Florida Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission, the two lead agencies conducting a five-year project funded
by the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, offered details on what they have found
two years into the study. Discovered so far are the presence of predators and parasites
including the oyster drill and boring sponges are stymieing the reproductive capacity of
oysters to rebuild their populations on the bars where they live (Adlerstein, 2017). The
state has closed oyster beds to replenish reefs and conduct experiments, but in the
meantime, oyster beds that once made a living for 600 to 700 fishermen now count 40
people on the water. “There just ain’t nothing nowhere. There just ain’t hardly no oysters
there,” Shannon Hartsfield, president of the Franklin County Seafood Works Association,
told The Apalachicola Times (Adlerstein, 2018, p. 1).
While the oyster fishery provided a foundation for local jobs and identities during
the national recession, a complex interplay of historical, political-economic, and cultural
factors will shape Apalachicola’s future as the water wars continue. Apart from politicaleconomic and ecological hardships facing the commercial fishing industry, one additional
force threatens to change Apalachicola over the next decades, but whether its typology
will track more toward the sportfishing tourism of coastal Louisiana, casino-resort
tourism of Mississippi, or the Disneyfied tourism of nearby Destin and Seaside remains
to be seen. The interrelated struggles of the tri-state water wars and the Apalachicola
oyster industry may soon contend with the interests of coastal real estate speculators and
land companies, who began carving new subdivisions in Franklin County sand and
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swamps beginning in the early 2000s. Like water shortages and water resource battles
everywhere, the rise, fall, and inevitable recovery of the coastal housing market in Florida
will eventually impact the future of Apalachicola. In the last half century, Florida has
experienced extraordinary population growth, from 2.8 million people in 1950 to 21.6
million in 2019. Florida within the next ten years will grow another 13 percent.
Considering the overcrowded conditions of south and east Florida, Apalachicola city
leaders are worried new residents will look to relocate to the still-remote Florida
Panhandle, where they questions whether there are enough resources—water—to support
higher population density without further risk to the endangered watershed (“Sea Level
Rise,” 2018).
Like the St. George Island and master plan growth battles of the 1970s, the water
wars battles of today are reminiscent of the forces at work in Apalachicola and other Gulf
coastal fishing communities throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Over the
past 150 years, traditional coastal communities along the Gulf Coast of the United States
have had to adapt to significant transformations that have altered the landscape and lives
of coastal residents—from coastal development to tourism to environmental degradation
to offshore oil and gas exploration (Margavio, Forsyth, Laska, and Mason, 1996). While
the offshore oil industry has most affected coastal communities in Texas and Louisiana,
as discussed in Chapter 2, Florida’s coast has been affected by the growth of a leisure
industry that is a reflection of the state’s political economy, natural amenities, availability
of capital and peninsular geography that contains 663 miles of beaches.
Florida’s dramatically changed coastline through each decade of the twentieth
century is a product of the influx of migrants and the expansion of the leisure industry as
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Americans acquired more free time and resources, urban populations urbanized the coast,
and land use patterns met their demands for less traditional farming and fishing and more
recreational beaches, marinas, and resorts. This case study supports Margavio, Forsyth,
Laska, and Mason (1996), who note that the trajectory of coastal communities is not
uniform, and coastal communities experiencing change do so at different rates. To some
extent, the ways in which land and water are packaged and consumed are not only subject
to market forces, but also to local control and power, “the ability of successful groups to
get what they want” (Margavio, Forsyth, Laska, and Mason, 1996, p. 79). Local and state
governments have enormous capacity to encourage or discourage particular land use
patterns and determine how marine resources will be used.
Yet as this case study shows, scale and boundary matter, too. Apalachicola is a
classic case of boundaries, policy, and governing the commons (Dietz et al., 2003;
Brewer, 2012). Differentials in power across scales and state lines are affecting the
resilience of the Apalachicola environment and an economy that has been developed to
depend on its once-healthy river basin. Apalachicola’s locally evolved and intentionally
designed institutional arrangements have made its working waterfront survive and thrive.
Through the years, this survival has depended on a stable community whose sustainable
resources were insulated from outside forces and whose leadership were united in
defending the coast from pollution and development. The rapid changes happening in
Apalachicola today have destabilized these conditions. Forces outside local influence and
beyond the scale of the Panhandle region are threatening its future. The lesson here is
whether critical problems like transboundary pollution, water resource management,
natural resource collapse, deforestation, and climate change also can inspire collaborative
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strategies, engaging metro Atlanta, southwest Georgia and Apalachicola in critical
conversations that encourage and facilitate experimentation, learning, and change.
Shaping a compromise that addresses real solutions for the water usage of the entire river
basin would go a long way in not only quelling the longtime water wars, but also
revealing just how far people might be willing to go to accommodate growth even as it
threatens to render extinct a national environmental treasure.
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Chapter Four: Case Study, Biloxi, Harrison County, Mississippi
Introduction: ‘Authentic, Iconic Biloxi’

Image 4.1: The study area highlighted in red contains the city of Biloxi, roughly the halfway point between the
cities of New Orleans to the west and Mobile to the east.

In 2017, the Biloxi City Council approved Mayor Andrew “FoFo” Gilich’s
Waterfront Enterprise development, a sprawling $75 million urban revitalization project
designed to give visitors a “genuine waterfront experience” of East Biloxi’s maritime past
by reviving its former headquarters at Point Cadet, much of which has been flattened in
the years since Hurricane Katrina (Perez, 2016). Unveiled on the twenty-fifth anniversary
of the first casino opening in south Mississippi, the Waterfront Enterprise plan included a
slew of projects to recreate the extinct working waterfront of the Back Bay, to resurrect
the look and feel of “Old Biloxi,” complete with an oyster aquaculture center, floating
oyster docks, sidewalk cafes, a pavilion to host deep sea fishing tournaments, a floating
bandstand, a seafood marketplace, and walking paths to nearby casinos. “Authentic,
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iconic Biloxi,” is how attorney and former Biloxi Mayor Gerald Blessey and current
Mayor Gilich sold the city’s latest waterfront scheme (Perez, 2016, p. 1). In mid-2018,
the plan took a major step forward toward becoming reality when three of its six census
tracts were deemed impoverished enough to be eligible for Opportunity Zone tax credits.
Biloxi city boosters cheered the move as a turning point for Waterfront Enterprise and
East Biloxi, calling the project “a significant development that will celebrate our history,
create jobs, increase tax revenue and help expand our tourism industry” (“Biloxi,” 2018).
Eating, playing and shopping in the same storied location, everything needed to
have a good time in one place—the decades-old Disneyization of Biloxi appears to
finally be coming to the last frontier of East Biloxi, where factory workers settled more
than a century ago to be close to sawmills and the sea (Beames, 2017). This chapter will
explore the key factors that drove Biloxi’s transformation from turn-of-the-twentiethcentury “Seafood Capital of the World” to a place whose all-you-can-eat crab legs are
imported not from the Gulf of Mexico but from the Gulf of Alaska (Beckett, 2017, p.1).
Most ironic in the city’s Waterfront Enterprise scheme is the fact that Biloxi’s shrimp and
oyster industry is no longer, and city-driven schemes to boost the tourism economy have
largely driven them away; the oystermen have relocated twenty three miles west to Pass
Christian, right on the Louisiana border, while only nineteen commercial shrimp boats
participated in the 2018 Blessing of the Fleet, down from three hundred during its peak.
The 2017 oyster season in Biloxi Bay lasted just four days; only two reefs were opened,
and only to tonging, according to the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources. The
year before, oystering in Biloxi Bay was allowed for the first time in fifty years (Perez,
2016).
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Image 4.2: A homemade sign near Biloxi, Mississippi’s Back Bay directs shrimpers to park in a gravel lot
near a commercial fishing marina. (Source: Author’s photograph, 2009).

Indeed, much of the proposed East Biloxi waterfront plan is designed not to
glorify or even resurrect the seafood industry, but to leverage Old Biloxi maritime
nostalgia for the benefit of visitors to the region’s twelve Mississippi Gulf Coast casinos,
whose revenues totaled $1.192 billion in 2018, a five-year high (Perez, 2018). With the
opening of Mississippi sports betting in August 2018, which is expected to bring to light
a black market estimated to handle $150 billion in bets annually, the state’s quartercentury trajectory of legalizing gambling and promoting casino-based tourism growth has
resulted in the near-complete displacement of the seafood capital of yesteryear. Two
generations of Biloxi residents have grown up removed from the coast’s fishing industry
past. They are unwitting witnesses to the Disneyfication of a city whose population in
1890 was the same size as rural Apalachicola and composed almost entirely of fishers
and the companies that bought, canned, iced and shipped their catch.
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However, as this case study shows, it was precisely the long descent of the Biloxi
seafood industry that created the conditions for the casino industry to rise. In the twenty
three years between the Hurricane Camille disaster of 1969 and the legalization of
dockside gambling in 1990, Biloxi was in serious trouble. Its fishing industry was all but
gone and tourism was nearly dead, too, as vacationers bypassed Biloxi for Florida
beaches and the 1980s oil economy decline kept even the regular Louisiana and Texas
tourists away. With miles of shuttered businesses, boarded up and blighted homes, Biloxi
had become primarily a military town, or, in the words of the late former mayor A.J.
Holloway, “a tourism town without tourists” (Solomon, 1999, p. 8). The city was broke,
with no money to meet payroll or even fill a pothole.22 Casinos brought tourists,
prosperity and jobs to the coast, but it has been a hair-raising gamble from the start, and
with debatable payoffs from an industry some still consider a pariah (Skolnick, 1978;
Taft, 2016). In the words of Mississippi journalist Charlie Mitchell, “Mississippi has been
living like a gambler for nearly 30 years, sustained by one jackpot after another. Absent a
stable and rising core of revenue from more and better jobs, higher property values and
increasing economic activity, Mississippi has time and again just gotten lucky finding
cash to pay its bills” (Mitchell, 2017, p. 4).
Set against this backdrop is the long rise and swift fall of East Biloxi’s working
class neighborhoods, which were ground zero for Hurricane Katrina destruction and now
find themselves at the center of controversial schemes to redevelop Biloxi’s gutted urban
core. The second section of this chapter, Arrivals, opens with a lens into what East Biloxi
was by chronicling the beginning of the commercial seafood and tourism industry on
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Personal interview, June 3, 2009.
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Biloxi’s Back Bay. In a tale of two cities, the section shows how the real working
waterfront of the city’s early twentieth century past rose up alongside the tourism
development that swept the Mississippi Gulf Coast from after the Civil War through
World War II. The third section, Fast Times, describes how this coexistence ended
between the 1950s and 1960s with a David vs. Goliath fight for the beach whose stakes
only grew when casino gambling came to town. The last section, Adaptation, considers
the future of a city that aspires to diversify its economy but lacks the resources to finance
conservation, and the political will to embark on a real transition to a blue economy.

Arrivals: Seafood Capital of the World, 1840-1944
For most of its early existence, Biloxi was a small fishing and lumber town with a
few resorts that attracted a clientele of mostly wealthy summer visitors from New
Orleans. After the War of 1812, some people from Georgia and the Carolinas migrated to
the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but the small towns that dot the shoreline from Waveland to
Moss Point remained more closely linked to New Orleans. This relationship was
enhanced in the 1820s and 1830s when New Orleans businessmen as well as Mississippi
and Alabama planters maintained villas and vacation homes and patronized bathing and
rooming houses in Biloxi, taking advantage of expanding railroad, overland and
steamboat transportation. As an editorialist with a sense of humor wrote in 1838,
“Disappointed politicians and others who have overheated themselves during the election
would do well to take a trip over to Pass Christian or Biloxi in the [steamboat] Isabella
to-morrow morning, and cool off. She leaves immediately after the 7 o’clock cars on
Thursday” (“Disappointed,” 1838, 1).
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As early as the 1840s Biloxi was known as one of the nation’s premier beach
resorts. Grand hotels graced the waterfront, steamers from New Orleans and Mobile
made regular stops in Biloxi, and urban travelers sought relief from the healing power of
the beach (Husley, 1998; Stagnonis, 2014). New Orleans newspapers are full of Biloxi
vacation advertisements in the years before the Civil War. In one, J.B. Currie, the owner
of Bachelors’ Hall, writes a personal appeal to prospective men guests by remarking on
his establishment’s recently renovated and expanded accommodations. “The advantages
of Biloxi as a summer retreat is [sic] too well known to need encomium, and its oysters
cannot be surpassed. His table will be will be constantly supplied with the best fish,
oysters, shrimps, &c., and every thing else that this market and that of New Orleans
afford, and his bar with the choicest wines and liquors. A Ten-pin Alley is attached to the
premises, where the visiter [sic] may combine amusement with exercise. He pledges
himself to use every exertion to give satisfaction to those who may favor him with a call”
(“Bachelors,” 1845, p. 1). Other advertisements touted Biloxi’s fine live oaks and
countryside peace, with updated properties stocked with horses, good carriages, sailboats,
billiard rooms, ballrooms, and bathhouses.
The natural landscape of the Biloxi area was as conducive to the growth of the
seafood industry as it was to tourism. The city sits on a peninsula between Biloxi Bay and
the Mississippi Sound, which is separated from the Gulf of Mexico by the barrier islands
of Deer, Cat, Ship and Horn. West of these islands lie the fertile shrimping and fishing
grounds of the Louisiana marshes. Biloxi, chartered in 1838 with a population of nearly
600, originated in an area of East Biloxi approximately one mile wide and several blocks
deep midway along the south side of the peninsula (Biloxi, 2009). In the 1840s, Catholic,
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Episcopalian, and Baptist congregations established in East Biloxi as neighborhoods
grew alongside sawmills, brick yards, and boat yards along the Back Bay (Husley, 1998;
Blokker, 2017). By 1860, Biloxi contained a few brick buildings, primitive roads, and a
population of approximately 900, 28 percent of whom were foreign born and one quarter
of whom came from other states, primarily Louisiana and Alabama. After the Civil War,
the timber industry expanded and steamboat service resumed, but the Biloxi economy
was slow to rebound. New Orleanians had little economic capacity for the vacations they
enjoyed in Biloxi before the war (Husley, 1998).
New impetus for growth came in 1869 when construction of the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad opened passenger service to Biloxi between New Orleans and Mobile.
The railroad stop marked a critical early turning point in Biloxi tourism and economic
history. Former Confederate president Jefferson Davis retired to the beachfront in 1876,
right around the time the Biloxi economy was linking up with inland markets and
exposing the city to a broader audience. Factors such as the manufacture of ice and the
commercial canning of shrimp and oysters made it possible to preserve fresh seafood for
shipment by train car. The Biloxi seafood industry rapidly expanded with these process
improvements, and with it the city population grew to 3,000. By the 1890s, Biloxi was
proclaiming itself “Seafood Capital of the World” and its seafood canneries were
employing almost 2,500 workers. That number is more than twice the population of the
town recorded in 1860 and five-sixths of that in 1869 (Husley, 1998). In markets as far
away as Chicago and San Francisco, Biloxi had become a household name.
Despite claims that the seafood industry built Biloxi, this research argues that the
natural conditions of Biloxi created the seafood industry, and also led to its downfall. The
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industry itself did not come into its own until the turn of the twentieth century, when it
grew so big so fast that Biloxi’s population was not large enough to support it. As Bayou
Petit Caillou industry leaders would do two decades later, Biloxi factory owners looked
north. They began importing Polish and Czech laborers from the Little Bohemia section
of East Baltimore, paying their train passage and housing them in seasonal camps of row
houses and shotguns located next to the factories (Pietila, 2018). Those who came from
the Dalmatian coast of what became Yugoslavia identified as Croats, Serbs and
Slavonian, with the greatest immigration occurring during the early twentieth century and
immediately after World War I through 1917. For imported laborers, many of whom
came from backgrounds as rural landless peasants, sailors, political refugees and men
avoiding conscription, the prospect of life on the Gulf Coast was appealing. While early
immigrants preceded the birth of the Biloxi seafood industry, their emergence constituted
a viable economic force that attracted more of their kin to the coast. With their experience
as sailors and fishermen, they were served well by the economic opportunities available
in Biloxi. The migration of the Cajuns occurred around the same time, although their
numbers peaked after a sugar cane crop failure in the 1920s (Husley, 1998). Biloxi
resident Neville “Te-Jean” Broussard moved from Lafayette to Biloxi when he was four
years old. As he recalled, dire economic conditions motivated his family and others to
seek better opportunities in Biloxi: “My daddy was a sharecropper. He’d work and work
and at the end of the year he never saw any progress. He had no education. He was under
their control. Like the song, ‘owed everything to the company store.’ So we moved.
Many families came over here (to Biloxi)” (Schmidt, 1995, p. 8).
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Rising up alongside the seafood industry was the timber industry, which, like the
majority of southern lumber workforces, employed mostly African Americans (Jones,
2005). Working-class factory workers from both the seafood and lumber industries lived
and worked in segregated communities alongside each other in what locals still refer to as
Back Bay and, on the easternmost point facing the sound, Point Cadet, or The Point.
African Americans settled in a Back Bay community known as “back of town,” a term
widely used in the south to refer to lower-lying, often poor minority communities on the
periphery of a city. It was in the back of town where these groups could buy property,
build homes and establish businesses (Campanella, 2007; Blokker, 2017; Logan and
Martinez, 2018). It was also the site of several lynchings, and where Biloxi’s civil rights
battles would be headquartered decades later. An example of one of the early back of
town families to establish themselves in East Biloxi, the Reed family, is described in a
2017 National Park Service survey of twenty three resources in what is still a deeply
segregated African American section of town. George Reed was born a slave in Perry
County, Mississippi, but was drawn to economic opportunities in Biloxi in 1869,
followed by his family. George Reed’s younger brother, Pleasant Reed, worked at a
sawmill and his father, Benjamin Reed, was a community pillar whose involvement in
the East Biloxi fishing, lumber, railroad, tourism, and charcoal industry was legendary.
The Reeds are among the best-known of the early African American families of Biloxi,
but they are far from unique in their involvement and success with local industry
(Pleasant Reed, 1979). Each community had its own church, with Greater St. John AME
Church organized in 1880, Main Street Baptist Church organized in 1905, Bethel Baptist
Church organized in 1909, and Our Mother of Sorrow Catholic Church organized in 1914
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for African American parishioners; St. Michael Catholic Church uniting Point Cadet
fishers in 1907;23 and St. John’s Catholic Church uniting Back Bay fishers in 1921
(Schmidt, 1995; Blokker, 2017).
Although many histories of Biloxi and the Mississippi Gulf Coast romanticize the
commercial fishing industry, it was backbreaking, low-paying work that trapped entire
families in crippling poverty for generations. The New York photographer Lewis Hine
captured the underside of the seafood industry when he traveled to East Biloxi in 1911 as
part of a campaign by the National Child Labor Committee to document the conditions in
which children were working at factories across the country. Of the 5,000 photographs
Hine took for the committee between 1908 and 1916, 170 depicted women and children
laboring in Mississippi seafood factories, canning companies, and oyster boats during the
winter of 1911.

23

St. Michael’s still calls itself the “church of the fishermen.”
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Image 4.3: With two hundred boots and locations across the Gulf Coast, the Dunbars, Lopez, & DuKate Company
was the largest canning company in America when Lewis W. Hine took this photograph outside the cannery
location near downtown Biloxi in 1911. (Source: Photo courtesy of The J. Paul Getty Museum. Hine, Lewis W.
1911. “Group of Oyster Shuckers, Biloxi, Mississippi.”)

After Hine’s photographs were published by the National Child Labor
Committee, one particularly startling image of Manuel, a 5-year-old barefooted oyster
shucker, helped lead to the creation of federal child-labor laws in 1916 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act in 1938. “It was hard times back then,” Joseph Olier, the son of one of the
young Biloxi girls photographed by Hine, told historian Joe Manning, creator of the
“Lewis Hine Project.” “That house they were living in looks like a rundown shack. I’d
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seen some of those shacks down in Biloxi when I was a kid. You could see through the
walls when you went in them” (Perez, 2017, p. 3).
From the beginning, the unsightliness of the hardscrabble seafood industry was in
direct conflict with the carefree, seaside resort image being created by the burgeoning
tourism industry. By the early twentieth century, Biloxi’s proximity to the Port of New
Orleans had fostered year-round tourism, and the seafood industry was not good for
business. In March 1888, the Biloxi Herald noted, “Standing on the front gallery of the
Montross Hotel one looking to the Gulf would see the line of unsightly bath and oyster
houses, dilapidated wharves, and high piles of oyster shelves. If the bath and oyster
houses are to remain in [sic] cannot they be made neat and handsome and the large oyster
piles-are they to remain and offend the eyes and noses of the denizens and visitors?”24
As tourism expanded, many facilities along the Mississippi Sound began
welcoming wintering northerners to the “cool Gulf Coast,” especially those from the
Midwest. The coast’s image was further boosted in 1914 after a three-week vacation by
President Woodrow Wilson drew national attention to Mississippi beaches. At one point,
an amusement park was even built on Deer Island, only to be wiped out by a 1915
hurricane. After Prohibition was enacted in 1919, some of the ships once used for hauling
lumber were repurposed to transport illegal liquor to entertainment establishments along
the Mississippi Coast. From the Caribbean Islands, particularly Cuba, to various ports
along the Mississippi Sound, ships secretly sailed around the barrier islands and bayous.
Two islands in particular, known as Dog Keyes, were popular stopping-off points for the

24

The Mississippi Gulf Coast Museum of Historical Photography has a detailed chronicle of Hine’s child
labor photographs of the Mississippi Gulf Coast with Hines’s original source notes and newspaper accounts
from the time. See http://www.msmohp.com/lewis-w-hine.html.
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underground liquor trade, which soon led to the birth of Biloxi’s first casino (Nuwer,
2005).
By all accounts, Dog Keyes25 was the place to go on summer weekends during the
Roaring Twenties. Once known as the “Monte Carlo of the South,” the two islands lay
thirteen miles southeast of Biloxi between Ship and Horn islands (Houston, 1931). The
large of the Dog Keyes, Dog Island, was three miles long and more than a quarter-mile
wide, resting on a shallow stretch of shoals (Hearn, 2011). While the island had long been
used by seafarers—artesian springs provided fresh water—during Prohibition it became a
haven for bootleggers and rum runners. Realizing its importance because of the
freshwater source and its location outside the jurisdiction of United States claims, three
entrepreneurs looking for ways to attract tourists decided to develop a resort on Dog
Island, technically not an island because of its lack of a real foundation, a fact they would
realize too late.
The men, Colonel Jack Apperson (builder of Biloxi’s 1924 Buena Vista hotel),
Walter “Skeet” Hunt (founder of Biloxi Mardi Gras in 1916), and Arbeau Caillavet,
acquired the three-mile-long Dog Keyes strip of land, between Ship and Horn islands,
through a quit-claim deed for $183.75, and welcomed the first visitors in 1925. Tourists
from New Orleans and Mobile, and as far as Illinois and Texas, loaded passenger boats
like the Pan American from piers at the Buena Vista to experience the $1 ride to
sunbathing, music, dancing and gambling at the Isle of Caprice (Beaugez, 2016).26

25

The island has gone by many names, but in the 1920s it was Dog Keyes before briefly renamed the Isle
of Caprice. The area is now called Dog Keys Pass. The actual hotel and casino building is still there, buried
in waist-deep water.
26
The name comes from a story passed down by local Pascagoula Indians about a disappearing island in
the Gulf of Mexico. Appearing on maritime charts in 1847, Dog Keyes disappeared in 1859, only to surface
again in the early 1900s.
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Image 4.4: An early advertisement for the Buena Vista hotel notes regular trips to the Isle of Caprice.
(Source: The Clarion Ledger, June 19, 1925).
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The first few seasons were so popular, the Isle of Caprice was able to expand the
next year, and kept expanding. Marathon swims from the mainland, bathing beauty
contests, and big-band entertainment kept patrons entertained until the last boat left at 4
a.m. (Beaugez, 2016). “The casino, empty and bare last year, has undergone a remarkable
change,” a Daily Herald front-page article reported in 1928. “It now presents a
duplication of the great arenas of ancient Rome. These columns are placed about the hall
and entrance, giving one the impression that he is entering a sporting place of the ancient
city in all its glory. Three huge, artificial tigers, of life size and color, are about the arena”
(“Coast,” 1928, p. 1).
At the height of the resort’s success in the midst of the booze bonanza of the
1920s, the owners had bought a lighting plant to double the island’s electrical capacity
and developed a scheme to construct a seawall to protect Isle of Caprice from the Gulf of
Mexico. Tourists traveled from as far away as Chicago to fish and play in the surf
between rolls of dice. Inside the casino, reported one 1926 newsman, “There are soft,
thick carpets and a general atmosphere of quiet luxury. Divans along the wall were
tapestried and deep-cushioned. Mahogany-colored, cane-bottomed stools were on hand
for players. A roulette table, two crap tables, a bird cage and a faro layout comprised the
paraphernalia. A money changer with a capacious bankroll walked about. Each table was
operated by a croupier plentifully supplied with chips. In fives, tens, twenties and
hundreds, the bills flowed in” (Bergeron, 1992, p. 51).
By the time a fire destroyed the property in 1931, erosion was already evident.
The following year, when the resort would have normally been open to tourists, all that
remained was a pipe that still gushed fresh water from an artesian well that once serviced
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the whole island (Beaugez, 2016). Local lore has it that the combination of industry and
the harvesting of sea oat plumes for flower arrangements by Yankee tourists caused the
island’s fate (Bergeron, 1992; Nuwer, 2005).
Two decades of steady infrastructure investments not only paved the way for the
Isle of Caprice tourism scheme to take off, but also for the Biloxi Chamber of Commerce
to successfully lobby citizens to pay for more street improvements, to lure even more
tourists. A 1920 voter referendum to spend $350,000 on paved roads was an
overwhelming success that increased the chamber’s power as well as the ability of the
business community to influence the local agenda (“City,” 1920). The momentum that
began with paved streets accelerated through the early 1920s as attempts were made to
form a Mississippi Coast Chamber of Commerce, later refashioned as the Mississippi
Coast Club, uniting the 35,000 residents of the state’s three coastal counties under the
imperative, “Why should Florida and California have these things and we not?” (“Coast,”
1925; “Many,” 1925). The membership club raises $100,000 in funds for a national
publicity campaign to establish the Mississippi coast as the go-to resort for the central
and Midwestern states. Modeled after similar regional initiatives along the California
coasts, the Mississippi Coast Club immediately got to work hiring a Chicago public
relations expert to direct a national advertising campaign aimed at stimulating investment
in the Mississippi Gulf Coast (“Gulf,” 1925).
The organization was wildly successful, influencing the adoption of a series of
infrastructure improvements that opened national access to the coastline and significantly
increased coastal property values.27 These improvements included a massive $2 million

27

Between April and November 1925, beach frontage real estate values jumped from $75 to $400 per foot.
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seawall and boulevard project stretching nearly thirty miles; seven bridges across Mobile
Bay, Biloxi Bay, Bay Saint Louis, Back Bay, Pascagoula River, Lake Pontchartrain and
Moss Point; expansion of the Illinois Central railroad; extension of the Mississippi Power
company grid; and construction of grand resorts such at the Edgewater Gulf Hotel, which
opened in 1927 with $5 million in financing from Chicago investors (“Many,” 1925;
“New Bridges,” 1926; Stanonis, 2014). The seven bridges in particular, all constructed
between 1925 and 1935, created for the first time an unbroken drive along the Gulf Coast
from Mobile to New Orleans via the Old Spanish Trail. With southerners vacationing in
the summer and northerners visiting in the winter, the state’s three coastal counties were
now able to offer tourists year-round refuge and respite.
The Great Depression did not squelch the dreams forged in the 1920s; in fact, the
Depression and World War II created pent-up demand for the beach that resulted in a
veritable tourist explosion in the late 1940s. Through the New Deal and early 1940s,
Mississippi Coast communities consolidated resources and collaborated in their
communication channels to more effectively advertise local attractions, including
festivals that honored local culture and promoted area traditions. This includes the
Blessing of the Fleet shrimp festival that inspired Desire Theriot and St. Joseph Catholic
Church to launch a similar ritual in Bayou Petit Caillou in the early 1930s. Biloxi’s
blessing started in 1929 as a distinctly local attraction to highlight a major industry and
honor the traditions of a 500-boat fishing fleet whose ancestors might have celebrated
similar religious ceremonies in their native European countries (“Gulf,” 1929).
Competition for the tourism dollar resulted in repeat violations of Prohibition, even after
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it was repealed in 1933,28 and a citywide crackdown on honky-tonks and juke joints that
engaged in gambling, which had evolved from roulette, craps and cards to include more
sophisticated slot and pinball machines, leading to an all-out ban by Mississippi
Governor Hugh White in 1938. The new gambling law did little to dampen the niche
Biloxi had carved for itself as a free-wheeling betting playground, nor did it give pause to
city leaders whose pre-war coffers were padded by the gambling economy. Legal
gambling was now commonplace at hotels such as the Pine Hills, Edgewater, Tivoli,
Buena Vista and White House.
The same year the gambling ban was enacted, the swank Broadwater Beach Hotel
in Biloxi opened with a specific mission to lure wealthy out-of-state and Mississippi
gamblers to a cavernous room where “roulette, bird cage, faro bank, roquetnoir, craps,
dice” and other unlawful games were played (“Children,” 1949; Nuwer, 2005).
According to a 1949 lawsuit brought by two children against the owners of Broadwater
Beach, where their father had lost nearly $84,000 in eighteen months, the hotel-casino
gave patrons an “uncontrollable desire” to gamble by creating an irresistible atmosphere
“with music, wine and song to lead and deceive the unwary to their loss and destruction
at the gaming tables” (“Children,” 1949, p. 1). As the southern seaboard moved from the
periphery to the center of the regional economy, the road was now paved for the rise of
casino gambling to take over Biloxi as capitalism continued its march to the coast in the
postwar era (Boissevain and Selwyn, 2004; Kahrl, 2016).
28

Prohibition became increasingly unpopular during the Great Depression, as the repeal movement, led by
conservative Democrats and Catholics, emphasized that repeal would generate enormous sums of muchneeded tax revenue, and weaken the base of organized crime. The repeal of Prohibition in the United States
was accomplished with the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution on
December 5, 1933. By its terms, states were allowed to set their own laws for the control of alcohol. The
organized Prohibition movement was dead nationwide, but survived for a while in a few southern and
border states including Mississippi, which continued to enforce statewide Prohibition until 1966.
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Reinvention, Desperation, and Resurrection, 1945-1969
The making of the Mississippi Coast beach economy after World War II
paralleled an organized series of efforts to resist crackdowns on the strip—the
entertainment, liquor and betting mecca between Gulfport and Biloxi that contained
upwards of thirty gambling houses by the late 1940s. Conflict between, on the one hand,
city and business leaders hungry to get their hands on the money that would come from
legal gambling and alcohol sales accused their opponents, religious leaders and nearby
Keesler Air Force Base personnel, as confusing moral issues with economic issues
(“Biloxi,” 1951). Tensions over the moral or societal consequences of the new beach
gambling economy in the early 1950s foreshadowed the civil rights battles over the beach
that would surface a decade later in Jim Crow Biloxi in terms of who could access,
experience, and participate in the coast’s tourism economy. As the rise of the Sunbelt and
decline of the Blackbelt altered the city economy once and for all in the latter part of the
twentieth century, the seafood industry took a nosedive. These dynamics were cemented
in the economic desperation that surfaced in the aftermath of Hurricane Camille in 1969,
which, after decades of resistance, created the conditions for gambling to spread and
eventually displace the workers who built the seafood capital of the world.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, gambling steadily expanded along the
Mississippi Coast despite concerted efforts by military leaders and ministerial groups to
stop it. Civic and business leaders were winning the battle and the war through a steady
drumbeat of coastal transportation investments, beach upgrades and advertising
campaigns that all but doomed the anti-gambling establishment and wrote the future
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casino industry’s ticket to dominance. As one businessman quipped at a 1950 chamber of
commerce meeting dedicated to resisting anti-gambling forces, “If we don’t have slot
machines, they’ll be referring to this section as the ‘ghost coast’ instead of the ‘gold
coast’” (“Chamber, 1950, p. 1).
The business strategy was built on the theory that increasing access to the coast
would create an army of defenders who would demand more, not fewer, places to play;
and who would insist on their right to spend their tourism dollars as they wished. By
1950, the opening of Biloxi’s Highway 90 link, a four-lane superhighway paralleling the
Gulf of Mexico from Bay St. Louis to Ocean Springs, boosted travel along the
Mississippi Coast literally overnight. Nightclubs sprouted up, drawing entertainers as
famous as Elvis Presley, Jayne Mansfield, Andy Griffin, and Hank Williams Sr. One
newspaper writer teased this out in a laudatory column: “Fifteen years ago Mississippi
boasted few paved roads and travel by car was a tortuous, dusty and tiresome
undertaking. Few tourists entered the state by choice. Today the story is the reverse.
Mississippi boasts one of the finest paved highway systems in the South, approximately
7,000 miles of hard-surface roads” (O’Brien, 1952, p. 33).
Around the same time as the Highway 90 beachfront thoroughfare was completed,
the Army Corps of Engineers finished construction of a 27-mile-long seawall. To protect
both the fortification and the new Highway 90 from salt water and erosion, the Corps
dumped seven million cubic yards of sand on the Mississippi Coast, giving Highway 90
travelers a new spectacle to visit: the longest manmade beach in the world (Kahrl, 2014).
While the 1951 beach cost $3 million, the sand had to be replenished in 1972 at a cost of
$5 million, not counting the $350,000 spent annually through the early 1980s to maintain
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the “nice white beach” (Riley, 1983, p. 1). While other Gulf Coast towns were catering to
summer or specialty vacationers, Mississippi did not have a specific tourist “season.” It
was always open for business, so much so that the resort industry by 1953 was worth
$100 million (“Coast’s,” 1953). In 1955, the Mississippi Gulf Coast claimed 3,717 rooms
in 122 hotels and motels, accommodating 2.6 million guests who brought $37.8 million
to the beach.
Resistance to, and organized efforts against, Biloxi’s gambling industry, and the
tourism interests aligned with it, came from two groups: the military and ministers. The
interwar era witnessed a remarkable expansion in gambling, both legal and illegal. In the
1930s, for example, “bank night” at the movies, church-sponsored bingo games, and the
ubiquitous punch boards became institutions. The numbers and policy games reached into
the pockets of even the poorest neighborhoods. In Mississippi and other states, machine
gambling, slot machines, horse and dog racing rose in popularity as gambling houses and
lotteries declined. Slot machines, attractively boxed “one-armed bandits,” were designed
to collect any size coin and were equipped with an adjustable pay-off mechanism, two
features that helped them spread rapidly throughout the country to a wide variety of
establishments. When New York's Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia in 1934 dramatically seized
and destroyed large numbers of machines belonging to one-time supporter Frank
Costello, Costello shifted a good portion of his operations to a more hospitable
Louisiana-Mississippi Gulf Coast (Moore, 1974).
Alarmed by the volume and intensity of prostitution and public gambling during
and after World War II, antigambling advocates began demanding enforcement of
existing laws forbidding the practice across the state of Mississippi. As unemployment

189

declined and incomes rose in the postwar period, an increasing amount of money flowed
into gambling and proposals for the legalization of gambling appeared in a number of
states, including Mississippi. Citing Hoover-era fears that legalizing gambling would lead
to rising crime rates and increased gang warfare, antigambling groups took every
opportunity to persuade the public that their neighborhood speakeasy was part of a larger
web of gambling with interstate ties that made it detrimental both to local business and to
society and government in general. Wrote one newspaper editorialist, “It is no
coincidence that the counties which thus tolerate and protect the ‘one-armed bandits’ are
counties which also tolerate, protect, and unofficially or officially ‘tax’ the illegal liquor
business. Gambling and liquor are two parts of the unholy trinity of which vice is the
third component. Where one flourishes and is tolerated the other two are likely to
flourish. And where all three flourish in defiance of law and public morals, graft and
corruption usually flourish also” (“Conscientious,” 1949, p. 6).
Harrison County Circuit Court Judge Lawrence C. Corban, a leader in youth
affairs, began advocating for a crime commission in Mississippi in 1944 to combat the
forces of gambling, crime and delinquency. Citing the FBI as a model of crime detection,
and successful crime commission models in New York, Chicago and Miami, the judge
remarked that “while we dedicate ourselves to future protection of our country from
foreign aggressors, we make no provisions to safeguard the sanctity of our home from the
man who swears he will do as he pleases” (“Crime,” 1944, p. 2).
It would take seven more years, a lengthy senate investigation, several alcoholinduced deaths of airmen stationed at nearby Keesler Air Force Base, and a countywide
ban on liquor for the Harrison County Crime Commission to finally materialize in 1951
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with the stated purpose “to suppress crime by promoting and encouraging respect for law
and order, by helping to bring about law enforcement, by fostering legislation deemed to
be in the public interest and by taking all lawful measures which appear to be necessary
or proper for improvement of conditions pertaining to crime and related problems in
Harrison County” (“Biloxi” 1951, p. 1). Modeled after citizen-led commissions in other
cities, the first officers of the group were civic leaders Dr. E.L. Bolton, president, of
Biloxi; Henry Leggett, vice president, a Gulfport businessman; Thomas L. Wallace,
secretary, a Biloxi attorney; and George Estes, treasurer, vice president of Hancock
County Bank. The birth of the commission followed Harrison County Sheriff Laz
Quave’s countywide liquor ban and closure of all forms of gambling along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, inspiring one newspaper writer to predict that “with gambling
closed and most liquor gone, many of the Gulf Coast businesses expect tourist trade to
drop off” (“Biloxi” 1951, p. 9).
How Biloxi went from gambling mecca of the South to effectively closed for
business, only to rise once more as the new Las Vegas, is part of a larger story that dates
back to 1938, when the state legislature passed a law banning slot machines and other
gambling devices, including any “cane rack, knife rack, artful dodger, punch board, roll
down, merchandise wheel, slot machine, pinball machine, or similar device.” Gambling
continued for the next fifteen years, but the June 1941 activation of Keesler Field inspired
a host of new critics to question gambling’s impact on young soldiers. Although the local
Biloxi community thought it was getting a technical training center with a student
population that might peak at 20,000, Keesler soon became host to one of the Army’s
newest basic training centers, and its population climbed to 30,000 soldiers nearly
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overnight. Their $48 million annual payroll represented 80 percent of Biloxi’s economic
base (Chandler, 1951).
Almost immediately, soldiers were getting arrested for drunkenness and gambling
in nearby Biloxi, where hotel proprietors and club owners scrambled to meet the influx of
demand for liquor, dice, roulette and slot machines.29 The situation was not unique to
Biloxi; World War II camps across the U.S. found themselves struggling with issues of
morality as wives, mothers and women’s church groups wrote letters of concern to
senators and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt about the proliferation of gambling,
prostitution and other vices occurring in communities outside camp limits, over which the
War Department had no jurisdiction. The department’s Morale Division responded by
improving its recreation programs, serving cheaper beer with lower 3.2 percent alcohol
content, and increasing the rigor of its training requirements, all the while denying
allegations that soldiers were acting immorally (Pearson and Allen, 1941; “Presbyterian,”
1942). “No American army in all history has been so orderly,” wrote the Office of War
Information in a December 1942 coast-to-coast survey of drinking conditions
surrounding army camps. In its report, which favored control over prohibition,
investigators found that on one Friday payday in Biloxi, fourteen Keesler soldiers were
arrested, five for drunkenness. Such small numbers of recreation and pleasure-seekers
gone awry “plainly show that army paynight is rarely the Klondike brawl and blow-out
that rumor makes it,” the report stated (Office of War, 1942, p. 10).
During the war, anti-gambling and anti-drinking religious groups in Biloxi kept a
relatively low profile. In 1943, members of the Biloxi Protestant pastors’ association
29

In late June 1941, the proprietors of several Biloxi hotels including Broadwater Beach and the Plaza
Club were fined for possession of gambling equipment, including a dice table, roulette wheel, faro layout
and slot machines (The Daily Herald, June 25, 1941, p. 3).
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issued a resolution that called on Mayor Chester Delacruz and other city leaders to
enforce laws in reference to slot machines and liquor. “We notice the increasing
reappearance of slot machines and continued evidence of the sale of liquor in Biloxi. The
indifference of our community concerning these evils is having a detrimental effect upon
the character of the children and youth of Biloxi as well as the men in the armed forces
here,” the resolution stated (“Biloxi,” 1943, p. 10).
After the war, the pressure mounted on city officials to crack down on gambling
as a driver of organized crime. The situation came to a head in the years leading up to the
launch of the Kefauver Committee, a unit of the Senate Armed Forces Committee led by
the crusading Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver. The Committee’s investigation of
interstate gambling was part of a larger probe of organized crime, defined as gambling,
prostitution, drugs, labor and business racketeering, and an attempt to be a “permanent
check on the growth of the underworld” (Moore, 1974, p. 2). The Committee’s
investigation in Biloxi focused on examining reports that the local gambling and liquor
situation was fleecing and demoralizing teenage soldiers stationed at Keesler base. At
least two Keesler soldiers had committed suicide and one 17-year-old died in his bunk in
incidents related to gambling and alcohol. On the eve of the commission’s one-day
hearing in Biloxi in 1951, debate intensified over the past, present and future of gambling
and its effects on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Slot machines began to disappear in Biloxi
as Sheriff Laz Quave ordered their exit from the city, threatening to send the Mississippi
National Guard to enforce the gambling ban for those who refused to comply within 48
hours. Sheriff Quave had strong support from the Biloxi Protestant Ministerial
Association headed by Reverend Douglass Carroll of the First Assembly of God and
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Reverend Thomas A. Carruth of the First Methodist Church, both of whom would testify
before the Kefauver Committee.
In a letter to the editor published just days before the Committee hearing, Carruth
expressed his frustration in losing a series of anti-gambling battles to local business
leaders who supported legalizing the industry altogether. Carruth counted 193 liquor
establishments and hundreds of slot machines within the Biloxi city limits, a situation so
out of hand in a legally dry state that “people will hold little babies up to the slot
machines and grey haired ladies will jingle nickels in their hands as if it were something
wholesome and clean” (“Wright,” 1951, p. 1). Other estimates suggested as many as 327
gambling establishments lined the Mississippi Gulf Coast and that 80 percent of their
combined $12 million revenues were owed to Keesler soldiers (Chandler, 1951).
In their testimony before the twelve-hour Kefauver Committee hearing in Biloxi
on October 22, 1951, Carroll and Carruth claimed that slot machines were so pervasive in
Biloxi that, with 1,200 machines in circulation, there was one for every thirty-five
residents. Sensational photographs taken by Life Magazine were introduced by
Committee counsel showing air base soldiers patronizing gambling houses. One picture
showed a boy of twelve and a girl of six pulling the handles of slot machines. In eight
pages of testimony, General Robert Powell, representing Keesler, admitted the base was
overcrowded, but insisted the local situation was not an emergency, was not a military
problem, and did not warrant as drastic an action as the call for National Guard troops.
Powell was firm in his belief that there was nothing wrong with the slot machines at
Keesler Air Force Base, insisting soldiers were citizens just like everyone else and should
not be deprived of their rights. The general’s testimony came under attack when
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Wyoming Senator Lester Hunt, who hosted the Biloxi hearing, criticized Powell for
failing to adopt a vigorous policy to stop gambling on the Gulf Coast. In his preliminary
report, Senator Hunt wrote, “It is most discouraging to this committee to learn beyond a
shadow of a doubt that the personnel of Keesler field have been exploited and victimized
by vicious, greedy elements of this community, aided and abetted by law enforcement
officers who have brazenly acknowledged in their appearances on the witness stand today
that they have knowingly and willfully flaunted their oath of offices” (Chandler, 1951, p.
2).
However, Biloxi Mayor Hart Chinn, like the majority of the fourteen witnesses
who testified, agreed with General Powell, saying that most Biloxi residents and visitors
liked things the way they were. Gamblers paid higher rents for business locations than
“legitimate enterprises,” which helped the city budget stay in the black, the mayor
testified, adding that all the state gubernatorial candidates came to Biloxi in the summer
of 1951 and none protested the city’s so-called vice conditions when they were drinking,
gambling and partying in resorts (Chandler, 1951).
The culmination of the decade-in-the-making crackdown on liquor sales and
gambling halls was not a culture change for the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but an outsider
would not know it at face value. Governor-elect Hugh White laughed in November 1951
when asked whether open gambling would ever return to greater Biloxi. “There’s about
as much chance of that as there is of a star falling out of the sky and hitting a lark,” he
said, winkingly, before adding that he would put the issue before voters, who tended to
prefer legalization in private while professing allegiance to a comprehensive ban in
public (“White,” 1951, p. 11). As slot machines were seized, liquor bottles destroyed, and
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hotels raided through the 1950s, the influence of the Harrison County Crime Commission
stalled while a second allied, citizens-led organization briefly rose up, called the
Taxpayers’ League of Harrison County, whose goal was to “eliminate waste and graft in
local government.” Headed by Clayton Rand, a daily columnist, editor of a weekly
magazine, and author of several books, one of the Taxpayers’ League’s sole victories
occurred in 1955 when it defeated a $25 million bond issue, backed by a state gasoline
tax fund, that would have financed a twelve-mile causeway between mainland Biloxi and
Ship Island, the largest and most distant of the four barrier islands protecting Mississippi
Sound, and close to the site where the Isle of Caprice casino mecca fell into the sea more
than twenty years earlier. Tied to the overall causeway scheme cooked up by a politically
savvy Gulf Coast businessman named John Lee Gainey was a plan to connect Deer Island
to Biloxi by a small causeway. In Gainey’s vision, the “island paradise” would help
Biloxi attract a bigger tourist market (Minor, 2001, p. 75). The Taxpayers’ League’s
Rand said the causeway would turn Ship Island into a “living hell and center of operation
for all vices” (Milner, 1955, p. 1), but the state legislature ultimately turned down
Gainey’s vision of paradise because of fears that a toll bridge—barred by the state
constitution—would be needed to keep the causeway deal afloat (Minor, 2001).
Despite all this, plus the continued activism of the Protestant Ministers
Association, Biloxi gambling continued unabated, one Crime Commission official
admitted in 1955, before attributing the persistence of gambling and alcohol consumption
to public apathy, corruption, and an inability to “take law enforcement officials from
under the control of our racketeers” (Milner 1955, p. 1). One year later, Governor White
declared in public testimony before the Federal Communications Commission that “there
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is no effort made on the part of the state government to break up the sale of liquor in this
community which caters to the tourist trade” (Bates, 1956, p. 1). Biloxi sheriff-turnedmayor Laz Quave agreed, testifying that the state’s gambling and liquor prohibitions
were a farce, “kicked around for fifty years or more. No sheriff, mayor or governor for
that matters has enforced the law.”30 In the midst of such blanket defiance rose modern
Biloxi, with its new manmade beach, publicly advertised 25-cent martinis and expanded
luxury resorts. Despite yet another threatened Mississippi Gulf Coast liquor crackdown
by Gov. J.P. Coleman, one travel writer wrote that in Biloxi, “a restaurant without a bar is
as unthinkable as a menu without shrimp” (Denley, 1956, p. 44).
Throughout the 1960s, under the administration of pro-gambling Sheriff Eddie
McDonnell, clubs such as the Beach, Fiesta, Gus Stevens, Mr. Luckey’s and Raven all
offered games of chance. They were repeatedly raided, fined, temporarily shut down, and
later reopened, sometimes under different management or another name. But in part due
to Sheriff McDonnell’s role as a conspirator in the operation of Gulf Coast casinos,
backroom gambling never stopped (Ricks and Saul, 1981). Across the state and along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast, these clubs, bars, and resort establishments possessed slot
machines and a wide variety of gambling devices, from blackjack and dice games to
roulette wheels and poker tables. Writing to The Clarion Ledger in 1962 (p. 3), one
Biloxi resident rolled her eyes at yet another governor’s promise to crack down on Biloxi
gambling: “Having grown up on the coast, I have pretty much learned the pattern of the
gambling situation. If said pattern is followed it will be only a few weeks when gambling
30

The testimony was solicited as the FCC sought to decide whether WLOX Broadcasting Co. or Radio
Associates Inc. should receive television channel 13 on the Gulf Coast. Gambling and liquor emerged as
issues because Gulf Coast hotels backed the radio stations. One group of hotels claimed to never break the
law; the other hotel produced witnesses who stated Mississippi’s liquor and gambling laws are
meaningless.

197

will reappear on the coast.” Indeed, liquor and gambling emerged as major issues in the
Mississippi governor’s races of the 1960s. Although it had been taxing illicit sales since
1944, Mississippi finally repealed its statewide spirits and wine prohibition in 1966; it
was the last state to end Prohibition (Holder, 1996).
The Mississippi Gulf Coast population in the three Gulf-facing counties of
Hancock, Harrison and Jackson experienced a 26.9 percent population increase, more
than twice the national average, between 1959 and 1969, and an influx of new money and
industries. As the cash poured in, coastal development accelerated, and by 1969 two
thousand people per square mile lived on the coast. As Biloxi’s tourism industry took
over the city economy, the seafood industry became its stepchild in the postwar era.
Plagued by agricultural pollution, threatened by competition, and handicapped by
politics, the many causes that led to the deterioration of the Mississippi seafood industry
inspired finger-pointing as early as the mid-1930s. One of the culprits to emerge then was
widely considered to be the nail in the coffin of Biloxi oysters and shrimp. It was the
unintended consequence of the Bonnet Carre Spillway flood control project, opened in
1945 as a safety valve for the city of New Orleans during Mississippi River floods. By
diverting freshwater from the river into Lake Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico when
river levels are high, the spillway inadvertently destroyed the production of oysters in
planting reefs along the Mississippi shore, and long with it the oyster industry itself,
every single time it opened.
The spillway presented the Mississippi coast with its own version of the FloridaGeorgia-Alabama water wars. “If it is the policy of the federal government to open the
spillway every time there is a flood, the oyster industry will be permanently destroyed. It
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will be necessary for the government to make reparations and perhaps establish new
oyster grounds,” Mississippi Rep. William Meyers Colmer argued before a House
subcommittee in 1947 in seeking compensation for the crippled oyster industry
(“Louisiana,” 1947, p. 8). His testimony set forth a pattern that would be repeated for
decades: spillway opens, oyster beds damaged, fishermen compensation denied, Army
Corps of Engineers maintains federal immunity from flood damage liability.
By the early 1960s, Bonnet Carre Spillway flooding issues forced Mississippi’s
hand in supporting the seafood industry. The state invested in a 5,080-acre oyster
growing area off the central part of the coast, and hoped it would stick. At the time the
project was widely considered to be the single largest oyster bed in the world, according
to the state Marine Conservation Commission. Gov. Ross Barnett, speaking at a Biloxi
convention of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Dealers in April 1961, spoke proudly of the
state’s support of the seafood industry. Gov. Barnett called the Harrison County coastline
not a fishery disaster, but the “future oyster and shrimp capital of the world” (Hills, 1961,
p. 8). The governor had consistently fought to reactivate the seafood industry on the
coast, and his efforts were paying off in steady oyster production growth and sales
through August 1969, when Hurricane Camille swept through coastal Mississippi,
severely damaging Biloxi’s Gulf Coast-facing seafood plants and presenting an
opportunity to gentrify the city’s waterfront.
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Image 4.5: East Biloxi’s Back Bay before casinos is depicted in this undated photograph thought to be from
1964 or 1965. St. Michael’s Church is the domelike shape in the background; note the oyster shell piles
fronting the seafood sheds in the center of the photograph. (Source: Preservation in Mississippi).
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Fast Times: ‘Las Vegas on a Peninsula,’ 1969-2005
Hurricane Camille tore apart Biloxi’s seafood and tourism industries when it hit
the Mississippi Gulf Coast as a Category 5 storm, causing $1.4 billion in damages ($11
billion in 2017 dollars) and leaving more than 150 people dead in Mississippi and
Louisiana. The storm swept away homes and businesses three blocks inland, but only put
a temporary end to the “American Riviera” marketing of the resort city. However much
the storm stirred up problems of inadequate insurance, at-risk infrastructure and the need
for regional cooperation, the disaster also cemented processes that had been in the works
for generations, including the relocation of the Gulf Coast seafood industry from valuable
beachfront property to the less lucrative, working-class Back Bay and the acceleration of
beachfront tourism.
Three months after Camille, the Mississippi Research & Development Center and
the federal Department of Interior’s Bureau of Commercial Fisheries began exploring the
future of the seafood industry as part of a report commissioned by the Governor’s
Emergency Council. This marks the first time the feasibility of moving the hurricanedamaged seafood plants documented by turn-of-the-century photographer Lewis Hine
from the Biloxi beach to a more inland location such as the Harrison Seaway on the
backside of Biloxi Bay was explored. The idea was to free up beachfront property for
development and allow destroyed seafood plants the opportunity to centralize and
modernize even as they relocated to the Back Bay (“Study,” 1969). John Mavar Sr.,
owner of Mavar Shrimp & Oyster Co., lost everything during Hurricane Camille, but he
told a newspaper reporter covering the aftermath of the disaster that he supported Mayor
Danny Guice’s effort to move the seafood industry off the beach. “That beach property is
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too valuable for our industry. It should be used for big beautiful hotels and apartments
like they have in Miami—building strong enough to withstand any hurricane,” Mavar
said (“Guardsmen” 1969, p. 14).
The creation of the Governor’s Emergency Council was part of Executive Order
No. 49 issued by Gov. John Bell Williams, a Washington-savvy Democrat, on September
6, 1969. In addition to studying issues like the relocation of the fishing industry from the
beach to the bay, the executive order mandated a regional, coordinated approach to
revitalizing the Mississippi Gulf Coast and birthed the Governor’s Emergency Council.
The council was a blue-ribbon panel then considered to be an innovative approach to
intergovernmental relations and development on a regional scale. The council had the
authority to initiate studies, evaluate alternative courses of action and establish priorities
to apply state and federal resources in the development of the coast’s full potential. The
council’s authority was strengthened after Republican President Richard Nixon and a
Democratic Congress approved Gov. Williams’ request to require federal agencies to also
coordinate their recovery work in Mississippi through the same Governor’s Emergency
Council.
The first test of the council’s power to implement plans came in the matter of
uniform building codes. Biloxi Mayor Guice took the lead in getting the Biloxi City
Council to become the first Gulf Coast municipality to adopt building codes. A second
challenge was commissioning a comprehensive six-county regional plan using a systems
approach to guide implementation of economic development, resource use and
technological innovation in the region. In June 1970, the Cambridge-based firm Meta
Systems published its 300-page report, “Mississippi Gulf Coast Comprehensive
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Development after Camille” at a series of public, private and civic meetings. From a
regional population of 300,000 in 1970, the Meta plan projected a doubling of coastal
residents by 1990 geared to an economy of maximum utilization of the resort,
recreational, port, land and residential potential of the region. The report recommended
establishing a new, regional, quasi-governmental and permanent Gulf Coast
Development and Services Corporation to deal with regional redevelopment activities for
which existing municipal and county agencies would be too limited in scope; designating
an ad hoc committee to develop studies and recommend findings to the corporation; and
embarking on a process of prioritizing action proposals within selected strategies such as
pollution abatement, health care and urban renewal coordinated by the Governor’s
Emergency Council (“Governor’s,” 1970).
Local mayors and county officials largely embraced Meta’s take on regional
rebuilding and the new regional agency, which would be comprised of mayors from
fourteen cities and presidents of county boards of supervisors in the coastal zone, and
thirteen members appointed by the governor from a cross-section of civic and minority
groups. The Massachusetts planning firm continued to keep an eye on Gulf Coast poststorm redevelopment. Meta planners warned local leaders that the rapid recovery of
tourism in the year following Camille, which saw 86 percent of its rooms restored in just
twelve months, was “not the result of any balanced plan for the region,” and such
uncoordinated recovery patterns would result in “wide variations in economic and social
impact” among the municipalities and counties that formed the base of the study.
Geographically, most of the resort industry concentrated in the western end of Biloxi
witnessed the biggest reconstruction boom, accounting for 2,459 of the 3,084 rooms
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available one year after the storm in 26 motels-hotels, and 75 percent of restaurant
service. Camille was a disaster, commented Dr. Robert Burden, chairman of Meta
Systems, “but it did not destroy the economic and cultural characteristics of the region. A
lot of the problems now predated Camille and unless they are resolved, a great many of
the new problems cannot be resolved” (Minor, 1970, p. 35).
The Meta Systems plan proposed new cities, new supporting services, a total
transportation system redo centered around Interstate 10, and a balanced industrial
economy built around the NASA-Mississippi Test Facility at the western end of the Gulf
Coast and the Litton-Ingalls shipbuilding facilities, the state’s largest industry, on the
eastern end. The proposal of a “seventh county” combining water-air-land resources
management, including offshore land and water bottoms, was another new approach
suggested by Meta planners (Minor, 1970, p. 35). The seventh county could bring
together management and development of the saltwater fishery, use of bays, marshes and
wetlands in mariculture, and through legislation a coordinated program for pollution,
environmental control, and conservation.
Meta’s plan, and the work of the Governor’s Emergency Council, later influenced
the 1973 decision by the Nixon Administration to combine federal disaster relief and
recovery. The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration was created as an
organizational unit within the department, overseeing disasters until its incorporation into
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, in 1978. More immediately,
concerns over Nixon’s and Williams’ handling of issues regarding the racial and
geographic representation on the council and federal distribution of hurricane relief funds
produced the passage of the 1970 Disaster Relief Act. While the governor’s initial list of
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council appointees was impressive, there was only one Republican represented, no
women, and no African American, although estimates suggest about 40 percent of
damages occurred in the black community. Within a short period, complaints were
registered from the NAACP, Urban League and American Friends Society and the
governor was seen as falling short of his promise that the council would be nonpartisan,
apolitical and represent people of all backgrounds (Salter, 2005).
Despite its utopian visions, the post-Camille recovery of the Mississippi coastline
occurred largely outside the influence of the Governor’s Emergency Council, which
disbanded in 1972. Reflecting back, former Biloxi Mayor Danny Guice said that the
farther the community went beyond the immediate aftermath of Camille, the less inclined
people were to join the proposed six-county, fourteen-city Gulf Coast Regional District
that was the centerpiece of the council’s rebuilding infrastructure (Minor, 2005). Gil
Carmichael, a Meridian developer who was the lone Republican on the council in 1969,
drew parallels between rebuilding trends after Camille and Hurricane Katrina in a May
2006 interview. “The Camille thing seemed such a disaster at the time, but we built back
on the beach anyway. We repeated a lot of the errors we made. I hope we don’t do it
again this go-around” (Mees, 2006, p. 1). Dr. J. Chester McKee, now the retired
Mississippi State University vice president emeritus for research and graduate studies, led
the Governor’s Emergency Council in the aftermath of Camille. Immediately after
Katrina, an interviewer asked McKee what he made of the task facing the 2005
Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal led by former Netscape
CEO Jim Barksdale. “Where we all thought Camille was the mother of all hurricanes,
now 36 years later with all the rebuilding, the many new developments, and the local
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relaxation of the codes, damage from Katrina is many times that of Camille. Barksdale’s
commission really has a huge job” (Salter, 2005, p. 71).
By 1971, there were more hotel and motel rooms along the Mississippi Gulf Coast
than before Hurricane Camille, but the completion of Interstate 10 linking New Orleans
and Texas to Florida’s sparkling beaches did not help Biloxi’s once-thriving tourism
industry. Rising up alongside the new lodging accommodations was the “Biloxi Strip,” a
“cancers on the city” (in the words of Mayor Gerald Blessey) collection of nightclubs,
strip joints, souvenir and gift shops, gambling clubs and, later, Biloxi’s version of urban
renewal. In Camille’s aftermath, economic recovery strategies centered on the
exploitation of the region’s recreational assets, and development proceeded in defiance of
the destructive lessons of the past (Kahrl, 2012). Instead of coordinated recovery,
developers seized control of the rebuilding of the coast, resulting in a patchwork quilt of
projects that served to exacerbate economic gaps, privilege wealthier insured
homeowners, and abandon the city’s working poor neighborhoods around East Biloxi.
Community blight dragged down the Mississippi Coast after Hurricane Camille because
of this institutional neglect, and inspired a series of ill-fated development projects that
only proved to make matters worse in the years leading up to the casino transformation of
the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the early 1990s. Practically every public official elected on
the coast during the 1960s and 1970s pledged to clean up Biloxi; nearly all failed (Riley,
1984).
One of the first recovery attempts to turn around East Biloxi was a traditional
downtown urban renewal effort called the Vieux Marche. Launched in 1972 and opened
in 1977, Vieux Marche was an attempt to revitalize a “totally deteriorated,” hollowed out
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downtown Biloxi, near the neighborhoods where turn-of-the-century African American
lumber and immigrant seafood industry workers built homes, churches and civic life
(Fuller, 1977). By transforming Howard Avenue from a commercial street into a canopycovered pedestrian mall, complete with a water fountain and Golden Fisherman statue
designed to commemorate the Mississippi Coast’s seafood heritage and pay tribute to
generations of commercial fishermen, city leaders hoped to breathe new life into a once
vibrant downtown. The $22 million project covered 170 acres and included two
intersecting pedestrian thoroughfares totaling eleven blocks, 40 percent of which were
vacant when the project began. Like many top down urban renewal projects, Vieux
Marche failed to accomplish even a fraction of its economic goals. In fact, some city
leaders argued it made matters worse in East Biloxi. Over time, as the last shoppers and
businesses left downtown for indoor, climate-controlled venues like suburban Edgewater
Mall, the city took down the last of the canopies and opened the street once again to oneway traffic (Fuller, 1977), leaving East Biloxi to falter for several more years.
A second waterfront renewal project emerged in the mid-1980s under the banner,
“A Rising Tide Lifts All Boats.” The original Point Cadet waterfront redevelopment plan
of 1983 was billed as a shot in the arm for the struggling East Biloxi community’s
pocketbook, a way to boost tourism, create up to 1,400 jobs and transform a “trash pile”
of a neighborhood, in the words of one city elite, into an economic showcase of preWorld War II Old Biloxi (Oliver, 1986, p. 79). The Point Cadet project foreshadowed the
scores of drawings, designs and development dreams that would persist for decades into
the future to refashion East Biloxi into a working waterfront without the workers. The
1983 plan was developed with input from Washington, D.C.-based The Waterfront
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Center and was widely considered to be a national model for waterfront revitalization.
The $50 million scheme included plans to house a hotel, marina, waterpark and Jackson
Brewery-style festival marketplace on a seventeen-acre campus comprised of twenty
blighted or abandoned property tracts acquired by the city of Biloxi in the aftermath of
Hurricane Camille through eminent domain. The land was once home to a U.S. Coast
Guard station and a variety of seafood processing plants. Describing the project in 1986,
the Point Cadet Development Corp. executive director noted it would be “the one place
on the coast where you can sample everything we have to offer” (Oliver, 1986, p. 79).
The development corporation was formed as a public-private agency to implement the
Biloxi Waterfront Master Plan, funded with a $160,000 grant from the state Bureau of
Marine Resources, $2.1 million from federal community development block grants and
more than $10 million in HUD funds. With a seafood industry museum, state park,
marine education center, casino dinner cruise ship, sportsman’s club, yacht boatyard,
seafood restaurant and shrimp, fuel and ice wholesaler, the project was a bright spot in
post-Camille recovery. Then-Mayor Gerald Blessey described Point Cadet revitalization
as a deliberate, coordinated attempt to maintain the city’s traditional fishing culture while
avoiding the atmosphere of a Disneyland amusement park. “We’re putting old wine in
new bottles. We will revive both the commercial fishing industry and tourist activity all
in one place” (Oliver, 1986, p. 79).
In the aftermath of Hurricane Camille, the actual commercial fishing industry was
bolstered by the arrival of Vietnamese refugees, who settled in Biloxi and Pass Christian
specifically to fish. They revived the seafood industry by accepting low-paying jobs in
packing plants and contributed to the city economy when they went on to build their own
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boats, open businesses and join the Catholic Church in East Biloxi, just like their French,
Yugoslavian and Polish predecessors at the turn of the century. Monsignor Gregory
Johnson of St. Michael’s Catholic Church counted 800 Vietnamese in his 2,500-member
congregation by 1983. The Vietnamese influx was not without issues. As their presence
increased, tensions arose between American and Vietnamese shrimpers over
misconceptions about Vietnamese overfishing and perceptions that Vietnamese fishers
were not following state fishing regulations and local ordinances. The most serious
incident occurred in spring 1981 when a gasoline bomb was placed on a Vietnamese boat
in Biloxi, but did not explode because of a faulty base. By 1983, about 5,500 boats, 1,500
more than 1980, were licensed in Mississippi, including 300 Vietnamese boats (Riley,
1983). The numbers continued to climb throughout the oil slump of the 1980s; by 1988
there were 6,000 licensed shrimpers and 68 seafood wholesalers, processors and retailers
working in Mississippi’s $337 million shrimping industry, according to figures from the
Gulf Coast Research Laboratory in Ocean Springs. Increased competition for an
increasingly at-risk catch was made worse by the rise of weekend and recreational
fishing. In a familiar feud, career fishers accused outsiders of robbing them of their
livelihood while recreational fishers accused the commercials of overfishing and
environmental carelessness (Spear, 1992).
Competition for the same catch in a competitive market was the result of the
coast’s decades-long struggle to rebuild after Hurricane Camille. After a decade of fits
and starts, the Biloxi economy of the 1980s was defined by struggle. The situation got so
bad that a 1981 Clarion Ledger newspaper series dubbed “Wide Open and Wicked”
brought an investigative reporting lends to the landscape of prostitution, gambling, drugs
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and corruption that dominated the Mississippi Gulf Coast, where Harrison County Sheriff
Leroy Hobbs had recently left office after twelve years under the weight of a voluminous
federal racketeering indictment (Riley, 1984) The situation was compounded by sharp
declines in federal shipbuilding contracts at Biloxi’s Ingalls shipyard, the rollback of
NASA’s budget under the Reagan administration, and increased competition for fisheries
from Asian shrimp farms. Pre-gaming, the Mississippi Gulf Coast was a dying town; five
of the six largest hotels on the shore had entered bankruptcy proceedings and the other
appeared to be on its way (Drown, 1988; Hashimoto et al., 2011).
The Gulf Coast’s dire straits were music to the ears of the casino gambling
industry, which was in the early stages of deploying an unscrupulous but highly effective
strategy of preying on the most economically destitute regions of the country for market
expansion (Kahrl, 2012). Beginning in the late 1980s, as the effects of Reagan-era federal
budget cuts trickled down to state governments and as low taxes and fiscal austerity
became a form of civic religion, state legislatures embraced, as Robert Goodman argues,
casinos as “magic bullets for dying economies.” They were the “economic development
strategy of last resort” (Nuwer, 2005, p. 1).
Appearing out of nowhere, in a special session in 1990, the Mississippi legislature
passed the Gaming Control Act, making the state fifth in the nation to legalize casino
gambling, and the first in the South. Mississippi Senator Tommy Gollott, a Democrat
from the 50th Senate District in Harrison County, spearheaded legislation for dockside
gambling to help the slumping state economy. The legislation legalized gambling in the
fourteen counties along the Mississippi River and the Gulf Coast and required all casinos
to operate on the water. The so-called “riverboat gambling bill” provision appeased the
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state’s Bible Belt interior by ensuring the unseemly industry was confined to the margins
of the state, which at the time housed the most economically depressed counties. A single
deleted word in the bill, “underway,” meant that vessels did not have to leave their
dockspace to open as casinos; they likewise did not need engines. As the state got to
work writing regulations for cruise ship, riverboat and dockside gambling establishments,
Hancock County in December 1990 was the first Mississippi county to approve dockside
gambling. Harrison County quickly followed (Nuwer, 2005). Two years after the Gaming
Control Act passed, the Isle of Capri Casino opened in Biloxi, its misspelled name
inspired by the sunken island twelve miles offshore that was home in the Roaring ‘20s to
the Isle of Caprice casino. Isle of Capri started with two small boats tied up to the Point
Cadet pier in the waterfront redevelopment zone built just a few years earlier. Reflecting
on the Isle of Capri’s significance as Biloxi’s first casino, its marketing director said,
“Initially we chose Capri because of the historical significance. The island was such a
great place, and ‘Capri’ is what they were calling it. Now we feel that ‘Capri’ signifies
change and helps us bring it into the ‘90s. It allows us to introduce the fun and
exhilarating tropical feel with the history” (Bergeron, 1992, p. 51).
Veteran observers of Mississippi politics could not believe how quickly
Mississippi relented to the casino lobby. Writing in 1992, journalist Bill Minor, a
longtime capitol correspondent for the state newspaper, expressed his surprise in an
opinion column. “It is difficult for me to comprehend that Mississippi, long the cradle of
the Bible Belt, is now into legalized gambling. … Having seen the long struggle to bring
about the fall of Mississippi prohibition of alcoholic beverages 26 years ago … the
demise of another of the state’s venerated moral icons—the ban on gambling—is mind-
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boggling” (Minor, 1992, p. 1). The Isle of Capri casino’s growth is a case in point,
expanding over the course of five years into a casino complex complete with waterfall,
volcano explosions and a 370-roome Crowne Plaza hotel (Ragland, 1997).
The dawn of the casino industry in 1992 ushered in the most dramatic economic
development in Mississippi since the invention of the cotton gin. When Mississippi
opened its first casinos, its poverty rate of 24 percent was the nation’s highest—”no state
seemed to need that jackpot more than Mississippi. And yet no state could see it all
destroyed as swiftly” (Osnos, 2001, p. 1). Three dockside gambling casinos opened that
year, and two other floating casinos, the Grand Casino in Bay Cove and the Mardi Gras at
Bay St. Louis, were near completion, lending a boomtown atmosphere to a previously
depressed coastal port. The expectation that the casinos would create 3,600 jobs was
exceeded almost as soon as the first casinos opened, according to figures from the
Harrison County Economic Development Commission. Apartments were fully rented,
hotels were booked solid even in the middle of the week and weekends looked like the
Fourth of July (Minor, 1992).
Officials working to expand the casino industry in the 1980s and 1990s
understood the more depressed the state, the more lax the regulations they could get away
with (Kahrl, 2016). Socio-legal scholars have long examined the government’s role in
regulating “vice” industries—those industries providing “taboo products” and services
such as alcohol, guns, and gambling (Matthews, 2016, p. 1). The legalization of vice is
often motivated by the state’s need to generate revenue, which can produce conflict
between the government’s duty to protect its people and its desire to retain funding for
programs (Cosgrave and Klassen, 2001; Skolnick, 1979; Walker and Calcagno, 2013;
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Rorie, 2017). In the early 1990s, desperate Mississippi adopted among the most industryfriendly gambling regulations in the nation, placing no restrictions on the number of
casino licenses; charging nominal licensing fees; putting no limits on the amounts of
wagers, losses, or days in a row a person could gamble, and taxing the industry at half the
rate of other states (Kahrl, 2016).
While the original riverboat planners imagined the gambling boats could be towed
to a protective Back Bay during a storm, visions of paddlewheel cruisers eventually gave
way to the reality of elaborate gaming palaces on barges, and regulators abandoned any
notion of moving them. By 2004, twenty-nine vessels were tied to piers on the shore.
Together they employed 29,000 people in mostly low-wage jobs; generated $330 million
in annual state tax revenue, accounting for 10 percent of the Mississippi budget; and
further connected coastal ecological management and environmental policy principles to
the market needs of the regional economy (Kahrl, 2012). Rather than exemplifying a
regional approach to growth management, as state planners envisioned in 1969, the
Mississippi Gulf Coast between 1990 and 2005 became a case study in what happens to a
community when free-market-based forces shape not only disaster relief, recovery and
renewal, but also poverty alleviation, workforce development, job creation, and
community economic development (Mele, 2011).
Casinos fueled economic spinoffs—golf courses, restaurants, souvenir tourist
traps, and residential home sales, which increased in Biloxi and neighboring Gulfport by
84 percent from 1992 to 2001, according to the Harrison County development
commission. The tourism industry became during this decade the largest non-military
employer in Biloxi. In fact, tourist visits to the coast increased tenfold from 1992 to over
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20 million in 2001. Local politicians used their share of the money, 4 percent of gaming
revenues, to slash property taxes, hire new teachers and improve services. Along the way,
many of the former seafood industry workers gave up their working waterfront for jobs in
the new casino economy, collectively making a 1995 prediction come true that casinos
would permanently shut down Biloxi’s $40 million seafood industry and transform the
city into “Las Vegas on a peninsula” (Schmidt, 1995, p. 18).

Conclusion: Adaptation: Hurricane Roulette, 2005-2019
After the ravages of Hurricane Katrina, the California architecture-and-planning
team Moule and Polyzoides was invited to participate in a national charrette to provide
emergency urban design services for the reconstruction of Biloxi. The firm was among
fifty teams of designers, planners and architects who came to Biloxi in October 2005 for
the Mississippi Renewal Forum, a six-day charrette to help the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s
eleven cities rebuild. Inspired by the idea of repairing Biloxi’s postwar suburban scars,
Elizabeth Moule and Stefanos Polyzoides came up with a plan to address not only
widespread hurricane devastation, but also the social mobility, environmental and
economic problems that had long plagued the city. The firm’s proposal focused on
revitalizing the Back Bay as well as core urban issues such as preservation, traditional
neighborhood reconstruction, downtown redevelopment, connectivity, walkability,
infrastructure, codes and administration (Moule and Polyzoides, 2005). Describing the
Biloxi plan, New York Times Magazine writer Jim Lewis said “it looked like a
quintessential sleepy Southern city, or perhaps a parody of one.” While more affluent
cities like Ocean Springs might be able to afford “graceful boulevards and pretty streets
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flanked by neat houses and stately mansions,” Biloxi is bigger, more diverse,
geographically more at risk of flooding, and indebted to the casino industry. “Playing
posthurricane politics in Biloxi is like trying to sword-fight on a rolling log, and as the
months wore on, almost everyone found something to object to” in Moule and
Polyzoides’s plan (Lewis, 2006, p. 17).
Four months after Governor Haley Barbour convened his Commission on
Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal at the weeklong charrette, Biloxi Mayor A.J.
Holloway unveiled “Reviving the Renaissance,” a plan produced by chairman Clark
Griffith, a retired Air Force general, and New York-based Living Cities to help guide the
city’s long-term recovery. In a February 2006 letter to the community, Holloway said he
chose the title to follow up on Gov. Haley Barbour’s challenge that the people of south
Mississippi should create a renaissance as part of its recovery. “In Biloxi, we were
enjoying unprecedented prosperity and opportunity in the decade or so before Katrina.
We didn’t see a need to create a renaissance, we needed to revive the one we had before
the storm,” Holloway wrote.
In April 2006, Moule and Polyzoides formally withdrew their firm from the
process of rebuilding Biloxi, stating in a letter to local and state officials their concerns
that the Reviving the Renaissance plan was allowing casino operators and condominium
developers to influence rebuilding, especially on the city’s impoverished and severely
damaged east side (Hines, 2006). Instead of the Seaside, Florida-style New Urbanism
scheme cooked up by Moule and Polyzoides, the Reviving the Renaissance plan called
for East Biloxi to build on its pre-Katrina direction, ultimately becoming a tourist,
entertainment and gaming destination of national stature. Weighing in on the urban
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planning controversy, Griffith said that Biloxi needed a realistic, affordable, workable
plan that would consider existing patterns, and that the New Urbanism concepts that
dominated the Gulf Coast’s post-Katrina planning conversations just did not fit with
Biloxi. “We didn’t have a clean slate. We have a broken city,” Griffith said (Hines, 2006,
p. 13).
In East Biloxi, the heart of Biloxi’s coveted renaissance, the central problem was
socioeconomics, as the reimagining of neighborhoods like Back Bay and Point Cadet
went head-to-head with the reality and lived experience of the local community. With a
population of 12,000—half white, 30 percent black and 20 percent Vietnamese—the area
was low-lying, persistently poor, and filled with one-story cottages, 60 percent of which
were destroyed by Katrina’s 30-foot storm surge (Little, 2006). Planners, in their rush to
action, did not consult the working people of East Biloxi, the fishers, bus drivers, and
casino laborers whose version of affordable housing was a $65,000 home, not the
proposed $140,000 New Urbanism model that filled post-Katrina pattern books. As one
Biloxi resident said about the so-called affordable Mississippi Cottage: “A poor lady like
me, what the hell am I going to do with that? Walk by it and admire it? We can’t buy it.
The white man will always have us pushed to where we have to just … go by and admire
it and then go home somewhere and eat them old beans and bread and be thankful”
(Little, 2006, p. 27). Visions of Hope, a Biloxi social services and affordable housing
agency, advocated for the city to keep working-class homes in East Biloxi to fuel the
city’s economy. “They are bank tellers. They work in doctors’ offices. They are teachers.
They are police and fire. These are not lazy people. They are out there working hard.
They can’t help it their wages are low” (Hines, 2006, p. 13).
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While plans were being cooked up to shape the future of post-Katrina Biloxi, the
state’s gambling industry and its political allies quickly turned disaster into opportunity.
Following the storm, state and local officials in Mississippi worked to channel federal
funds and subsidies toward rebuilding Gulf Coast casinos and away from small
businesses and low-income homeowners, and rewrote laws that augmented the industry’s
influence over the coastal economy. Weeks after the storm, the Mississippi state
legislature called a special session and passed a bill that waived the requirement for
casinos to be anchored on the water and instead allowed for construction farther inland.
Meanwhile Governor Haley Barbour successfully lobbied the U.S. Congress to strip a
provision from a recovery bill that specified that 50 percent of the funds for Community
Development Block Grants be granted to low-income people. Such moves were
indicative of a larger strategy to remake the coast through rolling out the red carpet for
commercial developers while constructing innumerable obstacles for poor homeowners
to return. In the mostly poor, low-lying but highly coveted East Biloxi, new flood maps
required homeowners to elevate on eighteen-foot-high stilts at an average cost of
$30,000; few saw any other option but to sell (Petterson et al., 2006; Kahrl, 2012).
As recovery faded to rebuilding, large buildings of condominiums and resorts rose
where family homes had been while geographies of power further reshaped the
Mississippi Gulf Coast into a place divided by those who could offer the high flood
insurance premiums and housing costs that came with “living on the littoral” (Waugh and
Smith, p. 2). In the words of longtime Biloxi city spokesman Vincent Creel, Biloxi was
fully aware of its role in what he termed “hurricane roulette.” Hurricane Camille lulled its
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survivors into a false sense of security; that complacency “killed more people in 2005
than it did in 1969” (Farber and Chen, 2006, p. 1).
The state’s reliance on its casinos and beaches as a source of revenue, and the
environmentally disastrous policies that grew out of this marriage after Hurricanes
Camille and Katrina, were on full display in the aftermath of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. As of fall 2018, the latest economic estimates suggest there are 4,400
fewer jobs on the Coast in fall 2018 since the oil spill eight years ago, and 11,265 fewer
than before Hurricane Katrina in 2005. As the Biloxi growth machine pushes on, those
employment gaps show every sign of closing by 2025. In August 2018, after years of
haggling, the Mississippi Legislature approved a bill directing 75 percent of the $750
million from BP economic damages back to the state’s coast. The money can be spent
only for projects in the six southernmost counties—Harrison, Hancock, Jackson, George,
Stone and Pearl River. Another bee in Biloxi’s bonnet is a planned expansion of
Margaritaville to include a new 300-room hotel tower on Point Cadet and adjacent
downtown amusement park, by Barrington Group, a firm that just a few years ago built
Bay Cove, a multi-million-dollar retirement and assisted living home on Back Bay.
Milton Segarra, CEO of Visit Mississippi Gulf Coast, said the project represents the
future of a coastline willing to pull out all the stops to secure its economic future. “You
have casinos, nightlife, nature, adventure, gastronomic and culinary offerings, fishing and
history. Those are the key drivers to attract more and new visitors to the coast” (Walker,
2018, p. 2).
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Chapter Five: Cross-Case Analysis
Introduction
The previous three chapters brought to the forefront case studies that explore the
hidden histories, geopolitics and socioeconomics of Gulf Coast change. While several
themes are at play when considering the Gulf Coast’s rapid twentieth century coastal
dynamics, at the same time, these case studies reveal that the situation in each state, and
in each specific coastal community, are unique, as are the factors that come into play to
influence local, regional and state support for local coastal issues. The most important
variable determining the pace of change in the study timeframe is different for each of the
three cases; even a state like Florida, with more rigorous coastal environmental
protections, has followed a contradictory path in its promotion of pro-tourism policies
along its ecologically fragile coastline.
In choosing the development of three unique coastlines over a 118-year time
period as the target of investigation, the field of analysis might seem somewhat broad.
After all, coastal growth and development during the twentieth and into the early twentyfirst century encompass a broad range of local milieus; mobilization histories and
techniques of empowerment of social actors; development policies; economic constraints;
and new forms of governance (e.g. government structures established after disasters or
strategies and tools to accelerate or slow down local development according to who holds
the power). Indeed, this broad range of contexts contrasts how scholars typically view
tourism development and urban revitalization, in general, as changes in land use or
changes over time to the built environment (Drewe et al., 2008).
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The purpose of each descriptive case study chapter is to provide the background
and context needed for the development of a model that can inspire new insights into the
complexities of coastal change at a time of near-uncontrolled coastal urbanization, riskblind infrastructure investment, and erosion of traditional livelihood systems, all within
the lens of “disaster resilience” (Keating et al., 2017; Didier et al., 2018). Multiple
variables factor into each case’s divergent trajectory of change. Given the depth and
breadth of the case study material, several tactics are used in this chapter to synthesize
their implications for the research model: the themes and patterns, how they link to each
other, and how they connect to the theories discussed in Chapter One. Findings from the
three cases can be categorized into several overarching explanations. Figure 5.1 provides
a theme map in the form of a cross-case matrix of broad patterns and empirical evidence
drawn from each case study community. The purpose of the cross-case matrix is to
determine whether the case studies share a more generic, common transformation process
as well as the conditions that might be underlying the transformation process within each
specific context. The matrix identifies five themes, or common denominators, and fifteen
findings that can be seen as the primary, place-based drivers influencing the varied
outcomes of development described in each case study chapter.
The matrix doubles as an independent framework for understanding historical
processes beyond the communities themselves; it considers certain events, such as
disasters or policy changes, as a starting point for unpacking the underlying conceptual,
institutional, economic, and systemic structures that shape patterns and events. The
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theoretical implications of the theme map, and how they intersect with the typologies of
coastal development presented in Chapter One, will be explored in more depth
throughout the chapter, which is divided into five sections that progressively build on the
material shown in the cross-case matrix.
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State Control
Along the Gulf Coast, the ecological and economic dimensions of development
are inextricably linked. Reduced access to natural resources, including land, water and
forests, negatively impacts the livelihoods of communities who depend on them to make
a living. Moreover, the severity of local impacts depends largely on what happens at the
state level; specifically, in how governments execute or ignore equity-based principles,
such as principles of distributive justice (fairness in the distribution of access to natural
resources) and procedural justice (fairness in procedures, such as opportunities for
participation in the decision-making process of affected communities). The literature on
the political ecology of state-led infrastructure development and resource allocation (e.g.
intensive agriculture, energy projects, extractive projects) is clear that uneven power
relations are no surprise; indeed, they are inherent in decision-making processes; usually
costs and benefits are unequally distributed within the national, state, and local scales,
and the people most affected are overlooked or ignored in planning and construction. A
political ecology theme is relevant, then, to understanding the first theme in the crosscase matrix: the extent of state control. That is, the tensions that exist within each case
study community between state priorities and local needs, and how that friction manifests
locally in poor implementation of social safeguards and/or unequal distribution of access
to resources (Siciliano and Urban, 2017).
Coastal Louisiana’s cozy, at times corrupt, relationship with both the energy
industry and the regulators who govern it has, more often than not, meant little to no
regulation of oil and gas canal building, drilling and offshore exploration. Since the first
salt dome produced oil in the 1920s, local power elites aligned their interests with those
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of the state to maximize the production of oil and gas, and soon even powerless locals,
many of them former commercial fishers, joined with them. They were unknowing
participants in a system that would not only restrict their access to previously unrestricted
and unregulated waterways but, over the course of a century, contribute to the ecological
demise and environmental destruction of their communities. As Louisiana became the
nation’s oil and gas epicenter, with 600 platforms in a forty-mile radius around
Terrebonne Parish, it also became a classic case of distributive injustice.
One state over, the pattern of state control has a similar dimension. Mississippi’s
poverty-stricken economy created the sense of urgency the state growth machine needed
to pass the 1990 Gaming Control Act, a legislative decision that instantly changed the
trajectory of the state’s political economy and the coastline that doubled as its lifeline. As
coastal casinos boomed, their revenues padded state and Mississippi Gulf Coast
government coffers, an exchange that inspired even looser regulations and even more
revenues. It was a spin-cycle of dependence that only strengthened after Hurricane
Katrina and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
Florida’s situation as a longtime pro-planning, pro-preservation state is
complicated because of the influence of geopolitics on its natural and human resources.
Even as the state has sought to protect its environmental assets as a matter of public
health, its location downstream from major urban, agricultural, and ecological threats
puts it in a precarious position. The state’s ability to advocate on its own behalf, and
protect its natural resources, depends on its relationship with pollution sources as far
away as Appalachia. The Florida-Georgia-Alabama water wars spanning the course of
the past thirty years boil down to issues of procedural justice, of politics, equity, and
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infrastructure—who owns it, who regulates it, and who gets to decide what purpose it
serves.

Power Balances
It may be obvious to point out that American businesses routinely try to influence
policy, from establishing a political agenda, to influencing decision-making in executive
agencies and the courts, to steering public opinion in ways that were successful for
Mississippi Gulf Coast chambers of commerce, for example, when they sought voter
approval for infrastructure upgrades in the postwar era. Nationally in 2015, for every
dollar spent on lobbying by labor unions and public-interest groups combined, large
corporations and their associations spent $34 (Drutman, 2015). Surveys of the “most
influential interests” in the fifty states have deemed groups representing manufacturing,
business, and electricity-generation firms to be extremely powerful, regularly eclipsing
organizations devoted to environmental protection (Dincer, 2012).
What this study is more interested in, within the context of Gulf Coast
development, is how; how did certain conditions create opportunity for businesses to
experience increasing success in local and state policy interventions, in both setting the
agenda and winning the vote, during the research timeframe; how did specific instances
of economic development support local capacity and local efforts to adapt to rapidly
changing economic and environmental contexts; and how have communities been
supported or hindered? The case study findings reveal very different configurations of
organized interests in both the microdynamics of the three coastal communities under
investigation and in the broader states in which they belong.
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In Louisiana, the privatization of the coast that started in the Edward Wisner era
set the foundation for past, present and future decision-making processes related to the
coast’s economic development. Now that coastal land ownership is largely consolidated
in the hands of five holding companies, access to the coast is severely limited to those
privileged few individuals and companies who pay annual rights to lease the land for
extraction and exploration. Classical economic development strategies, such as
dependence on industrialized resource extraction for export, often come at a cost to
community well-being. In Bayou Petit Caillou, reliance on the oil and gas industry has
left an entire region of the U.S. not only vulnerable to global markets, but at risk of
extinction due to long-term persistent impacts of industrialization (e.g. saltwater intrusion
and sea level rise); persistently high, intergenerational poverty; and limited homeowner
and flood insurance protections. These are the primary factors that drove the “sink or
sell” mentality that not only pushed residents away from the coast to settle “up the
bayou,” but also opened the way for tourism businesses to recreate a recreational paradise
where seafood canneries, processing sheds, and workforce housing once stood. It has
only been since 2017 that coastal Louisiana residents experiencing continuing economic
and social ills, and a weakened capacity to fight for their share of local decision-making
power, have adopted the adaptation mindset. Their argument is that the survival and
endurance of their communities means more than economic growth, but also the
improvement of human well-being: adaptation to risk, a social network of resilience, and
access to choices to shape their future.
Such lessons have not been absorbed into the fabric of Biloxi, where external
capital, external entrepreneurs, and private land ownership dominate the city’s power
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balance; business interests singularly drive the tourism-dependent economy, as evidenced
by the post-Katrina casino boom and ongoing attempts to reshape the blighted shoreline
of East Biloxi. The economic importance of the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s resources has
grown over the last decades primarily due to the influences of tourism and the spread of
the particular brand of casino tourism that is unique to Biloxi, where a constellation of
structural factors (poverty, systemic racism) interact with local conditions (tourism,
service and retail-based jobs) to produce specific livelihood options.
What has set Apalachicola apart, until recently, is its historically strong fishing
cooperatives and relatively healthy fish stock. Local business and commercial seafood
leaders have worked hand in glove since the oyster boom of the early twentieth century.
The commercial fishing industry for decades has resisted efforts to develop its
historically working waterfront, as shown in the example of the business and politics
surrounding the adoption of the city’s first master plan in the 1970s. As a peripheral
fishing community, Apalachicola’s capacity to regenerate and maintain its homegrown
local economic growth processes is now being called into question in the aftermath of the
ecological collapse of the oyster industry since 2012. Apalachicola’s deep dependence on
its fishery, combined with its peripheral status, has led to population loss, decline in job
opportunities, and an overall inability to economically restructure for the new reality.
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Infrastructural Zones
Across each case study, it is clear that infrastructure, urban-regional politics, and
ecological dynamics converged over time to generate distinctive political situations and
environmental justice dilemmas. Efforts to restructure human-environment interactions
collided with changing ideas about nature, frequently in conjunction with new tourism
and development markets. In each case, contemporary controversies (oil and gas
exploration damages, polluted estuaries, tourism monopolies) have their origins in
infrastructure projects from the early 20th century (canal dredging, agriculture runoff,
manufactured seawall).
Barrier island restoration combined with the Morganza to the Gulf hardened
shoreline project reflect Louisiana’s $1 billion race to save its shore, but this case also
illustrates how present-day issues are deeply informed by past decisions regarding the
placement, operation, and maintenance of large-scale water infrastructure projects. It is
well-known from this case that the benefits and hazards associated with Louisiana’s
centuries-old maze of canals, pumps, gates, and levees have been unevenly distributed.
Writes Tulane University’s Joshua Lewis in a 2017 investigation of controversies
surrounding Mississippi River diversions, the beneficiary is “the urban center of New
Orleans and its associated agglomerations of financial capital, institutional capacity, and
political power, [which] has sought to rework its periphery to secure its economic
position and enroll peripheral ecologies into the infrastructure of urban drainage, flood
protection, and maritime transportation” (p. 8). The infrastructure zone of drainage
systems and shipping canals along the Louisiana coast have succeeded in (1) fragmenting
urban space; (2) endangering left-behind peripheries (Bayou Petit Caillou); (3)
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encouraging particular forms of global connection; (4) triggering profound environmental
transformations; and (5) creating a “situational dissensus” among neighboring
communities (Lewis and Ernstson, 2017, p. 10).
The implementation of widespread engineering or infrastructure solutions to
achieve economic growth is not unique to Louisiana. The intersection of state-initiated
conservation governance (i.e. Pointe-aux-Chenes Wildlife Preserve in southern
Terrebonne, Apalachicola National Forest in Franklin County; and DeSoto National
Forest north of Harrison County) and amenity-related residential development (e.g.
coastal second home markets and condo hotels) also can be seen as overlapping or
coupled processes that set the stage for uneven community outcomes (Hurley and Ari,
2018), particularly as these developments restrict local hunting and fishing access.
Literature on conservation territory establishment and amenity migration suggest these
outcomes might be influenced by divergent social-cultural communities, who sometimes
cooperate and who sometimes compete, within the context of ongoing
“reterritorialization,” a set of dynamics that describes how in-migration and its associated
property transfers often change who can access and control certain resources (Hurley and
Ari, 2018, 195). Coastal Mississippi’s manufactured beach and 26-mile seawall are two
examples of the hazardous development of the tourist landscape on shores that were once
inhabited by workers and deemed unfit for development. In Apalachicola, efforts to
preserve an endangered ecosystem have put most county land under state and federal
wildlife management and protection, and are reflected in the state’s longtime battle to
receive more of its share of upstream freshwater resources.
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Closed waterways, restricted commercial use of the beach, and forests protected
from hunting and lumber are examples of state-sanctioned “infrastructural zone”
decisions that, over time, forced Bayou Petit Caillou, Biloxi, and Apalachicola to
abandon traditional livelihood practices. These forces are at least partially responsible for
the outmigration trends documented in each case study chapter, as the unfolding
landscape of coastal risk, coastal tourism, and second home development diminishes the
ability of locals to access and make a living from natural resources, and to afford to
continue living in their communities. With over half of the at-risk affected coastal
communities in the United States being home to socioeconomically vulnerable rural
communities (Dahl et al., 2017), equity in resource distribution and an array of adaptive
responses—particularly ones that preserve community cohesion (Adger et al., 2012)—are
needed to prepare against physical exposure and bolster the capacity of communities to
rebound. In the coming decades, water security and the persistent impacts of water on
low-lying coastal communities, like those analyzed in this study, will continue to threaten
the ability of already socially vulnerable neighborhoods and groups to thrive
(Bhattachana et al., 2018).

Geopolitical Economies of Reconstruction
The small window of opportunity that exists between disaster striking and
recovery beginning is rife with possibilities. It is also a deeply challenging time because
it calls for a balance of short-term, immediate priorities—preserve jobs, the right to return
home, and the freedom to rebuild—with long-term, often environmental concerns—
reduce risk, protect nature and habitat. Researchers have written extensively about how
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communities ought to use this fleeting window as an opportunity to push for smartgrowth principles, restricted rebuilding in flood-prone areas, and implementation of
mandatory flood mitigation measures. However, as the Biloxi case study revealed in both
post-Camille and -Katrina planning, residents and business owners also need to return
home to normalcy. Tobin and Montz (1997, p. 187) argue that while there is usually
“great interest” in mitigation and innovation immediately after a disaster, momentum
quickly dissipates when the community begins to resettle. While communities tend to
expect swift governmental aid, they also denounce policies that threaten to encroach on
their activities or property rights once their journey home is complete.
The long history of hurricane activity ordered key aspects of Gulf Coast life,
including local attitudes toward emergency preparedness, building codes, economic
development, and social responses to both natural disasters and local authorities. In the
context of coastal Louisiana, recovery and reconstruction efforts following Gulf Coast
crises served to exacerbate existing tensions between public and private interests in the
use and demarcation of prized waterfront land. Surges in reconstruction following
damaging coastal storms, in particular, have stimulated development pressures because of
the change opportunities that frequently surface after disasters (Colton, Kates, and Laska,
2008; Flint and Luloff, 2005; Platt, 1999). The situation is at its most obvious in Bayou
Petit Caillou, a coastal rural community geographically isolated from central planning
agencies and largely outside the boundaries of code enforcement. These factors played
definitive roles in driving Cocodrie’s post-disaster conversion to recreation playground
following Hurricane Andrew in 2002.

231

Marginalized groups, such as East Biloxi’s African American and Vietnamese
communities, suffering from legacies of social inequality and persistently low
socioeconomic status, have greater risk exposure; power imbalances left them in the
lowest-lying neighborhoods. Driven from their homes, they were voiceless in postdisaster planning following Hurricanes Camille and Katrina. If planning is fundamentally
about the allocation, distribution, and alteration of property rights, more often than not,
the political power of development interests shapes the terms of the debate (Glickfeld &
Levine, 1992). Furthermore, what makes coastal communities different in planning
processes are the added dynamics of water: who controls it, who can access it, and who
needs it most. In his recent study of Spain, Erik Swyngedouw calls this “liquid power,”
the idea that coasts, coastal people, and their interactions with water (canals, dams,
irrigation, and desalination stations) present additional layers to unpack and unravel when
considering coastal communities, how they change over time and how coastal places
might learn to better integrate issues of water flow and water security into future
decision-making. Water plays a “decisive role” in transforming coastal places, often in
radical ways, into inseparable “hydro-social landscapes” in which water, social power,
and identity are inextricably linked (Swyngedouw, 2015).
Given these realities, planning researchers consent to the fact that effective public
integration into the post-crisis reimagining process is difficult to achieve. Forester (2006)
points to an array of reasons. Local residents and developers alike often doubt planners’
motivations and seek to defend diverse interests ranging from protecting neighborhoods
to developing the local economy. After disasters, the task of attracting diverse
stakeholders to the planning table becomes even more daunting because the
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circumstances are far from typical and often fraught with emotion. Urban planners,
developers, and architects tend to see solutions in demolition and massive redevelopment
projects. Property owners want to get back what was lost. Government and philanthropic
groups sit somewhere in the middle, commonly offering expertise, financial assistance,
and volunteers for both property owners and developers (Werwath, 2005). The limited
literature on planning for disaster recovery does not adequately explore the factors that
hinder participatory planning in these circumstances, or how planners, policymakers, and
local participants can overcome them, but one lesson from Apalachicola could help
expand the literature. Apalachicola fishing community interests have been integrated into
decision-making processes following every major event chronicled in Chapter Three; a
preference has been consistently given for sustainable, community-based approaches to
recovery, and it is a major reason the city’s working waterfront has literally weathered
the storms. Apalachicola’s experience defies the notion that environmental protection and
economic development are a zero-sum game—more of one is purchased at the expense of
less of the other—yet the case study also shows the limits of local resistance when the
ecology upon which most livelihoods depend is threatened by forces outside its control.
As Whitfield and Hart (2000) note, over the last century in the United States, the
economy and the environment have operated like a mathematical equation, with each
term affecting the other in a dynamic tug of war. Part of the struggle is due to fiscal
constraints. Local governments have experienced a shortage in the level of funding they
receive to integrate economic development and environmental management. This matters
in near-single-economy coastal communities like Apalachicola, whose economic and
ecological interests are so closely tied as to be inseparable. When asked to choose
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between preserving nature or preserving jobs, though, most governments, particularly
poor governments like Bayou Petit Caillou and Biloxi with struggling economies and
declining revenue streams, almost always choose economic development over
sustainability (Wilson, 2000; Hansel et al., 2015).

Antifragile or Resilient?
The antifragility concept is useful for my analysis of variations in Gulf Coast
community change. To recap Taleb’s theory, explained in more depth in Chapter One,
when systems are antifragile, artificially stabilizing them by restricting their range of
environmental variations tends to make them fragile, or stagnant, if the induced fragility
provokes the collapse of a system’s ability to transform. In either case, restricting
variation, or increasing the resistance of the system itself to change, is dangerous. This
concept is useful in unpacking the meaning behind the shift in attitude among Bayou Petit
Caillou residents surveyed about the future of their community post-Hurricane Rita in
2006 (LA SPEAKS) and in 2017 (LA SAFE). In the former survey, residents
overwhelmingly demanded funding for flood mitigation projects that would reduce their
risk of exposure to water threats—literally restrict the range of environmental variations
they would experience and, by engineering resilience, create an equilibrium that would
provide them with a false sense of security, limit their ability to thrive, and, inadvertently,
make them more fragile. In the more recent LA SAFE survey, residents are finally
acknowledging that stability is not possible, and that it may even be harmful.
Writes science philosopher Gillian Barker (2017) about the contrast between
resilience and antifragility, “... a system that is too successful in resiliently returning to its
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current equilibrium state is also ultimately limited—incapable of transformation in
response to large environmental changes. No stage in the adaptive cycle is better than the
others; what is good is the ongoing activity of the cycle itself and its potential for
transformation. … striving to build resilience at all levels and locales at the same time is
bound to fail” (p. 580-581, emphasis in original).
Bayou Petit Caillou’s historical identity, strong attachment to place, and local
Cajun maritime heritage traditions created the cohesion and sense of purpose they needed
to mobilize, with the blinders off, to the uncertain, risky, fragile future of their coast. In
admitting to this fragility, the community is embracing uncertainty and disorder rather
than trying in a futile way to eliminate them; they are becoming antifragile.
The cases of Biloxi and Apalachicola reveal the dangers inherent in not
acknowledging adversity. In Biloxi, a near-singular reliance on casino gambling income
has created a never-ending boom-or-bust cycle that has severely limited locals’ ability to
not only bounce back, but to begin to dig out from its longtime overreliance on blackjack
and poker tables to pay its bills. At the same time, a growing impatience is emerging with
Biloxi’s fragility, its perpetual passiveness in the face of economic opportunity, and its
historic willingness to sacrifice just about anything (a healthy fishery, barrier island
protections, historic neighborhoods) to expand its tax base. Increasing calls for a blue
economy approach, complete with a new regional emphasis on enhancing livelihoods,
building a more cohesive civic life, and funding more environmental protections, could
alter this course.
The graying of the Apalachicola fishing fleet is a symptom of the city’s lack of
livelihood diversity, its rural dis-connectivity to the region, and its overall fragility.
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Researchers suggest livelihood diversity is correlated with higher adaptive capacity in
that this diversity provides households with some ability to shift efforts away from
livelihoods that suffer environmental and economic shocks, thereby buffering against
impacts on food security or income (Mills et al., 2017). As an aging community,
Apalachicola’s livelihood dependency on the water has helped to create its current
predicament: a state of community vulnerability and uncertainty that has no endpoint.
The implications in terms of antifragility boil down to the dangers of specialization; the
traditional Apalachicola oyster tongers do well when the ecological conditions are just
right; they are exposed to near-insurmountable shocks downstream when pollution threats
force the state to shut down oyster beds or alter the overall health of the fishery. The
fragility of Apalachicola is further magnified by its lack of connectivity to the region. Its
remote location contributes to livelihood dependence on the commercial seafood
industry, which, among natural resource-based livelihoods, is relatively stable. With its
year-round source of food and income, fishing is less subject to shocks than crop or
livestock farming (Mills et al., 2017).
However, families in rural economies like Apalachicola rarely hold the power to
invest, relocate, or switch their efforts from one poorly performing livelihood to one that
reaps more rewards. Instead, disruptions like the 2012 oyster crisis often leaves poorer
households more exposed and potentially caught in a structural poverty trap. The solution
is the argument presented in the still-unfolding Florida v. Georgia Supreme Court case.
In the war over water, Florida is pushing for regulation to reduce pressure on downstream
resources as well as tri-state compromises and reforms that improve resource governance.
In their study of improving livelihoods and managing resources on Atauro Island, Timor-
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Leste, Mills et al. (2017) found that structural realities faced by rural coastal communities
cannot be overcome through local or livelihood-based interventions; their research
emphasizes the need for cross-sector engagements in both policy development and
intervention planning.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion

The justification for this study lies in what has not been answered, or satisfactorily
addressed to date, about how specific coastal transformation processes unfold at the local
level, over time, in the context of complex and overlapping forces ranging from water
insecurity and hurricane-induced physical destruction of the built environment to the
collapse of the Gulf Coast commercial fishing economy to the political might of
municipal growth machines. The gaps or unanswered questions in the literature on
coastal gentrification, tourism, and urban political and historical ecology provide the
rationale and ultimately the justification for the multiple-case-study research design. By
weaving multiple lines of inquiry into a holistic, historically rooted study of coastal
community change, this work contributes to deepening knowledge of local reactions to
external growth pressures and to deepening understanding of the broader conceptual,
institutional, and economic structures that shape events.
This research makes a valuable contribution to the emerging literature on coastal
gentrification and local responses to external development pressures. Its focus on the
largely unstudied locus of the Gulf Coast and emphasis on how hurricanes and other
calamitous events inspire ever-bolder plans for coastal change make this research timely
and relevant, particularly in light of forecasts which predict no ebb in hurricane intensity,
sea level rise and other water-security threats over the next decade. The need to
understand how at-risk coastal communities cope with pressures to transform
economically, socially, and politically is great in terms of developing coastal and
fisheries-related policies that contribute to the livelihood and survivability of the
increasingly populated coastal reaches of the United States.
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The specific research goals of this project also provide insight into the study’s
limitations. To restate, there are four overarching goals of this research and four specific
questions. The four research goals are:
1. To chronicle the evolution of local environmental, planning, social, political, and
economic policies that have allowed for tourism development activities to flourish
along the northern Gulf of Mexico since the early twentieth century
2. To connect tourism development in coastal communities to gentrification theory,
particularly its most recent offspring rural, coastal and green gentrification, by
building on the author’s previous research on rural gentrification in Louisiana’s
coastal communities
3. To examine the impact of tourism-induced development on economic, cultural,
and social change, using indicators such as population growth, migration, new
growth, and urban development
4. To develop a new line of inquiry about these dynamics by bridging theories from
several research areas.

To better grasp the local process of change based on Gulf Coast tourism
development patterns, this study seeks to answer four research questions:
1. How are coastal communities experiencing economic transitions caused by
coastal tourism interests?
2. How are external development interests able to influence local economic,
political, social and environmental conditions to promote their agendas?
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3. What are the outcomes of these gentrification and development interests on local
coastal communities?
4. What is characteristic of fishing communities’ responses to coastal land-use
pressures that makes them different from other places?

The rampant development of Martha’s Vineyard described in 1973 by the late
environmentalist Anne Simon forever altered the landscape and identity of one of the
coastal United States’s quintessential “battleground islands” (p. 3). By reason of
circumstances noted in this study, Gulf Coast fishing communities are late in confronting
the land use dilemmas other coastal places in the United States have been exposed to as
early as the turn of the nineteenth century. But all along the northern Gulf Coast is a
growing sense that while coastal cities, towns and villages are catching up to the
overdeveloped shores of the east and west coasts, the conditions facing communities on
America’s Third Coast are fundamentally different.
The Gulf Coast is a place of remarkable transformation. The boundaries that have
constrained lives and defined new possibilities have opened up significantly over the past
forty years. For communities that have long depended upon the independence of
operating their own fishing enterprises or the flexible, seasonal rhythms of a resourcebased economy, there are many adjustments and implications for social relations that, in
some cases, will take decades more to realize.
Uprooted families, loss of isolation, and disrupted livelihoods are offshoots of
coastal capitalism that deeply limit choice. The incursions of globalization through
restructuring in the agro-food industry and aquaculture; the loss of a reliable, year-round
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fishery through regulatory regimes, government interventions and pollution; and the
growing influences of tourism, technology, and second-home developments have all
contributed to changing the trajectory of once isolated, familial and ethnically
homogenous fishing communities.
Although the U.S. Gulf Coast’s problems are diverse, critical, and understudied,
they are not new. From the creation of the shrimp industry in Bayou Petit Caillou, to the
preservation of the Apalachicola working waterfront, to the devil’s bargain of legalized
gambling in Biloxi, this study uncovers the numerous schemes, structures, laws, and
policies that have been deployed to shape the future of three coastal communities over the
course of a century—these are intriguing precedents and patterns that were deliberately
created, cultivated and crafted by each community, for each community, to survive not
only the booms and the busts, but also the chronic pain of living, working and doing
business in a persistently at-risk and disaster-prone coastline.
If the end is also the beginning, the lived experience of adaptation and
antifragility will be part of the Gulf Coast’s story in the next one hundred-plus years. If
water, policy, and society were the larger themes of the twentieth century—what
historian James Cobb calls the “selling of the South” in post-World War II America,
accomplished in large measure through changes in tax codes favorable to industry and
environmental regulations that encouraged developers to turn fragile coastal ecosystems
into valuable real estate (Kahrl, 2012)—then the twenty-first century will be filled with
rapid-cycle tests of change that will force communities like Bayou Petit Caillou,
Apalachicola and Biloxi to act quickly, pull together around regional consensus, and
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resist the push of outside development interests to continue privatizing the coast into
fortresses of exclusion.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Operational Definitions

Coastal tourism and coastal gentrification: Coastal tourism in the United States started in
the 19th century and has increased in non-linear fashion ever since, stimulated by a
combination of developments in transport technology and rising prosperity (Davenport
and Davenport 2006) as well as growing interest in rural or “wild” recreational
experiences. Over the past thirty years, coastal counties have shifted from traditional
maritime activities such as fishing and boating to a more service-oriented and tourismdependent economy. This coastal tourism economy encompasses leisure and recreational
activities such as swimming; recreational fishing; snorkeling and diving, recreational
boating and cruises that occur in the coastal zone and in offshore coastal waters. Also
included are establishments such as hotels; resorts and restaurants; and the sectors that
support coastal development such as retail businesses; marinas; fishing tackle stores; dive
shops; fishing piers; recreational boating harbors; beaches; and recreational fishing
facilities. Coastal gentrification is a process that includes a growth in tourism and its
associated dislocating, often disruptive forces of economic development, as well as a shift
from a maritime-based to a service-based economy. Coastal zones around the world are
experiencing gentrification pressures that are expected to become even more intense as
the population continues its shift toward the sea. Researchers predict growth to continue
in the coastal zone, universally displacing native populations and traditional economies
because of the political power of pro-growth coalitions (Charlier and Bologa 2003;
Griffith 2000; Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997).
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Coastal urbanization: Urbanization is often referred to as either the degree of or
increase in urban character or nature, and may either refer to a geographical area
combining urban and rural areas, or to the transformation of areas to greater urban
development. The term may be used to describe a condition at a specific time, namely the
proportion of total population or area in urban localities or regions, or the increase of this
proportion over time (since 1970 in this case). Coastal counties within 80 kilometers of
the coast make up only 13 percent of the land area of the continental United States, but
this area encompasses 51 percent of the population (Rappaport and Sachs 2003).
Commercial fishing: Commercial fishing can generally be thought of as fishing
for a commercial purpose, e.g., to sell a catch. The commercial fishing industry along the
northern Gulf of Mexico, including the five states with voting members on the Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council, is characterized by (1) individual fisher-operators
who act in ways similar to small business owners, and (2) commercial fishing companies.
This research focuses mainly on individual fishers who own their boats, work
independently, catch their fish in state or federally controlled waters (but usually not
both), and sell their daily or weekly catches to processing docks and the general public.
Historically, individual fishers who work in the commercial fishing field have
characterized the Gulf of Mexico’s commercial fishing industry, with generations of
families participating in the commercial fishing process by passing down boats and
fishing techniques to sons and daughters. The five coastal states bordering the Gulf of
Mexico – Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida – require commercial
fishers and commercial boat captains to obtain commercial fishing licenses, thereby
allowing for the statistical tracking of boat operators and their annual catches (in
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poundage and value). Licenses also are required for wholesale, retail and bait fish dealers
who sell commercially-caught products to consumers, including the general public, hotels
and restaurants.
Commercial fishing community: A commercial fishing community is being
operationalized here to include, since 1970, current or former coastal fishing
communities as defined by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Reauthorization Act of 2006. The act states that a fishing community is “a
community which is substantially dependent on or substantially engaged in the harvesting
or processing of fishery resources to meet social and economic needs.” Considered in the
research are two types of commercial fishing communities: (1) Gulf Coast communities
in which catching fish commercially is a current, primary economic indicator and (2)
Gulf Coast communities that had commercial fishing as their main economic base from
1970 but have since seen new industries such as tourism and sports fishing replace the
resource-extraction-based commercial fishing.
Fishing: Fishing has been a popular human activity since ancient times and
remains important for generating food, income, and to satisfy various non-consumptive
needs (Arlinghaus and Cowx 2002). Globally, marine and freshwater fish stocks are
facing a number of threats from anthropogenic stress (e.g., exotic species invasions,
hydropower generation, land use, pollution, eutrophication, aquaculture, pollution and
displacement, habitat loss or change, river fragmentation, flow regulation, and
navigation; see Cowx 2002). The loss of fish biodiversity is a matter of global concern
not only because of the associated loss of substantial intrinsic, ethical or cultural values,
but also because it has numerous consequences for human life-support systems. Fishing
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can be commercially, economically, and culturally driven, or practiced solely for
recreational purposes.
Livelihoods: Livelihoods are “… a set of capabilities, activities and assets
(including both material and social resources) that contribute to a means of living.”
Rural gentrification: Rural gentrification can be seen as one of many recent
examples of how restructuring space perpetuates uneven geographies of affluence,
deprivation and exclusionary processes of change (Atkinson 2006). Notably, these
include pervasive forms of urban and rural gentrification (Phillips 2004). Davidson and
Lees (2005) argue, for example, that social groups with relatively low stocks of economic
capital are often constrained from acting as pioneer gentrifiers – as networks of powerful
institutional actors dictate the (re)production of gentrified spaces; arguably symptomatic
of the political hegemony of neoliberal ideology (AND. Smith 2002). Gentrification in
the rural setting exhibits many of the same phenomena as urban gentrification, as
exemplified by the supply and production of privatized spaces for corporate global
consumption, large-scale mega-projects, gated communities, and ‘highest and best use’
planning and policy regimes (Atkinson 2003; Lees 2003). Such readings can be
transposed to the rural context, and may be essential for understanding why more places
are susceptible to rural gentrification (Phillips 2004, 2005) and increasingly take the form
of privatized and gated developments (D.P. Smith 2007).
Second homes: Second homes can be seen as an extension of urbanization as a
central feature of modernization. As leisure time expands due to globalization, more
energy can be diverted to recreating. Rather than gazing at spectacular sites and
documenting new experiences, what matters to second home owners is inhabiting places
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(Haldrup 2004). Second homes take many forms, including personal vacation properties,
timeshares, sale and leasebacks and rental homes. They are often attractive to families
and well-off city dwellers who generally live within a weekend recreational commutable
driving distance to the second home; as a result, second homes are often built in amenityrich areas and the hinterlands of cities. Second home developments can be characterized
as elite landscapes that are enclosed, protected zones for wealthy vacationers.
Researchers generally agree that the owners of second homes are members of the upper
middle class, or higher-status members of the middle class making between $250,000 and
$500,000 annually (Coppock 1977; Gallant et al. 2003, 2004: Hall and Müller, 2004).
Sports fishing/recreational fishing: Sports or recreational fishers (the terms are
used interchangeably here) fish for pleasure. They capture a feed of fish for personal
consumption, their primary motive being leisure, not profit. National laws forbid the sale,
barter, or trade of recreationally caught catches. Because they do not rely on the fish as a
source of income, the philosophies and tactics used by sports fishers are markedly
different from what recreational anglers term “feed fishing,” or commercial fishing.
Sports fishers and the associations and lobbying groups to which many belong support
sustainable fishing practices that limit the activities of commercial fishers and, ideally,
increase fish stocks for the fish they net. Sports fishers commonly argue that intensive
commercial fishing can lead to stock declines and species extinction and induce
ecosystem regime shifts. As commercial fishing declines, recreational fishing is coming
to be seen as comparatively more important, involving millions more people, and thus
contributing in the view of the urban growth machine substantial economic benefits.
Today, angling is the sole or dominant use of fish stocks in most freshwater habitats and
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in many coastal areas in the industrialized societies of the temperate regions (Welcomme
2001; Arlinghaus and Cowx 2002; Coleman et al. 2004; Cooke and Cowx 2006). Even in
the developing countries, where most fishing still focuses on food security and
maximizing harvest of fish stocks for commercial or subsistence use, the importance of
angling is increasing (Cowx 2002), namely for tourism development.
Tourist: Given the multidisciplinary nature of the study of tourism, a clean and
precise definition of the tourist has not yet emerged from the literature on tourism (Pearce
1991; Theobold 1994; Shaw and Williams 2001). Holecek and Herbowicz (1995)
attribute the large number of definitions of tourism and the tourist not only to the
multifaceted nature of the concepts, but also to measurement issues. They argue that
when a theoretical definition conflicts with the realities of quantifying it, an alternative
definition is developed to bring the definition and measurement into congruence.
However, they note that most definitions are still based on travel experience outside of
one’s daily routine whose purpose is for pleasure. This research views tourism within the
broader framework of leisure and recreation. Although distinctions between tourism,
leisure, and recreation have often led to the development of separate strands of research,
there is an increasing awareness of the linkages between the three phenomena. This
research will focus on tourists as a group because available data does not make finer
distinctions.
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Appendix B: Dissertation Work Plan, 2007-2019
Dates
March 2007December 2007
October 2007December 2007
December 2007August 2009

August 2008 and
August 2009
2009-2011

2016-2018

May 2019

Tasks
Preparing for data collection; refining methodology
Exploratory phase: Document collection, preliminary field work
and preliminary analysis
Direct observations of sites began
Interviews
Direct observations
Ongoing data collection
Full-time schedule in case study sites May-August for two
summers
Preliminary analysis and production of a brief report on the first
year’s progress to satisfy the stipulations of a grant from the
RAND Gulf States Policy Institute
2010: Update grant report to RAND
Follow-up interviews
Complete transcriptions
Categorize and code data
Converge evidence
Write drafts of three case study chapters and cross-case analysis
Reexamine Florida chapter and case study to include “water
wars” tri-state environmental issue and Apalachicola oyster
industry collapse
Reexamine Mississippi chapter to include sports gambling
Reexamine Louisiana chapter to include climate change and
population resettlement
Revise three case study chapters and rewrite cross-case analysis
to be current through 2018
2018: Re-enroll in program
Degree Completion
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Appendix C: Interview Questions
Interview Questions – Non-fisher community stakeholders/leaders
1. How has life in your community changed, from as far back as you can recollect?
[Indicators are economic, cultural, social, political and environmental – hurricanes
and storms, pollution, land loss, etc., since 1960s]
2. When did you start noticing these changes?
3. What is your opinion of these changes? Have population changes or tourism
affected local markets or raised costs?
4. Tell me about the role you or your associates have played in these changes.
5. How have these changes altered your life and your family?
6. Who are the significant players at the local, state, and federal level in terms of the
various coastal industries? How do their choices influence local development?
7. Tell me what you imagine your community will look like in another fifty years.
8. Are you hopeful or concerned about your community’s future?
Interview Questions – Commercial Fishers
1. Tell me about your experiences as a commercial fisher in [insert community name
here].
2. How has the industry evolved during your career?
3. Take me back to when you first started fishing for a living. How were things back
then? How have they changed? Are other members of your family commercial
fishers?
4. What are the factors influencing you as a commercial fisher today? What are the
struggles? What keeps you on the water? What would you want changed?
5. What have the economic trends in the fishing industry been like, apart from
coastal development? What financial issues have you faced? Turnover of
ownership?
6. What is your relationship with recreational sports fishers?
7. Who are the significant players at the local, state, and federal level in terms of
your industry? How do their choices influence local development?
8. If you weren’t fishing, how would you make a living? What do people do if they
quit fishing?
9. Has the area you live in or fish in been in the path of other development? How has
that affected your life?
10. Tell me about your thoughts concerning the new land uses along the coast,
compared to when you started fishing.
11. Tell me about where you see the industry headed in the next fifty years.
Interview Questions – Sports Fishers
1. How long have you been a recreational fisher?
2. Talk to me about some of the major changes you’ve seen during this time.
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3. Describe what the fishery is like in [insert community here]. What areas do you
fish and what types of fish do you catch?
4. What are your experiences with recreational fishing in terms of how the sport has
changed with new policies, competition, and environmental regulations?
5. One of the things I’m interested in is recreational fishers and their relationships
with commercial fishers. Talk to me about the commercial fishers you come in
contact with.
6. Describe the activities you participate in as a recreational fisher.
7. [Questions 10-20 only for professional sports fishers]
Describe some of your clients, such as who they are, where they’re from and what
they’re looking for when they hire you.
8. Tell me about how you advertise or promote the business.
9. I’m really interested in what your day is like. Reconstruct your day for me from
the time you get up to the time you go to bed.
10. Describe some of the characteristics of the commercial and recreational fishing
industries. Tell me what you see as their distinguishing features.
11. Talk to me about your relationship to the commercial fishing industry.
12. In general, describe to me how the recreation fishing industry is different from
commercial fishing.
13. Describe how commercial fishing has changed since you became a charter boat
operator.
14. While recreation fishing is on the rise, commercial fishing is in decline. Can you
talk to me about what you have seen in your career that might help explain this?
15. As a charter boat captain, talk to me about what sorts of networks you rely on in
your business. In other words, in order for you to be successful, what factors need
to be in place?
16. How has the region [insert name] accommodated these needs?
17. Talk to me about what you see as the future of the recreation fishing industry, and
then the commercial fishing industry. Where do you see the two industries headed
over the next few decades?
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Appendix D: Case Study Questions and Sources of Data
1. How are coastal communities experiencing economic transitions caused by coastal
tourism interests and general economic restructuring due to a decline in the fishing
market?
Sources of Data:
-

Annual town (if available) and county budgets and property tax collection
records approximately since 1950; including Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana;
Harrison County, Mississippi; and Franklin County, Florida

-

Census date on hotel accommodations, including casinos, since 1950, in the
case-study areas

-

State industry and/or economic reports quantitatively measuring and itemizing
the value of annual fish catches and tourism dollars; including states of
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida; since 1950

-

Gulf States Marine Fisheries Commission economic records

-

U.S. Fisheries Department state data for the 1950-2018 time frame to establish
correlation

-

U.S. census data for the years 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010;
American FactFinder for recent years

-

Local newspaper records starting in 1950 (The Terrebonne Press, The Houma
Courier and The Times Picayune in Louisiana, The Sun Herald, The Gulfport
and Biloxi Mississippi Daily Herald and Mississippi Today in Mississippi, The
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Islander, Mobile Register, Mobile County News, and Mobile Daily Tribune in
southern Alabama, and The Times in Apalachicola)
-

National sources such as the monthly magazine National Fisherman;
magazine publication such as Southern Breeze: The Good Life on the Gulf
Coast and beachblvd; sports fishing and tourism industry publications, and
materials affiliated with relevant special interest groups such as the Gulf Coast
Conservation Association

-

Historical resources for each case-study community; including archives in
libraries and universities, city and/or county archives, county courthouse
records, photography archives, libraries, museums

-

Interviews with selected knowledgeable town and county real-estate experts;
fisheries officials; county accountants, mayors and other identified leaders;
local historians; fishermen, shrimpers, oyster catchers, processors, dealers,
packers, marina operators and others involved in the business from
Apalachicola, Florida to Cocodrie, Louisiana (see Interview Questions)

2. How are external development interests able to influence local economic, political,
social and environmental conditions to promote their agendas?
Sources of Data:
-

Interviews with planning directors, mayors, local actors, real estate leaders,
chambers of commerce heads (see Interview Questions)

-

City directories

-

Visits to former or current fishing communities; direct observations

283

-

Formal and informal meetings of fisheries, conservation, sports fishing and
commercial fishing groups (see Interview Questions)

-

Examination of county property tax records to determine who has historically
owned and controlled strategic land parcels and the use of harborfront
property

3. What are the outcomes of these gentrification and development interests on local
coastal communities?
- Cross-case analysis

4. What is characteristic of fishing communities’ responses to coastal land-use pressures
that makes them different from other places?
Sources of Data:
-

Federal and state legislative bodies formed to regulate, track, monitor and
shape policies affecting the seafood industry, to determine the economic
trends in the fishing industry beyond economic development

-

Agency reports, contract completion reports, planning documents,
management plans, newsletters, proceedings and other “grey literature”
related to fisheries agency-sponsored public meetings. Some of this literature
has been produced by social scientists of institutions geographically close to
the management agencies, ranging from major state universities to local
community-oriented teaching institutions without traditions of research. There
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is an abundance of this type of literature in existence; I will rely on and cite
only that material which is methodologically sound
-

Marine resource bulletins and annual reports of marine resource divisions in
each state

-

Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant Program, Louisiana Sea Grant and Florida
Sea Grant publications

-

Records of the acts and proceedings of the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Florida
legislatures, which provide materials on the deliberations and legislation of
the respective bodies and can be rich sources for cultural and institutional
histories.

-

Mapping networks of support groups, organizations, and other social networks
present in each coastal community to represent the interests of locals, such as
the Apalachicola Riverkeepers, Organized Fisherman of Florida, the
Louisiana Shrimp Association, Southern Shrimp Alliance, American Prawn
and Shrimp Growers Association, Mississippi Shrimp Association, Biloxi
Shrimp Festival and Heritage organization, Alabama Shrimp Association,
Organized Seafood Association of Alabama, and the Alabama Inland Shrimp
Producer’s Association

-

Interviews with current or former commercial fishers

-

Changes in land use patterns reflected in planning and zoning documents
before and after disasters
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